Battle of Kursk
The summer of 1943 brought a massive tank battle near Kursk in southwestern Russia between Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union. This engagement became the single largest battle in the history of warfare, ranking only behind the Battle of Stalingrad as the most cited turning point in the European theatre. The conflict began with Operation Citadel on the 5th of July, an offensive designed to pinch off the Kursk salient from both north and south simultaneously. German leaders hoped to weaken Soviet offensive potential for that summer by cutting off forces they anticipated would be trapped within the bulge. Hitler believed victory here would reassert German strength and improve his prestige with allies who were considering withdrawing from the war. He also expected large numbers of Soviet prisoners to be captured for use as slave labor in the German armaments industry. By January 1943, a gap had opened between German Army Group B and Army Group Don, threatening to cut off all German forces south of the Don River. Field Marshal Erich von Manstein received approval from Hitler for a counteroffensive against Soviet forces advancing in the Donbas region on the 6th of February 1943. On the 12th of February 1943, remaining German forces were reorganized into Army Group South under Manstein's command. The operation commenced on the 21st of February when General Hoth launched a counter-attack with the 4th Panzer Army. German forces retaking Kharkov on the 15th of March and Belgorod on the 18th of March left a Soviet salient extending from north to south and east to west into German control. This strategic situation centered on the city of Kursk created the conditions for the massive battle that followed.
Hitler signed Operational Order No. 5 on the 13th of March 1943 authorizing several offensives including one against the Kursk salient. Manstein attempted to persuade Günther von Kluge to immediately attack the Central Front but Kluge refused believing his forces were too weak. By mid-April poor weather and exhausted German forces led to postponement of these offensives. Hitler issued Operational Order No. 6 on the 15th of April calling for Operation Citadel to begin on the 3rd of May or shortly thereafter. Kurt Zeitzler drafted this directive emphasizing the need to attack before Soviets could prepare extensive defenses. Model met with Hitler on the 27th of April expressing concern about intelligence showing Red Army constructing strong positions at the shoulders of the salient. He argued that longer preparation phases made the operation less justified and recommended abandoning it entirely. Hitler called senior officers to Munich for a meeting on the 4th of May where he spoke for about 45 minutes on reasons to postpone the attack. Manstein advocated an early attack while requesting two additional infantry divisions which Hitler said were unavailable. General Heinz Guderian argued strongly against the operation stating the attack was pointless. The conference ended without Hitler coming to a decision though Citadel was not aborted. Three days later OKW postponed the launch date for Citadel to the 12th of June. Guderian continued voicing concerns over an operation likely to degrade panzer forces he had been attempting to rebuild. In a meeting with Hitler on the 10th of May he asked if the thought turned his stomach. Hitler replied I know. The thought of it turns my stomach. Guderian concluded in that case your reaction is correct. Leave it alone. Despite reservations Hitler remained committed to the offensive focusing more on expected new weapons like the Panther tank and Tiger heavy tank. He postponed the operation repeatedly to await their arrival receiving reports of powerful Soviet concentrations behind Kursk area. Alfred Jodl instructed armed forces propaganda office to portray the upcoming operation as a limited counteroffensive in July 1943. Due to concerns of Allied landings in southern France or Italy delays in tank deliveries led Hitler to postpone again until the 20th of June. Zeitzler was profoundly concerned with delays but still supported the offensive. On 17, the 18th of June following discussion where OKW Operations Staff suggested abandoning the offensive Hitler further postponed until the 3rd of July then announced the 5th of July as launch date.
