The WEIRDest People in the World
Harvard University professor Joseph Henrich published The WEIRDest People in the World in 2020. This book aims to explain history and psychological variation using approaches from cultural evolution and evolutionary psychology. Henrich explores how institutions and psychology jointly influence each other over time. He argues that a series of Catholic Church edicts on marriage began in the fourth century. These edicts undermined the foundations of kin-based society. They created more analytical, individualistic thinking prevalent in western societies. Reviewer Pauline Grosjean described WEIRD populations as Western, Educated, Industrialized, Rich and Democratic. Richard Nisbett suggested people in WEIRD cultures think reductively with a focus on personal attributes and intentions. Asians think holistically with a focus on relationships and situations. Non-Westerners emphasize family connections and allegiances. Henrich presents evidence that WEIRD people are more trusting of strangers. They are also more likely to give blood than most humans. Judith Shulevitz noted that Westerners identify more as members of voluntary social groups like dentists or artists. They do not identify primarily as members of extended clans.
Henrich draws on an array of qualitative and quantitative evidence regarding religious beliefs. He focuses on specific policies called the Marriage and Family Program. These policies were enforced by the Catholic Church starting in the 4th century. The program reduced clannishness among Western Europeans. It made them more analytic and individualistic. This shift led to various intermediating institutions. Trust in abstract rules grew during this period. The author argues these institutions are the accidental byproduct of specific policies. The Church dismantled Europe's kin-based institutions without intending to create the modern world. Without clan backing, nuclear families became isolated and vulnerable. They were forced to innovate to survive. This process ultimately created the modern world. Many believe modern Western institutions represent the products of reason. They argue these institutions appear once you strip away Church dogma. Henrich suggests a central role for ongoing psychological changes wrought by cultural evolution during the Middle Ages. He points to the demolition of Europe's kin-based institutions as a key factor. The expansion of impersonal markets also played a part. Domesticated forms of intergroup competition rose during Chapter 10. A broad, mobile division of labor grew in urban centers according to Chapter 11.
The third section discusses how Protestantism shaped early institutions and psychology. This paved the way for modern institutions in the view of the author. Accounts of modern history frequently argue that the Protestant Reformation created individualism. They claim it established a belief in rule of law. Henrich argues that edicts reduced clannishness instead. These changes made Western Europeans more analytic and individualistic. Voluntary associations like guilds shifted people's psychology. Charter towns changed social lives significantly. Universities acted as new centers of interaction. Religious orders fostered different community structures. Impersonal markets expanded across regions. Competition among voluntary associations drove change. People began to trust strangers more often. They gave blood at higher rates than most humans. Westerners identified with groups based on profession or politics rather than family. This shift allowed societies to scale up from families to states. The author seats these processes in an account of the past. Present-day institutions shape psychology while historical events shape them too. The result is a unique psychological profile found in the West.
A reviewer in The Economist was not fully convinced of Henrich's thesis. They argued the medieval church was negotiating with social reality. Cities emerged fast during this period. The church did not mold society alone. Hilton Root noted marriage rules did not apply to elites. He cited this as evidence against universal application. Pauline Grosjean observed marriage age varied over time. Colonies of the U.S. and Australia saw a sharp drop in marriage age. Migrating 19th century Europeans married younger there. Both places had sentiments of anti-Catholicism. They were more Protestant in their formation. Grosjean said Henrich fails to address the role that states may have played. States acted as competitors and regulators of the Church. Nicholas Guyatt anticipated scholars would point out uneven effects across time and space. The Protestant church accepted cousin marriage more than its Catholic rival. Cousin marriage increased across many European societies in the 17th and 18th centuries. Brysbaert remarked that WEIRD people from English-speaking countries are often seen as standard. Others compare themselves against this group. He proposed using the term WEIRDES people to refer to English centricity. This highlights how much psychological research relies on specific national samples.
The book received praise for its ambition and data points. Andrew Wilson called it sweeping, polymathic, counterintuitive, and provocative. He noted Henrich hits far more than he misses. The splutters of incredibility are made up for by narrative breadth. Daniel Dennett praised the book as engagingly written and meticulously argued. He stated the WEIRD mind is real. We must stop assuming our ways are universal. However, critics raised methodological concerns. Judith Shulevitz was skeptical of opposing cognitive styles between groups. She suggested differences in subjects' personal experience explain Triad Task responses. She said the author's indifference to intentions drives historians nuts. Coleman Hughes referenced the book when criticizing hereditarianism. Razib Khan found the second half of the book tendentious. He claimed the author attempts to answer the great riddle of economic historians. The great divergence between the West and the rest remains a puzzle. Guyatt said the book lacks insight into non-Europeans carrying ideas. It emphasizes the supposedly discrete nature of culture almost to endorsing social Darwinism. Henrich said the book aims to fill voids used by white supremacists. He provides an explanation for global diversity patterns. He argues claims about genetics or superior cultures are off-the-mark.
Continue Browsing
Common questions
When did Joseph Henrich publish The WEIRDest People in the World?
Harvard University professor Joseph Henrich published The WEIRDest People in the World in 2020. This book aims to explain history and psychological variation using approaches from cultural evolution and evolutionary psychology.
What specific Catholic Church policies does Joseph Henrich argue created modern Western psychology?
Henrich explores how a series of Catholic Church edicts on marriage began in the fourth century. These edicts undermined the foundations of kin-based society and created more analytical, individualistic thinking prevalent in western societies.
How do people in WEIRD cultures think differently according to Richard Nisbett?
Richard Nisbett suggested people in WEIRD cultures think reductively with a focus on personal attributes and intentions. Asians think holistically with a focus on relationships and situations while Non-Westerners emphasize family connections and allegiances.
Why does Joseph Henrich claim the Catholic Church unintentionally created the modern world?
The Church dismantled Europe's kin-based institutions without intending to create the modern world. Without clan backing, nuclear families became isolated and vulnerable so they were forced to innovate to survive which ultimately created the modern world.
Who criticized Joseph Henrich for failing to address the role that states may have played?
Pauline Grosjean said Henrich fails to address the role that states may have played because states acted as competitors and regulators of the Church. Nicholas Guyatt anticipated scholars would point out uneven effects across time and space regarding these historical processes.