Second Battle of Kharkov

• 1. Stalin's Spring Gamble

  ›

  On the 7th of November 1941, Joseph Stalin declared that German forces would collapse by spring or summer. This speech set a dangerous tone for Soviet strategy in early 1942. By late February, the Red Army had pushed German troops away from Moscow but exhausted its own reserves. Stalin believed his enemies were finished and ordered new offensives to exploit this perceived weakness. His advisors warned against such risks. General Boris Shaposhnikov argued for a defensive posture instead. General Aleksandr Vasilevsky wrote that reality was harsher than hoped. Georgy Zhukov noted that Stalin expected Germans to fight on two strategic axes simultaneously.

  Despite these warnings, Stalin insisted on local offensives across the front. He planned seven attacks stretching from the Baltic Sea to the Black Sea. One target became Kharkov, where action was originally scheduled for March. The Stavka issued orders to Southwestern Strategic Direction headquarters early that month. Forces under Marshal Semyon Timoshenko and Lieutenant General Kirill Moskalenko penetrated German positions along the northern Donets River east of Kharkov. Fighting continued into April as Moskalenko crossed the river and established a tenuous bridgehead at Izium.

  By the 15th of March, commanders introduced preliminary plans for an offensive toward Kharkov with large reserve numbers. On the 20th of March, Timoshenko held a conference in Kupiansk to discuss operations. A report prepared by his chief of staff, Lieutenant General Ivan Baghramian, summarized the meeting but omitted key intelligence features. Buildup of Soviet forces in Barvenkovo and Vovchansk continued well into May. Final details were settled following discussions between Stalin, Stavka, and leadership of the Southwestern Strategic Direction throughout March and April.

• 2. Mud And Misplaced Trust

  ›

  The Red Army offensive began at 6:30 a.m. on the 12th of May 1942. It started with a concentrated hour-long artillery bombardment followed by a final twenty-minute air attack upon German positions. Ground fighting commenced at 7:30 a.m. with dual pincer movements from Volchansk and Barvenkovo salients. The German defenses were knocked out by air raids, artillery fire, and coordinated ground attacks. Fighting grew fierce near the village of Nepokrytaia where Germans launched three local counter-attacks.

  Forces regrouping in the sector ran into rasputitsa which turned much soil into mud. This caused severe delays in preparations and made reinforcing Southern and Southwestern Fronts take longer than expected. Senior Soviet representatives criticized front commanders for poor management of forces and inability to stage offensives properly. Moskalenko blamed the fact that fronts did not plan ahead to regroup. He commented afterward that it was no surprise the German-Fascist command divined their plans.

  By the 11th of May, the Red Army allocated six armies under two fronts among other formations. The Southwestern Front included the 21st Army, 28th Army, 38th Army, and 6th Army. By the 11th of May, the 21st Tank Corps moved into region with 23rd Tank Corps plus another 269 tanks. Three independent rifle divisions and a rifle regiment from 270th Rifle Division concentrated there supported by 2nd Cavalry Corps in Bogdanovka. At its height, Southern Front could operate eleven guns or mortars per kilometer of front.

• 3. The First Days Of Blood

  ›

  Darkness fell on the 12th of May revealing deepest Soviet advance reached only limited distances. Moskalenko discovered movement of several German reserve units realizing attack faced two German divisions instead of one expected. This indicated poor reconnaissance and intelligence gathering before battle began. A captured diary of dead German general alluded to Germans knowing about Soviet plans in region. Next day Paulus obtained three infantry divisions and panzer division for defense of Kharkov while Soviet advance slowed achieving little success except left flank.

  Bock warned Paulus not counter-attack without air support though this later reconsidered when several Soviet tank brigades broke through VIII Corps General Walter Heitz in Volchansk sector only distance from Kharkov. In first 72 hours 6th Army lost 16 battalions conducting holding actions and local counter-attacks heavy rain mud. By the 14th of May Red Army made impressive gains but several Soviet divisions so depleted withdrawn needing tank reserves defeat German counter-attacks. German losses estimated minimal with only 35, 70 tanks believed knocked out 3rd and 23rd Panzer divisions.

  Soviet troops northern pincer suffered even more than those south. They achieved spectacular success first three days combat deep penetration German positions. Red Army routed several key German battalions including many Hungarian foreign soldiers. Success Southern Shock group attributed fact early penetrations north directed German reserves there limiting reinforcements south. But by the 14th of May Hitler briefed General Ewald von Kleist ordered his 1st Panzer Army grab initiative bold counteroffensive setting pace final launching Operation Fridericus.

• 4. The Sky Turns Black

  ›

  Hitler immediately turned to Luftwaffe help blunt offensive. At point its close support corps deployed Crimea taking part siege Sevastopol. Under command Wolfram von Richthofen, 8th Air Corps initially ordered deploy Kharkov Crimea order rescinded. Unusual move kept it Crimea did not put corps under command Luftflotte 4 Air Fleet 4 already contained 4th Air Corps General Kurt Pflugbeil Fliegerführer Süd Flying Command South small anti-shipping command based Crimea. Instead allowed Richthofen take charge all operations over Sevastopol.