Soviet intelligence received information about German troop concentrations spotted at Orel and Kharkov through the Lucy spy ring in Switzerland. They verified this via John Cairncross at Bletchley Park who forwarded raw decrypts directly to Moscow. Stalin notified Anastas Mikoyan on the 27th of March 1943 of possible German attack in Kursk sector. Zhukov wrote to Stavka and Stalin on the 8th of April recommending strategic defensive before going on offensive. Stalin consulted frontline commanders from 12 to the 15th of April 1943 agreeing Germans would probably target Kursk. Preparation of defenses began by end of April continuing until German attack in early July. The Central Front commanded by Konstantin Rokossovsky defended northern face while Voronezh Front under Nikolai Vatutin defended southern face. Steppe Front commanded by Ivan Konev waited in reserve. Both fronts constructed three main defensive belts subdivided into several zones of fortification. Over 300,000 civilians labored constructing these positions creating an interconnected web of minefields barbed-wire fences anti-tank ditches deep entrenchments machine-gun bunkers and dug-in armored vehicles. Behind three main belts were three more fallback positions bringing total depth to nearly 100 kilometers. Voronezh and Central Fronts dug over 600 kilometers of trenches laid in criss-cross pattern for ease of movement. Red Army combat engineers laid 503,993 anti-tank mines and 439,348 anti-personnel mines with highest concentration in first belt. Minefield densities reached 2,500 anti-personnel and 2,200 anti-tank mines per kilometer six times density used defending Moscow. For example 6th Guards Army spread over nearly 100 kilometers protected by 69,688 anti-tank and 64,430 anti-personnel mines in first belt plus further reserves. Mobile obstacle detachments functioned as anti-tank reserves at every command level consisting of two platoons of combat engineers with division-level mines or one company equipped with 500, 700 mines at corps level. Nearly all artillery including howitzers guns anti-aircraft weapons and rockets tasked with anti-tank defense. Dug-in tanks and self-propelled guns strengthened these defenses incorporating into every command level mostly as strong points concentrated on likely attack routes. Soldiers received special training overcoming tank phobia through exercises called ironing where tanks drove overhead until fear disappeared. Financial rewards promised 1,000 roubles bounty for each destroyed tank. Soviet deception efforts included camouflaging gun emplacements constructing dummy airfields generating false radio traffic spreading rumors among troops and civilians. Movement of forces occurred only at night while fires were forbidden and motor transport restricted around hidden command posts. German estimates mid-June placed total Soviet armored strength at 1,500 tanks vastly underestimating actual numbers.
Model's main attack delivered by XLVII Panzer Corps supported by 45 Tigers from attached 505th Heavy Tank Battalion began at 05:30 on the 5th of July. Nine infantry divisions and one panzer division pushed forward against Central Front deployed in three heavily fortified defensive belts. Jan Möschen later commented Model expected breakthrough on second day believing briefest delay would give Red Army time to react. Two companies of Tiger tanks attached to 6th Infantry Division formed largest single grouping employed that day. The 20th Panzer and 6th Infantry Divisions spearheaded advance behind which remaining two panzer divisions followed ready to exploit any breach. Heavily mined terrain slowed progress though safe lanes cleared through minefield by 08:00. Information obtained from prisoner interrogation identified weakness at boundary between 15th and 81st Rifle Divisions caused by preliminary bombardment. Tigers redeployed striking toward this area countered by force of around 90 T-34s. In resulting three-hour battle Red Army lost 42 tanks while Germans lost two Tigers plus five more immobilized with track damage. While first belt breached fighting delayed Germans long enough for rest of 29th Rifle Corps to seal breach. Of 653rd Heavy Panzerjäger Battalion's 45 Ferdinands sent into battle all but 12 immobilized by mine damage before 17:00. Most later repaired returned service though recovery difficult due to vehicle size. XLVII Panzer Corps penetrated Red Army lines before stalling while XLI Panzer Corps reached heavily fortified small town of Ponyri controlling roads railways leading