Short answers, pulled from the story.
The third Marques of Santa Cruz de Marcenado argued that counterinsurgency is a political struggle rooted in the grievances of the governed rather than a matter of superior firepower. He advocated clemency and good governance to win the people's heart and love as a theoretical ideal for military strategy.
David Galula argued that the aim of war is to gain the support of the population rather than control of territory and that support can be obtained with the help of an active friendly minority. He insisted that order enforcement must be done progressively by removing armed opponents area by area and building infrastructure to strengthen long-term relationships.
Lorenzo Zambernardi argued that it is impossible to simultaneously achieve force protection, distinction between enemy combatants and non-combatants, and the physical elimination of insurgents. A state must choose two goals out of three, and the sacrifice of the third is inevitable in any counterinsurgency strategy.
Syrian President Hafez al-Assad ordered his brother Rifaat to demolish the city with heavy artillery, killing between 10,000 and 25,000 people during the 1982 Hama massacre. This brutal act cowed the population and saved the regime but came at a terrible moral cost.
The Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction concluded that the U.S. government greatly overestimated its ability to use counterinsurgency and stabilization tactics for long-term success. The report found that successes in stabilizing Afghan districts rarely lasted longer than the physical presence of coalition troops and civilians.
Captain Raymond Westerling used the Westerling Method which involved registering all Javanese arriving in Makassar, infiltrating local villages, and shooting suspected terrorists without investigation. These actions restored Dutch rule but led to growing public criticism and an official inquiry into his controversial methods.