Remilitarisation of the Rhineland

• 1. Treaty Frameworks And Demilitarization

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  The Rhineland, a region stretching along the western bank of the Rhine River, became the focal point of European security after World War I. Under Articles 42, 43 and 44 of the Treaty of Versailles signed in 1919, Germany was forbidden from maintaining or constructing any fortification on either side of the river within fifty kilometers to the east. This legal restriction created a permanent demilitarized zone intended to prevent German aggression against its western neighbors. The Locarno Treaties, signed in October 1925 by Germany, France, Belgium, Italy and Britain, reaffirmed this status as permanent. These agreements were designed to guarantee peace by ensuring that no military forces could operate in the buffer zone between France and Germany.

  Allied occupation forces withdrew from the Rhineland over time, with the last British soldiers leaving in late 1929 and the final French troops departing in June 1930. Their departure removed the physical presence that had enforced the treaty terms for over a decade. Once these soldiers left, the zone lost its function as collateral for French security. The French government subsequently began building the Maginot Line in 1929, a massive defensive structure along their eastern border. This construction signaled an admission that German rearmament would eventually occur and that the Rhineland would be remilitarized sooner or later. Intelligence reports from the Deuxième Bureau indicated that Germany had been violating Versailles throughout the 1920s with considerable help from the Soviet Union.

• 2. German Rearmament And Strategic Planning

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  In March 1933, German Defence Minister General Werner von Blomberg drew up plans for remilitarization shortly after the Nazi regime took power. By the fall of 1933, he provided secret military training and weapons to paramilitary Landspolizei units stationed in the Rhineland. These preparations were conducted under the guise of maintaining internal order while secretly building capacity for future offensive operations. General Ludwig Beck's memo of March 1935 accepted that remilitarisation should take place once it was diplomatically possible.

  The German military maintained barracks and stored supplies along the border during the 1920s and early 1930s. They also built versatile towers designed to support rapid deployment if needed. From 1919 to 1932, British defense spending operated under the Ten Year Rule, which assumed no major wars for a decade and severely reduced military capabilities. This policy left Britain hesitant about deploying large armies on the continent. The Reichswehr planned for wars against France and Poland, anticipating the eventual return of troops to the Rhineland. Intelligence gathered by the Auswärtiges Amt suggested that France would do nothing if Germany moved forces back into the zone.

• 3. The Abyssinia Crisis As Catalyst

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  On the 3rd of October 1935, Italy invaded Ethiopia, marking the onset of the Abyssinia Crisis. This event created diplomatic friction between Britain and France as they struggled to balance collective security with their own strategic interests. The French prioritized their security concerns regarding Nazi Germany and hoped to preserve the Stresa Front with Italy even at the cost of Ethiopia. Their reluctance to impose sanctions revealed a deep division in Western European diplomacy.

  Germany extended support to Italy during this crisis, strengthening Italo-German ties while exploiting the rift between Paris and London. The complexity increased when the Hoare-Laval Pact was leaked, leading to strong negative reactions in both capitals and the resignation of British Foreign Secretary Samuel Hoare. By early 1936, Hitler accelerated his plans from 1937 to 1936 partly due to the disruption caused by the Second Italo-Abyssinian War. The League's discussions on oil sanctions against Italy provided a distraction that allowed Germany to contemplate remilitarization without immediate consequence. This shift in relations set the stage for German maneuvers regarding the Rhineland.

• 4. Operation Winter Exercise Execution

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  Not long after dawn on the 7th of March 1936, nineteen German infantry battalions and a handful of planes entered the Rhineland. They reached the river Rhine by 11:00 a.m., and three battalions crossed to the west bank. At the same time, Baron von Neurath summoned ambassadors from Italy, Britain and France to the Wilhelmstrasse to hand them notes accusing France of violating Locarno. These documents announced that Germany had decided to renounce Locarno and remilitarize the zone.

  When German reconnaissance learned that thousands of French soldiers were congregating on the Franco-German border, General Blomberg begged Hitler to evacuate the forces. Under Blomberg's influence, Hitler nearly ordered withdrawal but was then persuaded by the resolutely calm Neurath to continue with Operation Winter Exercise. Following Neurath's advice, Hitler inquired whether French forces had actually crossed the border. When informed they had not, he assured Blomberg that Germany would wait until this happened. The Rhineland coup is often seen as the moment when Hitler could have been stopped with very little effort since the German forces involved were small compared to the much larger French military.

• 5. Allied Diplomatic Paralysis And Response

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  France faced significant constraints during the crisis. General Maurice Gamelin informed the government that challenging Germany in the Rhineland would require full mobilization costing thirty million francs per day. This expense potentially escalated into a full-blown war that France could not afford given its financial crisis in late 1935 to early 1936. The state of the French Air Force was another concern as it was considered inferior to the Luftwaffe. Issues with productivity in the aircraft industry hampered its ability to replace losses in case of war.

  The French government issued statements hinting at military action but made decisions dependent on Britain and Italy taking similar actions. Prime Minister Albert Sarraut declared France's intent to maintain the Treaty of Locarno's guarantees while offering forces to the League of Nations only if other powers did the same. Georges Mandel was the only French minister advocating immediate military action to expel German troops from the zone. Flandin sought British commitment in the face of German remilitarization, but his approach aimed to secure the continental commitment from London rather than acting unilaterally. Britain issued a vague statement linking security to French security and agreed to limited staff talks, disappointing some in the French government.

• 6. Domestic Reactions And Public Opinion

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  In Germany, the news that the Rhineland had been remilitarized was greeted with wild celebrations all over the country. When German troops marched into Cologne, a vast cheering crowd formed spontaneously to greet them, throwing flowers onto the Wehrmacht while Catholic priests offered blessings. Reports to the Sopade mentioned that many erstwhile Social Democrats and opponents of the Nazis among the working class approved of the move. To capitalize on this popularity, Hitler called a referendum on the 29th of March 1936 where the majority expressed approval.

  Public opinion abroad differed sharply. In Britain, no public meetings or rallies were held anywhere in protest at the remilitarisation. Instead there were several peace rallies demanding that Britain not use war to resolve the crisis. Harold Nicolson MP noted in his diary entry for the 23rd of March that the feeling in the House of Commons was terribly pro-German because people feared war. By 1936, the majority of British people believed that Hitler was right to violate what they saw as an unjust Treaty of Versailles. Prime Minister Stanley Baldwin claimed that Britain lacked resources to enforce treaty guarantees and that public opinion would not stand for military force.

• 7. Geopolitical Aftermath And Balance Of Power

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  The remilitarization changed the balance of power decisively toward Germany. France's credibility in standing against German expansion was left in doubt after its failure to send even a single unit into the Rhineland. Potential allies in Eastern Europe could no longer trust an alliance with France which could not be trusted to deter Germany through the threat of invasion. Belgium dropped its defensive alliance with France and returned to reliance on neutrality during a war.

  With the Rhineland remilitarized, Germany started construction of the Siegfried Line along their border with France. This meant that if Germany attacked any state in the cordon sanitaire, the ability of France to threaten an invasion became limited. Czechoslovak President Edvard Beneš seriously considered renouncing the alliance with France and seeking rapprochement with Germany. King Carol II of Romania concluded that his country might have to abandon its alliance with France and accept moving from the French to the German sphere of influence. The event demonstrated that neither Britain nor France would intervene militarily, emboldening Hitler to quicken preparations for further aggression.