south to Kursk. German advance cost 1,287 men killed missing plus 5,921 wounded. Rokossovsky ordered counterattack following day on the 6th of July using 17th Guards and 18th Guards Rifle Corps backed by close air support. Only 16th Tank Corps commenced attack dawn after artillery barrage fielding about 200 tanks attacking XLVII Panzer Corps running into Tiger tanks knocking out 69 tanks forcing withdrawal. Later morning XLVII responded attacking 17th Guards Rifle Corps entrenched around village Olkhovatka in second defensive belt. Attack spearheaded by 24 serviceable Tigers failed breaking Red Army defense suffering heavy casualties. Olkhovatka provided clear view much frontline allowing Soviets to observe enemy movements. At 18:30 19th Tank Corps joined further bolstering resistance. Rokossovsky decided dig remaining tanks minimizing exposure. Ponyri defended by 307th Rifle Division attacked concertedly on the 6th of July by German divisions unable dislodging defenders from heavily fortified village. Over next three days Model concentrated effort at Ponyri and Olkhovatka both sides considering vital positions. Germans captured half town after intense house-to-house fighting the 7th of July though Soviet counterattack forced withdrawal series of exchanges ensued control exchanged several times over following days. By the 10th of July Germans secured most town but Soviet counterattacks continued back-and-forth battles referred as mini-Stalingrad or Stalingrad of Kursk salient by historian Paul Carell. War diary described heavy fighting as new type mobile attrition battle. Attacks on Olkhovatka and nearby Teploe failed penetrating Soviet defenses including powerful concerted attack the 10th of July by about 300 German tanks supported every available Luftwaffe air power northern face. By the 10th of July Soviets completely halted German advance launching Operation Kutuzov the 12th of July threatening flank rear of Model's 9th Army.
German attack commenced around 04:00 on the 5th of July with preliminary bombardment expending more shells in fifty minutes than combined total fired during Polish Campaign French Campaign. Manstein's main attack delivered by Hoth's 4th Panzer Army organized into densely concentrated spearheads regarded as most powerful striking force ever assembled under single German commander. XLVIII Panzer Corps included strongest division Großdeutschland supported flanks by 3rd and 11th Panzer Divisions supplemented company of 15 Tiger tanks spearheading attack. At dawn Großdeutschland advanced three-kilometer front upon 67th Guards Rifle Division Panzerfüsilier Regiment advancing left wing stalled minefield subsequently immobilizing 36 Panthers stranded regiment subjected barrage anti-tank artillery fire inflicting numerous casualties. Engineers moved clearing paths suffering casualties while combination fierce resistance marshy terrain south Berezovyy stream bogged down regiment once more. Despite fighting marshy terrain surrounding Berezovyy stream regiment resumed advance toward Gertsovka ensuing battle many casualties including regimental commander Colonel Kassnitz. Tanks deployed Panzerkeil arrow formation minimizing effects Soviet Pakfront defense Tigers leading Panzer IIIs IVs assault guns fanning out flanks rear followed infantry combat engineers. Attempts VVS impede advance repulsed Luftwaffe. 3rd Panzer Division advancing left flank made good progress end day captured Gertsovka reaching Mikhailovka. 167th Infantry Division right flank 11th Panzer Division also made sufficient progress reaching Tirechnoe end day. By end the 5th of July wedge created first belt Soviet defenses. To east night 4, the 5th of July SS combat engineers infiltrated no-man's land clearing lanes through Soviet minefields. At dawn the 5th of July three divisions II SS Panzer Corps attacked 52nd Guards Rifle Division main assault led spearhead 42 Tigers among 494 tanks attacking twelve-kilometer front. Totenkopf strongest division advanced Gremuchhi screening right flank. 1st SS Panzergrenadier Division advanced left flank towards Bykovka while 2nd SS Panzer Division advanced between two formations center. Following closely behind tanks infantry combat engineers coming forward demolishing obstacles clearing trenches. Advance well supported Luftwaffe greatly aiding breaking Soviet strong points artillery positions. By 09:00 II SS Panzer Corps broke through Soviet first belt entire front. While probing positions between first second belts at 13:00 2nd SS Panzer Division vanguard came fire from two T-34 tanks destroyed forty more soon engaged division. 