  Siege Crimea not over Battle Kerch Peninsula yet won. Hitler pleased progress content keep Richthofen where was withdrew close support assets Fliegerkorps VIII prevent Soviet breakthrough Kharkov. Use Luftwaffe compensate German Army lack firepower suggested Oberkommando der Wehrmacht OKW High Command Armed Forces saw Luftwaffe mainly ground support arm. This angered Richthofen complained Luftwaffe treated army whore. Now not being redeployed Kharkov Richthofen also complained withdrawal units ongoing Kerch Sevastopol battles felt transfer aerial assets Kharkov made victory Crimea uncertain.

  Despite Richthofen opposition powerful air support way bolster 6th Army news boosted German morale. Army commanders Paulus Bock placed so much confidence Luftwaffe ordered forces risk attack without air support. Meanwhile Fliegerkorps IV forced use every available aircraft meeting more numerous Soviet air forces Luftwaffe achieved air superiority limited German ground forces losses Soviet aviation some crews flying more than 10 missions per day. By the 15th of May Pflugbeil reinforced received Kampfgeschwader 27 Bomber Wing 27 KG 27 Kampfgeschwader 51 KG 51 Kampfgeschwader 55 KG 55 Kampfgeschwader 76 KG 76 equipped Junkers Ju 88 Heinkel He 111 bombers.

• 5. The Trap Closes

  ›

  On the 17th of May supported by Fliegerkorps IV German army took initiative Kleist's 3rd Panzer Corps and 44th Army Corps began counterattack Barvenkovo bridgehead area Aleksandrovka south. Aided greatly air support Kleist able crush Soviet positions advanced up ten kilometers first day attack. Soviet troop supply convoys easy targets ferocious Luftwaffe attacks possessing few anti-aircraft guns left rail-heads 100 kilometers rear. German reconnaissance aircraft monitored enemy movements directed attack aircraft Soviet positions corrected German artillery fire.

  Response time 4th Air Corps calls air strikes excellent only 20 minutes. Many Soviet units sent rear night refitted others moved forward reinforce tenuous positions across front. That same day Timoshenko reported move Moscow asked reinforcements described day failures. Vasilevsky attempts gain approval general withdrawal rejected Stalin. On the 18th of May situation worsened Stavka suggested once more stopping offensive ordered 9th Army break out salient.

  Timoshenko Khrushchev claimed danger coming Wehrmacht Kramatorsk group exaggerated Stalin refused withdrawal again. Consequences losing air battle also apparent. On the 18th of May Fliegerkorps IV destroyed 130 tanks 500 motor vehicles adding another 29 tanks destroyed the 19th of May. On the 19th of May Paulus orders Bock began general offensive area Merefa north bulge attempt encircle remaining Soviet forces Izium salient. Only then did Stalin authorize Zhukov stop offensive fend off German flanking forces. However already too late. Quickly Germans achieved considerable success against Soviet defensive positions.

• 6. The Mousetrap

  ›

  By end May 24 Soviet forces opposite Kharkov surrounded German formations transferred several more divisions front increasing pressure Soviet flanks finally forcing collapse. the 25th of May saw first major Soviet attempt break encirclement. German Major General Hubert Lanz described attacks gruesome made en masse. Driven blind courage Soviet soldiers charged German machine guns arms linked shouting Urray! German machine gunners need accuracy killing hundreds quick bursts fire broad daylight Luftwaffe enjoying complete air supremacy absence Soviet anti-aircraft guns rained SD2 anti-personnel cluster bombs exposed Soviet infantry masses killing droves.

  By the 26th of May surviving Red Army soldiers forced crowded positions area roughly fifteen square kilometers. Soviet attempts break through German encirclement east continuously blocked tenacious defensive maneuvers German air power. Groups Soviet tanks infantry attempted escape succeeded breaking through German lines caught destroyed Ju 87s StG 77. Flat terrain secured easy observation Germans forward observers directed long-range 10.5 cm 15 cm artillery fire Soviets safe distance conserve German infantrymen. More than 200,000 Soviet troops hundreds tanks thousands trucks horse-drawn wagons filled narrow dirt road Krutoyarka Fedorovka under constant German artillery fire relentless air strikes Ju 87s Ju 88s He 111s.

• 7. The Cost Of Failure

  ›

  Less than one man ten managed break out Barvenkovo mousetrap. Hayward gives 75,000 Soviets killed 239,000 taken prisoner. Beevor puts Soviet prisoners at 240,000 bulk armour Glantz citing Krivosheev gives total 277,190 overall Soviet casualties. Both tend agree low German casualty count most formative estimate being 20,000 dead wounded missing. Trigg called Timoshenko offensive ill-conceived Wehrmacht preparing Case Blue.

  Soviet forces surrounded forced back Donets 239,000 men surrendered 75,000 killed although Soviet reports said casualties only 171,000. Regardless casualties Kharkov major Soviet setback put end successes Red Army during winter counteroffensive. Many authors attempted pinpoint reasons Soviet defeat. Several Soviet generals placed blame inability Stavka Stalin appreciate Wehrmacht military power Eastern Front after defeats winter 1941, 1942 spring 1942.

  Zhukov sums up memoirs failure operation quite predictable since offensive organized very ineptly risk exposing left flank Izium salient German counterattacks obvious map. Still according Zhukov main reason stinging Soviet defeat lay mistakes made Stalin underestimated danger coming German armies southwestern sector Moscow sector failed take steps concentrate substantial strategic reserves meet potential German threat. Furthermore Stalin ignored sensible advice provided own General Chief of Staff recommended organizing strong defense southwestern sector able repulse any Wehrmacht attack.