East Pomeranian offensive
The East Pomeranian offensive began on the 10th of February 1945 and ended on the 4th of April 1945. This operation involved the Soviet Red Army fighting against the German Wehrmacht in Pomerania and West Prussia. Marshal Konstantin Rokossovsky commanded the 2nd Belorussian Front during this campaign. His forces were initially ordered to advance westward north of the Vistula River toward Danzig. The primary goal was protecting the right flank of Zhukov's 1st Belorussian Front. Zhukov was pushing directly toward Berlin at that time. During the earlier East Prussian offensive, Stalin ordered Rokossovsky to wheel north toward Elbing instead. This decision left substantial German forces intact within Pomerania. These remaining troops threatened the right flank of Zhukov's advancing formations. Once the initial phase of the East Prussian offensive concluded, the 2nd Belorussian Front redeployed to attack westwards into Pomerania. The Soviets aimed to eliminate any possibility of a German counter-offensive from that region. Parallel Silesian offensives by Konev's 1st Ukrainian Front protected the 1st Belorussian Front's left flank. Securing these flanks delayed the final push toward Berlin until April. Originally, the Soviets planned to reach Berlin in February.
Army Group Vistula defended the sector under Colonel-General Walter Weiß. The 2nd Army held a large and exposed sector running through Pomerania eastward toward Elbing. German intelligence services deduced on the 13th of February that the Soviets would clear Pomerania before advancing on Berlin. Weiß sought permission to withdraw his forces but Adolf Hitler denied the request. Graudenz on the Vistula was surrounded on the 18th of February. The garrison from the 83rd Infantry Division surrendered the following month. The corps of the Second Army were seriously understrength by this time. They consisted largely of fragmentary or ad hoc units. The 3rd Panzer Army had been rebuilt using the korps of the recently formed 11th SS Panzer Army. Its original formation had been largely destroyed in Lithuania and East Prussia. Remnants now defended Königsberg. The XXXXVI Panzer Corps and VII Panzer Corps operated under Weiß. XXVII Army Corps and XXIII Corps also formed part of the defense line. XVIII Mountain Corps provided additional support along the front. Fortress garrisons of Graudenz and Danzig held key positions. The Eastern flank of 3rd Panzer Army included General Erhard Raus's command. III SS Panzer Corps and X SS Corps reinforced these defensive lines.
Rokossovsky opened the offensive on the 24th of February using fresh troops from Kozlov's 19th Army. An initial advance of some distance occurred before intense German resistance halted progress. On the 26th of February, he inserted the 3rd Guards Tank Corps east of Neustettin. This unit achieved a penetration that relieved Kozlov of command. The 3rd Guards Tank Corps broke through at Baldenburg while Neustettin fell to the 3rd Guards Cavalry Corps on the 27th of February. Weiß hurriedly assembled the VII Panzer Corps including remnants of the 7th Panzer Division at Rummelsburg. This force threatened 19th Army's flank but could not stop the Soviet advance. A breakthrough at Köslin on the 2nd of March cut the 2nd Army completely off from its Army Group. Zhukov's right wing went over to the offensive on the 1st of March. This grouping included the 3rd Shock Army and 1st and 2nd Guards Tank Armies. Their main force concentrated at Reetz struck northward. The entire left wing of 3rd Panzer Army was cut off after Guderian refused Raus' request for withdrawal. Forward Soviet tank units reached the Baltic on the 4th of March. German forces in Pomerania were trapped in a series of encirclements.
Many civilian refugees from Pomerania fled into the coastal town of Kolberg by the 4th of March. The town was surrounded by Soviet forces yet successfully defended until the 18th of March. Evacuation was almost complete by that time. The Danzig-Gotenhafen Fortified Area served as the main port for refugees escaping East Prussia westward. Saucken ordered this area defended for as long as possible to keep evacuation routes open. Rokossovsky opened his final offensive on the 15th of March 1945. The main thrust targeted the coast at Zoppot between Gdingen and Danzig. The 70th and 49th Army advanced in parallel toward this objective. Fighting remained savage throughout early March. By the 19th of March 1945, Soviet spearheads had reached heights over Zoppot. The 4th Panzer Division was pushed back to the outskirts of Danzig itself. On the 22nd of March 1945, the 70th Army reached the sea splitting the German defense. Gdingen fell on the 26th of March 1945 with defenders retreating to Oxhöft headland. They evacuated to the Hel Peninsula from there. Danzig finally fell on the 30th of March 1945 after which remnants of the 2nd Army withdrew southeast of the city. Evacuation continued until the 10th of May 1945. According to Soviet claims, Germans lost 39,000 soldiers dead and 10,000 captured during the Battle of Danzig.
Operation Hannibal represented a massive evacuation effort by the Kriegsmarine during this period. Many civilian refugees fled Pomerania into coastal towns like Kolberg before being surrounded. The Danzig-Gotenhafen Fortified Area became the main port for refugees escaping East Prussia westward. Saucken ordered defenses maintained as long as possible to keep these routes open. Evacuation of civilians and military personnel from Danzig and the Hel Peninsula continued until the 10th of May 1945. Refugees escaped through multiple points including the headland at Oxhöft. The Soviets declared the East Pomeranian offensive complete a week after the fall of Danzig. Mass displacement occurred across the region as advancing front lines forced movement. Thousands sought safety while fleeing toward the coast. Military units coordinated with naval forces to transport people away from combat zones. The scale of displacement reflected the urgency of the situation facing German civilians.
Joseph Stalin's decision to delay the push toward Berlin from February to April remains controversial among Soviet generals and historians. One side argues that securing Berlin much quicker in February was possible with lower losses. Another side contends leaving large German formations on the flanks could result in successful counter-attacks prolonging the war further. Germans did mount a surprise counter-offensive in Pomerania in mid-February known as Operation Solstice. The delay allowed Soviets to occupy significant parts of Austria during the Vienna offensive. Historical debates continue regarding whether the strategic choice saved lives or extended suffering. Military historians examine the trade-offs between speed and flank security throughout this campaign period.
Continue Browsing
Common questions
When did the East Pomeranian offensive begin and end?
The East Pomeranian offensive began on the 10th of February 1945 and ended on the 4th of April 1945. The operation involved Soviet Red Army forces fighting against the German Wehrmacht in Pomerania and West Prussia.
Who commanded the 2nd Belorussian Front during the East Pomeranian offensive?
Marshal Konstantin Rokossovsky commanded the 2nd Belorussian Front during this campaign. His forces were initially ordered to advance westward north of the Vistula River toward Danzig to protect Zhukov's right flank.
What was the primary goal of the East Pomeranian offensive for the Soviets?
The primary goal was protecting the right flank of Zhukov's 1st Belorussian Front while pushing directly toward Berlin. The Soviets aimed to eliminate any possibility of a German counter-offensive from that region before advancing further east.
How many soldiers did Germans lose dead and captured during the Battle of Danzig according to Soviet claims?
According to Soviet claims, Germans lost 39,000 soldiers dead and 10,000 captured during the Battle of Danzig. This battle concluded when Danzig finally fell on the 30th of March 1945 after which remnants of the 2nd Army withdrew southeast of the city.
Why did Stalin delay the push toward Berlin until April instead of February?
Stalin delayed the push toward Berlin to secure flanks by eliminating large German formations in Pomerania that threatened Zhukov's advancing formations. This decision allowed Soviets to occupy significant parts of Austria during the Vienna offensive but remained controversial among generals and historians.