1st Guards Tank Army clashed four-hour battle resulting Soviet tanks withdrawing engagement bought time units 23rd Soviet Guards Rifle Corps lodged second belt prepare reinforced additional anti-tank guns. By early evening 2nd SS Panzer Division reached minefields perimeter second belt. 1st SS Division secured Bykovka by 16:10 then pushed forward toward second belt Yakovlevo attempts break-through rebuffed end day sustained 97 dead 522 wounded 17 missing lost about 30 tanks. Together with 2nd SS Panzer Division forced wedge far into defenses 6th Guards Army. 3rd SS Panzer Division made slow progress managing isolate 155th Guards Regiment but sweeping regiment eastward flank neighboring 375th Rifle Division failed when regiment reinforced 96th Tank Brigade. Hausser commander II SS Panzer Corps requested aid III Panzer Corps right had no units spare. End day 3rd SS Division made very limited progress partly tributary Donets river lack progress undermined advance sister divisions exposing right flank corps Soviet forces. Temperatures reaching over 30 degrees Celsius frequent thunderstorms made fighting conditions difficult. 6th Guards Army confronting attack XLVIII Panzer Korps II SS Panzer Korps reinforced tanks 1st Tank Army 2nd Guards Tank Corps 5th Guards Tank Corps. 51st and 90th Guards Rifle divisions moved vicinity Pokrovka path 1st SS Panzer Division. 93rd Guards Rifle Division deployed further back along road leading from Pokrovka to Prokhorovka.
By 1943 Luftwaffe strength Eastern Front started weakening after Stalingrad siphoning resources North Africa fighter units shifted Germany defend escalating Allied bombing campaign. By end June only 38.7 percent Luftwaffe total aircraft remained east. In 1943 Luftwaffe could still achieve local aerial superiority concentrating forces majority German aircraft left available Eastern Front slated Citadel goal remain unchanged priority gain aerial supremacy then isolate battlefield enemy reinforcements finally render close air support critical point reached land battle. Changing strengths prompted Luftwaffe make operational changes previous offensive campaigns initiated raids opposing airfields achieving aerial superiority realized aircraft easily replaced making such raids futile mission abandoned. Previous campaigns used medium bombers flying well behind frontline block arrival reinforcements rarely attempted during Citadel. Luftwaffe command understood support crucial success Citadel problems supply shortfalls hampered preparations. Partisan activity particularly behind Army Group Center slowed rate resupply cutting short ability build essential stockpiles petrol oil lubricants engines munitions unlike Red Army units there were no reserves aircraft replace damaged aircraft over course operation. Fuel most significant limiting factor. To help build supplies support Citadel Luftwaffe greatly curtailed operations last week June despite conservation resources did not have resources sustain intensive air effort more than few days operation began. For Citadel Luftwaffe confined operations direct support forces ground continued use Junkers Ju 87 Stuka dive-bombers new development Bordkanone 3,7 cm cannon one slung under each wing gun pod half Stuka groups assigned support Citadel equipped Kanonenvogel literally cannon-bird tankbuster aircraft. Air groups strengthened recent arrival Henschel Hs 129 30 mm MK 103 cannon F-subtype ground attack jabbo version Focke-Wulf Fw 190. Months preceding battle Luftflotte 6 supporting Army Group Center noted marked increase strength opposing VVS formations displayed better training flying improved equipment greater aggressiveness skill than Luftwaffe seen earlier. Introduction Yakovlev Yak-9 Lavochkin La-5 fighters gave Soviet pilots near parity terms equipment. Furthermore large numbers ground-attack aircraft Ilyushin Il-2 Shturmovik Pe-2 available well. VVS fielded large numbers aircraft supplied via lend-lease huge stockpiles supplies ample reserves replacement aircraft Red Army VVS formations able conduct extended campaign slackening intensity effort. Luftwaffe lost 26 aircraft the 5th of July compared to 176 lost by VVS 16th Air Army operating northern face lighter losses suffered 2nd Air Army. Luftwaffe gained maintain air superiority southern face until 10, the 11th of July when VVS began obtain ascendancy control skies northern face evenly contested until VVS began gain air superiority the 7th of July maintained rest operation.
