Battle of Cape Finisterre (1805)

• 1. Introduction

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  The Battle of Cape Finisterre on the 22nd of July 1805 was a fight that changed the shape of European history without either side quite realizing it. Off the rocky northwestern coast of Spain, two fleets emerged from fog and haze, exchanged broadsides in the failing light, and then pulled apart. Neither admiral pressed his advantage the next morning. What followed was a spiral of indecision that would put an end to Napoleon Bonaparte's dream of invading Britain and redirect the largest army France had ever assembled toward the plains of central Europe.

  The questions the battle raises are still worth asking. How did the commander of a British squadron walk away from a fight he had a chance to win, only to face a court-martial for it? How did a French admiral who had sailed the Atlantic twice in one year, capturing British prizes along the way, manage to squander every advantage he was handed? And why did a single inconclusive naval skirmish off Cape Finisterre matter more than any clear-cut victory could have?

• 2. Napoleon's Channel Plan

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  By 1805 Napoleon had assembled 150,000 soldiers at Boulogne in a formation he called the Armée d'Angleterre, the Army of England. That number reflects the scale of his ambition. He believed that if his troops could cross the English Channel, the poorly trained and equipped British militias would be unlikely to stop them.

  The blocking problem was the Royal Navy. French ports at Toulon and Brest were under British blockade, which meant the fleets sitting inside them could not combine into a force large enough to clear the Channel. Napoleon's solution was misdirection. French squadrons would break out, threaten Britain's Caribbean colonies, and draw off the British warships watching the Western Approaches. The combined Franco-Spanish fleet would then rendezvous at Martinique, double back to Europe, land troops in Ireland to raise a rebellion, and sweep the weakened British patrols aside. The Strait of Dover crossing could follow.

  French Vice-admiral Pierre-Charles Villeneuve sailed from Toulon on the 29th of March with eleven ships of the line, six frigates, and two brigs. He slipped past Admiral Nelson's blockading fleet, passed the Strait of Gibraltar on the 8th of April, and at Cádiz added six Spanish ships of the line to his force. The combined fleet reached Martinique on the 12th of May, while Nelson, delayed by westerly winds, did not clear the Strait himself until the 7th of May.

• 3. The Atlantic Crossings

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  Villeneuve waited at Martinique for Admiral Ganteaume's Brest fleet, which never arrived because it remained blockaded in port. French army officers pressed Villeneuve to attack British colonies. He largely ignored those appeals, with one exception: the recapture of the island fort of Diamond Rock. On the 7th of June, a captured British merchantman brought word that Nelson had appeared at Antigua, and four days later, on the 11th of June, Villeneuve left for Europe. He had achieved none of his Caribbean objectives.

  The voyage had not been without prizes. While in the Antilles the Franco-Spanish fleet had run into a British convoy escorted by the frigate Barbadoes, carrying 28 guns, and the sloop Netley. Two French frigates and the Spanish ship Argonauta, rated at 80 guns, chased down and captured all the ships but one escort. On the 30th of June the combined squadron captured and burned a 14-gun British privateer. Three days later it recaptured the Spanish galleon Matilda, carrying an estimated cargo of 15 million francs, from the Liverpool privateer Mars, which had been towing her toward Britain.

  The Atlantic crossings themselves were brutal. Spanish Admiral Gravina, who had crossed the Atlantic eleven times, testified to the difficulty of the passages. On the 9th of July the French ship Indomptable lost its main spar in a gale that also damaged several other vessels. When the combined fleet finally sighted land near Cape Finisterre on the 22nd of July, it was sailing with ships in poor condition, tired crews, and scarce supplies.

• 4. Fog, Fire, and Malta

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  News of the returning French fleet reached Vice Admiral Robert Calder on the 19th of July. He was ordered off his blockade of Rochefort and Ferrol and sent to intercept Villeneuve at Cape Finisterre. The two fleets sighted each other at about 11:00 on the 22nd of July.

  After hours of manoeuvring to the south-west, the fighting began at about 17:15. The British ship Hero, captained by Alan Gardner, led the van as the fleet bore down on the Franco-Spanish line. Poor visibility quickly turned the engagement into a confused melee. Malta, which had entered the action as the rearmost British ship, found itself cut off and surrounded by five Spanish vessels in the failing light and patchy fog. Under Captain Edward Buller, Malta fought on two sides at once, sending broadsides from both port and starboard. The ship suffered five men killed and forty wounded in that close-quarters struggle.

  At about 20:00, Buller forced the Spanish 80-gun San Rafael to strike her colours. He then sent Malta's boats across to take possession of the Spanish 74-gun Firme. Calder signalled to break off the action at 20:25, intending to renew the fight the following morning, but in the general confusion some ships kept firing for another hour.

• 5. The Mornings That Decided Everything

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  Daybreak on the 23rd of July found the two fleets 27 kilometres apart. Calder chose not to attack. He faced superior numbers, needed to protect the damaged Windsor Castle and the battered Malta, and worried that the French and Spanish squadrons blockaded at Rochefort and Ferrol might break out and join Villeneuve's force, making the odds even worse.

  Villeneuve later claimed he had intended to attack first, but the very light breezes on the 23rd made closing the distance impossibly slow, and he decided against risking a late-day battle. On the 24th of July the wind shifted and put the Franco-Spanish fleet in the windward position, the ideal stance for an attacker. Villeneuve turned away to the south instead of pressing the advantage.

  When Villeneuve arrived at A Coruña on the 1st of August, he received orders from Napoleon to proceed to Brest and then to Boulogne. What happened next destroyed the invasion plan entirely. Villeneuve, apparently believing a false report of a superior British force in the Bay of Biscay, turned for Cádiz rather than Brest. He arrived there on the 21st of August. Without the combined fleet at Brest to clear the Channel, Napoleon's window had closed for good.

• 6. Aftermath and Reckoning

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  The British captured the Firme and the San Rafael, both in badly battered states, along with more than 1,200 prisoners. British losses stood at 41 killed and 162 wounded, with no ships lost. The Franco-Spanish fleet suffered 158 killed and 320 wounded, with a further 800 ill. The French ships Atlas, Pluton, and the Spanish Espana were all severely damaged.

  Both sides claimed victory, though the British had the more persuasive case: they had engaged a larger force, taken two ships of the line, and lost none of their own. But the Admiralty viewed the glass as more than half empty. Calder was relieved of his command, court-martialled, and sentenced to a severe reprimand for not renewing the attack on the 23rd and the 24th of July. He never served at sea again. The two captured Spanish ships, the Firme and the San Rafael, were taken into Plymouth and converted into prison hulks.

  Napoleon wrote that Admiral Gravina was all genius and decision in combat, and that if Villeneuve had shared those qualities, the Battle of Finisterre would have been a complete victory. Villeneuve and the combined fleets sat at Cádiz until the 21st of October 1805, when they put to sea and met their destruction at the Battle of Trafalgar. The Armée d'Angleterre, renamed the Grande Armée, had already left Boulogne on the 27th of August, heading east to face Austria and Russia instead of south to cross the Strait of Dover.