Battle of Uman

• 1. Operation Barbarossa Prelude

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  The Wehrmacht advanced eastward in the initial weeks of Operation Barbarossa, defeating several Soviet mechanized corps at the Battle of Brody between 23 and the 30th of June. Army Group South wedged its III and XXXXVIII Motorized Corps between the 5th and 6th Soviet armies. On the 7th of July, XXXXVIII Motorized Corps cracked a weak defense on the Stalin Line and began to move rapidly. This movement embraced the right flank of the 6th Army. A new Soviet counter-attack was attempted on the 9th of July in the direction of Berdychiv to prevent further advance of the 1st Panzer Group to the east. The fighting continued until the 16th of July when the 11th Panzer Division lost 2,000 men. Soviet troops failed and the German offensive continued on that same day. Further north, mobile units of the III Motorized Corps overcame the Stalin Line and reached the approaches to Kiev. Hitler and the High Command insisted on a strike in the southern direction while Army Group South intended to capture Kiev quickly. The compromise solution proposed capturing Belaya Tserkov before striking southwest towards the 11th Army.

• 2. Soviet Command And Order Of Battle

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  The Soviet forces were under overall command of the Southwestern Direction led by Marshal Semyon Budyonny. Colonel General Mikhail Kirponos commanded the Southwestern Front while General Ivan Tyulenev commanded the Southern Front. Lieutenant General I. N. Muzychenko led the 6th Army and Major General P. G. Ponedelin commanded the 12th Army. Most Soviet forces were severely depleted having withdrawn under heavy assaults from the Luftwaffe from the Polish border. Mechanised units were virtually reduced to a single Corps after the Brody counter-offensive with mechanised infantry now fighting as ordinary rifle troops. The 18th Army was originally part of the Southern Front until the 25th of July when it separated from the 6th and 12th armies. The 2nd Mechanised Corps transferred from the Southern Front at the end of July and was in better condition compared to other mechanized corps. It stood under direct command of the Front and did not belong to any specific army. The 26th Army initially occupied positions between the 6th and 12th armies before receiving orders on the 11th of July to leave the front.

• 3. German Encirclement Tactics

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  Since the 15th of July, the XLVIII Motorized Corps repulsed counter-attacks of the Soviet Berdichev Group and resumed the offensive. The 16th Panzer Division broke resistance and seized Kazatin which sat 25 km from Berdychiv. On the left, the 11th Panzer division operated in the gap between Soviet armies making a deep 70 km breakthrough to the South-East by the 16th of July. By the 18th of July that division advanced another 50 km crossing the Ros River and captured Stavishche. Franz Halder chief of OKH irritably wrote on the 18th of July that the operation of Army Group South was increasingly losing its shape. He noted the enveloping flank of the 1st Panzer Group still hung about in the area of Berdichev and Belaya Tserkov. Units of the Army Group Center had to hit the South and North to surround Soviet troops instead of attacking Moscow. The close task of Army Group South became encircling the 6th and 12th Soviet armies West of the Dnieper. German tanks of XXXXVIII and XIV Motorized corps had already broken through the retreat line planned by Soviet command.

• 4. The Uman Cauldron Battles

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  On the 31st of July the 1st Mountain Division captured Golovanevsk located 45 km south-southeast of Uman. On the same day Soviet troops left Uman leaving the 6th and 12th armies on territory around 40x40 km surrounded from all sides except the south. The Soviet command mistakenly believed Germans would immediately move east to crossings over the Dnieper. By the 1st of August the German command refused plans to surround the 18th Army of the Southern Front in addition to existing forces. They directed XXXXIX Mountain Corps along the shortest path to finish surrounding near Uman. On the morning of the 1st of August commands of the 6th and 12th armies sent a joint communication stating the situation was critical with no reserves or ammunition. Fuel was running out for the combined combat order of both armies. Tyulenev assured Stalin that the situation would be restored but denied any supply difficulties. On the 2nd of August units of the 1st Mountain Division reached the Sinyuha River where they joined the 9th Panzer Division of XIV Motorized Corps. The ring of encirclement closed but remained weak until reinforced by a second joining when German 16th Panzer Division met Hungarian Mobile Corps in Pervomaysk.

• 5. Human Cost And Prisoner Of War Status

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  On the night of the 6th of August Soviet troops made a desperate attempt to break out of the encirclement striking south towards the 18th Army. Detachments of the 1st and 4th Mountain divisions failed to stop the night breakthrough as Soviet strike forces marched 20 km taking Golovanevsk. Instead of friendly units they encountered German troops of LII Army Corps and 9th Panzer Division and were stopped. By the morning of the 7th of August most groups were routed with only small parties without heavy weapons exiting the encirclement. The Special Task column was annihilated and commander Muzychenko taken prisoner. Parts of the predominantly 12th Army broke through to east and north-east on the following night. Commander Ponedelin was taken prisoner after his tank was hit while commissars left months later. On afternoon of the 7th of August Soviet troops surrounded in forests near villages including Green Brama forest began surrendering. Four corps commanders and 11 division commanders joined the two army commanders in captivity. By the 5th of August territory held by surrounded Soviet troops measured roughly 10x10 km and sat under total fire from German artillery.