Battle Kursk became final strategic offensive Germans able launch Eastern Front. Allied invasion Sicily began during battle forcing Hitler divert troops training France meet Allied threat Mediterranean rather using strategic reserve Eastern Front. Result Hitler cancelled offensive Kursk after only week part divert forces Italy. Germany heavy losses men tanks ensured victorious Soviet Red Army held strategic initiative remainder war. Battle first time Second World War German strategic offensive halted before break through enemy defenses penetrate strategic depths. Though Red Army succeeded winter offensives previously counter-offensives after German attack Kursk first successful summer offensives war. Battle called last gasp Nazi aggression. By the 10th of July Soviets completely halted German advance launching Operation Kutuzov the 12th of July threatening flank rear Model's 9th Army. 12th Panzer Division thus far held reserve slated commit northern side Kursk salient along 36th Motorized Infantry 18th Panzer 20th Panzer Divisions redeployed face Soviet spearheads. On the 7th of July 5th Guards Tank Army began advancing Prokhorovka Lieutenant General Pavel Rotmistrov described journey 10th Tank Corps then still subordinate 5th Guards Army rushed ahead rest army arriving Prokhorovka night the 7th of July. Ivan Konev objected premature piecemeal commitment strategic reserves but personal call Stalin silenced complaints. Zhukov ordered 17th Air Army serving Southwestern Front support 2nd Air Army serving Voronezh Front. By evening the 6th of July Voronezh Front committed all reserves except three rifle divisions under 69th Army yet could not decisively contain 4th Panzer Army. XLVIII Panzer Corps Oboyan axis third defensive belt mostly unoccupied now had Red Army second defensive belt blocking breakthrough into unfortified Soviet rear forced Stavka commit strategic reserves reinforce Voronezh Front 5th Guards 5th Guards Tank Armies both Steppe Front 2nd Tank Corps Southwestern Front. Germans hoped weaken Soviet offensive potential summer cutting enveloping forces anticipated within Kursk salient Hitler believed victory reassert German strength improve prestige allies considering withdrawing war expected large numbers Soviet prisoners captured used slave labor German armaments industry.
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Common questions
When did the Battle of Kursk begin and what was its official name?
The Battle of Kursk began on the 5th of July 1943 with the launch of Operation Citadel. This massive tank battle took place near Kursk in southwestern Russia between Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union during the summer of 1943.
Who commanded the German forces at the Battle of Kursk and which units were involved?
Field Marshal Erich von Manstein led the southern attack while General Walter Model directed the northern offensive against the Central Front. The German forces included XLVII Panzer Corps, 4th Panzer Army under Hoth, II SS Panzer Corps, and specialized units like the Großdeutschland division equipped with Tiger tanks.
How many anti-tank mines did Soviet engineers lay during the defense of Kursk?
Red Army combat engineers laid exactly 503,993 anti-tank mines and 439,348 anti-personnel mines to create defensive belts around Kursk. These minefields reached densities of 2,200 anti-tank mines per kilometer, six times the density used defending Moscow.
Why did Hitler postpone the start date of Operation Citadel multiple times before July 1943?
Hitler postponed Operation Citadel repeatedly to await the arrival of new weapons including Panther tanks and Tiger heavy tanks. He also delayed the launch due to concerns about Allied landings in southern France or Italy and delays in tank deliveries from Germany.
What was the outcome of the Battle of Kursk for the strategic initiative on the Eastern Front?
The Battle of Kursk became the final strategic offensive Germans were able to launch on the Eastern Front before losing control. German heavy losses ensured that the victorious Soviet Red Army held the strategic initiative for the remainder of the war.