Dehousing
On the 30th of March 1942, Professor Frederick Lindemann delivered a memorandum to Prime Minister Winston Churchill. This document proposed that destroying civilian housing in Germany would break enemy morale more effectively than killing relatives. Lindemann believed this approach could prevent the need for an invasion of Europe. The strategy relied on data from British cities during the Blitz. It argued that demolishing homes was the most effective way to affect public spirit. Documentation based on the Area bombing directive issued in February 1942 became known as the dehousing paper. Also called the Lindemann memorandum or Cherwell memorandum, it shaped British policy until 1945.
The debate over resources raged within the War Ministry throughout early 1942. Some officials wanted to reduce the Royal Air Force to fund the Army and Navy instead. Others pushed to expand strategic bombing operations. Sir Charles Portal, Chief of the Air Staff, claimed a force of 4,000 aircraft could destroy 43 German towns with populations over 100,000. He stated such a force might win the war in six months. Churchill expressed doubts about these claims but allowed Bomber Command to keep its planned allocation of materiel. Secretary of State for Air Sir Archibald Sinclair supported the paper despite reservations. Critics outside the Chiefs of Staff questioned whether resources were damaging other branches of the armed services.
Bomber Command faced severe limitations after the winter of 1941/1942. The Butt Report revealed that less than one third of sorties flew within five miles of their target. Actual accuracy was even lower at about 5% when excluding failures due to weather or equipment issues. Since November 1941, the RAF had been husbanding its resources while waiting for heavy bombers. The Short Stirling entered service in early 1941 followed by the Handley Page Halifax later that year. The Avro Lancaster arrived in mid-1942 alongside the GEE radio-navigational device. Attrition rates during operations gave poor returns on expended effort. Policy shifted away from precision bombing attempts as results remained consistently disappointing.
Professor Patrick Blackett wrote that the dehousing paper overestimated achievable results by 600%. He served as civilian Director of Naval Operational Research since January 1942. Sir Henry Tizard argued strategic bombing only tied up enemy resources defending Germany. He claimed a far smaller offensive could achieve similar effects. Tizard warned the War Cabinet might reach wrong decisions based on flawed data. He doubted new navigational aids would be ready before 1943. His calculations suggested no more than 25% of bombs would land on target. Cherwell replied that calculations were for the Prime Minister's benefit not statistical analysis. Max Hastings characterized the debate as one about resource allocation rather than total destruction.
The area bombing directive issued on the 14th of February 1942 authorized systematic destruction of German cities. Eight days later Arthur Harris took command of Bomber Command as Air Officer Commanding. The directive followed heated debates between military and scientific advisers. The Cabinet chose the strategic bombing campaign over all other options. This decision allowed Bomber Command to continue operations despite criticism from other branches. The policy aimed to destroy about 30% of housing stock in Germany's 58 largest cities. It marked a shift toward maximizing damage to civilian areas during raids.
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Common questions
What was the dehousing paper and who wrote it?
The dehousing paper, also known as the Lindemann memorandum or Cherwell memorandum, was a document written by Professor Frederick Lindemann. He delivered this memorandum to Prime Minister Winston Churchill on the 30th of March 1942.
When did the area bombing directive authorize systematic destruction of German cities?
The area bombing directive issued on the 14th of February 1942 authorized the systematic destruction of German cities. This policy aimed to destroy about 30% of housing stock in Germany's 58 largest cities.
How accurate were RAF bombing operations during early 1942 according to the Butt Report?
The Butt Report revealed that less than one third of sorties flew within five miles of their target. Actual accuracy was even lower at about 5% when excluding failures due to weather or equipment issues.
Who criticized the dehousing paper for overestimating achievable results?
Professor Patrick Blackett wrote that the dehousing paper overestimated achievable results by 600%. He served as civilian Director of Naval Operational Research since January 1942.
What did the Hull and Birmingham Survey conclude about public health after raids?
Research published on the 8th of April examined bombing effects on Hull and Birmingham conducted by Professors Bernal and Zuckerman. The study concluded there was no measurable effect on public health in both locations despite anxiety among residents following raids.