Vyborg–Petrozavodsk offensive

• 1. Strategic Origins And Planning

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  In January 1944, Soviet forces raised the Siege of Leningrad and drove the German Army Group North back to the Narva-Lake Ilmen-Pskov line. Finland had conducted peace negotiations intermittently during 1943, 1944 with the Western Allies and the USSR, but no agreement had been reached. Finland asked for peace conditions again in February, but the Finnish Parliament (Eduskunta) considered the terms received impossible to fulfill. After Finland had rejected these peace conditions, and Germany halted the Soviet advance, the Stavka started to prepare for an offensive to force Finland's exit from the war. The plan called for a two-pronged offensive, one from Leningrad via Vyborg to the Kymi river, and the second across the Svir River through Petrozavodsk and Sortavala past the 1940 border. The strategy aimed to destroy the Finnish Army and push Finland out of the war while creating better conditions for a major offensive to the south against Germany.

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• 2. The Karelian Isthmus Breakthrough

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  On June 9, a day before the main Soviet offensive, the 1,600-strong 13th Air Army conducted a major aerial assault. At the same time, artillery units of the Leningrad Front and the Baltic Fleet shelled Finnish positions for 10 hours. On June 10, the Soviet 21st Army opened the offensive on the Valkeasaari sector, which was defended by the 1st Infantry Regiment of Finnish 10th Division. During the day, the Soviet units captured frontline trenches and destroyed fortifications, shattering the first Finnish defense line at the breakthrough sector. By June 13, the Soviet 21st Army's offensive reached the partially completed VT-line. The defensive position was breached at Kuuterselkä by June 15. Though the line was breached, the Finnish resistance managed to delay further Soviet advances. Simultaneously, the Soviet 23rd Army attempted to break through at Siiranmäki, where Finnish troops used anti-tank Panzerfausts and Panzerschrecks imported from Germany. Despite heavy losses, including 20,000 KIA, MIA or WIA in the Red Army, the Soviets could not trap large Finnish units.

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• 3. Tali Ihantala Defensive Victory

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  The offensive continued on June 25, when the Red Army breached the VKT-line at Tali, between the Vyborg Bay and the Vuoksi river. On June 26, the Finnish president Ryti gave the guarantee to Ribbentrop that Finland would fight to the end alongside Germany. When it became evident that a breakthrough was not possible at Ihantala, the Leningrad Front attempted to double envelope the defenders with twin assaults at the Vyborg Bay and Vuosalmi. However, the Finnish army held its positions on these sectors of the front. The battle fought over the area is considered to be the largest battle in the history of the Nordic countries. Soviet military losses peaked on the 28th of June when Leningrad Front reported losing over 5,000 soldiers, including 1,800 killed in action. Finnish artillery caused high proportions of these losses by concentrating deadly firepower with 250 artillery pieces sending 2,000 shells to one small target area the size of just 6 hectares in one minute. By July 15, the Red Army troops were ordered to assume a defensive posture, and offensive elements were transferred to the German front for use in Narva offensive and Operation Bagration.

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• 4. Eastern Front Operations In East Karelia

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  The Soviet Union's Karelian Front attacked in the Olonets sector of White Karelia on June 20. Weakened Finnish forces proved unable to stop the offensive which reached Olonets on June 25 and on June 29 took Petrozavodsk, one of the main goals of the operation. The long advance and the delaying tactics of the Finnish forces sapped the Soviet strength and the main push of the 7th Army stopped at the Finnish U-line. The Soviet 7th Army and the 32nd Army tried to go around the U-line attacking further to the north but failed to break through the defending Finnish units in battles fought in the wilderness of Karelia. The last attempt to resume the offensive was made further north by two divisions of the Soviet 32nd Army which were defeated by counterattacking Finns in the Battle of Ilomantsi. Soviet losses in Nietjärvi were 7,000 KIA, MIA and WIA while Finnish forces lost 1,200 soldiers. The Soviets themselves estimated having captured 933 Finnish artillery pieces and 18,000 rounds of ammunition however many of the guns had been spiked.

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• 5. Naval Landings And Amphibious Tactics

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  After the Soviet offensive on the Karelian Isthmus pushed north past Koivisto, the Finnish forces defending the Koivisto Islands became isolated. After the Soviet 21st Army failed to attack the islands, the Leningrad front ordered the Soviet Baltic Fleet to capture the islands. The initial Soviet landing was contained but the Finnish Navy soon evacuated the defending forces. This movement was largely unopposed. Although the eagerness of the commanders to evacuate preserved the defending forces, the loss of the islands proved costly because the Soviet Baltic Fleet gained a safe route to Vyborg Bay. On June 23, 70th naval infantry brigade attacked and captured a beachhead behind the Finnish lines and also beyond the 'PSS'-line between the Viteleenjoki and Tuuloksenjoki rivers, severing the main road and railroad connections along the shore of Lake Ladoga. As Finns had previously moved most of the coastal defenses to the Karelian Isthmus the Soviet landing met only skeleton defense. Situation in the beachhead was improved when the 3rd Naval Infantry Brigade started its landings on the evening of June 24. Bad weather hampered the efforts the brigade was finally unloaded on the June 26 and it was able to link up with the advancing 7th Army.

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• 6. Military Losses And Material Disparity

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  With Finnish army reinforcements, there were 268,000 Finnish army troops with 2,350 guns facing the two Red Army Fronts; 40% of the men and guns, and all the tanks were on the Isthmus. In total, the Red Army had a 1.7:1 advantage in men, 5.2:1 advantage in guns, and 6, 7:1 advantage in planes and tanks against the Finnish army. Less than 40 Finnish tanks and assault guns were modern (StuG III, T-34, KV-1) and less than 60 aircraft too (Bf 109 dayfighter and Ju 88 medium bomber). With these figures Red Army material advantage was about 1:20 at mid June 1944 regarding armour and aircraft. The Soviet 21st Army also faced logistics issues after its fast 120 km advance to west. Despite the losses suffered, the Finnish army managed to avoid encirclement of battalion-size units and benefited from supplies delivered by Germany. The offensive failed to breach the VKT-line and reach the Kymi River as ordered by the Stavka.

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• 7. Political Fallout And Peace Negotiations

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  On June 21, the Finnish government asked for Soviet peace terms. The response arrived on the next day and it demanded Finnish capitulation before any conditions could be presented. This created confusion in the Finnish government, where Ryti and Tanner were willing to repeat the inquiry about the conditions, while others opposed the capitulation. During the meeting Marshal Mannerheim stated that the Soviet demand constituted an unconditional surrender. When Paasikivi's negotiation trip to Moscow in March 1944 was remembered, the government decided to interpret the Soviet response as a demand for unconditional surrender. In September 1944 the Soviets offered peace terms that were roughly the same as in April 1944, though some of the demands which had been seen by the Finns as impossible to concede to were reduced. The $600 million war reparations were halved and the time to pay them off was extended. However, after the ceasefire the Soviets demanded that payments be based on 1938 prices which nearly doubled the actual amount to be paid. Despite not achieving all of the goals set by the Stavka, the offensive forced Finland from the war and to accept Soviet peace terms.

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