Prague offensive

• 1. Background And Political Context

  ›

  By the beginning of May 1945, Germany had been decisively defeated by the coalition of the Western Allies and the Soviet Union. Berlin was on the verge of capitulation in the face of a massive Soviet attack. The great bulk of Germany had already been conquered. However, large bodies of active German troops remained in southeastern Germany, parts of Austria, and Czechoslovakia. These forces included Army Group Centre and the remnants of Army Group Ostmark. On the 2nd of May 1945, Generaloberst Alfred Jodl ordered these German forces to avoid capture by Russia. He instructed them to facilitate separate negotiations with Western Allies instead. The Nazi regime considered Czechoslovakia their last bastion if Berlin fell. They concentrated many powerful military units in the region including elements of the 6th SS Panzer Army. They also deployed the 1st and 4th Panzer Armies alongside the 7th, 8th, and 17th Combined Armies. Jodl ordered local Nazi officials to prepare fortified buildings for a new government. From the 30th of April to the 1st of May 1945, Karl Hermann Frank announced over radio that he would drown any uprising in a sea of blood. Frank was an Obergruppenführer and General of Police. The situation in Prague was unstable as several Soviet fronts advanced toward the city. Two divisions of the Russian Liberation Army arrived near Prague. The KONR 1st Division encamped north of the city while the 2nd Division took positions south of it. Their allegiance varied depending on the situation they faced. Stalin issued orders on the 1st of May directing the 1st Belorussian Front to relieve the 1st Ukrainian Front. This allowed the latter to regroup along the Mulde River and drive on Prague. The 2nd Ukrainian Front received orders on the 2nd of May to advance from the southeast. Stalin was determined to have the Soviet Army present in western Czechoslovakia when German troops surrendered.

• 2. Terrain And Strategic Deployment

  ›

  The terrain over which the Soviets had to advance was varied but mostly mountainous and forested. Routes of march for the 1st and 4th Ukrainian Fronts were perpendicular to ridge orientations. The 2nd Ukrainian Front moved along less arduous routes through lower elevation regions leading to Prague. The 1st Ukrainian Front had to cross the Ore Mountains to advance from areas north of Dresden and Bautzen. Urban areas like Dresden and Prague itself posed significant military obstacles. Army Group Centre's deployment resembled a horseshoe straddling Bohemia and Moravia. To the west, the 7th Army had been pushed east by U.S. operations. It became a subordinate command of Army Group Centre. The 7th Army deployed roughly along a north-south axis in western Czechoslovakia. Besides one Panzer division and one Volksgrenadier division, it held four other divisions. Two were named battle groups while the remaining two were replacement formations filled with trainees. To the northeast of Prague, the 4th Panzer Army defended along a front running slightly southeast. This army possessed five Panzer or mechanized divisions plus thirteen others. It had just won the Battle of Bautzen damaging Soviet forces. To its right flank stood the 17th Army counting eleven divisions including one Panzer and one motorized division. These formed three corps deployed in an arc beginning about 40 kilometers southwest of Breslau. From here the front ran southeast to Olomouc where the 1st Panzer Army was deployed. This army included six Panzer or motorized divisions alongside nineteen others organized into five corps. In southern Moravia, Army Group Ostmark's 8th Army deployed on a front leading southwest into Austria. Its right flank met up with the 6th SS Panzer Army near Vienna. Facing part of these German armies, the Soviet 2nd Ukrainian Front numbered thirty-seven rifle divisions and six cavalry divisions. Allied forces with this front included Romanian Armies totaling twelve infantry divisions. Confronting primarily the 1st Panzer Army, the 4th Ukrainian Front commanded thirty-four rifle divisions and one tank corps. Unlike the 2nd Front, it lacked direct major road connections from Olomouc to Prague slowing its advance. The 1st Ukrainian Front counted seventy-one rifle divisions and nine tank corps massed north of Dresden for a direct advance on Prague.

• 3. The Prague Uprising And Soviet Response

  ›

  Orders from Stalin on the 1st of May called for the offensive to commence on the 7th of May. Marshal Konev provided detailed orders to his commanders on the 4th of May for three thrusts by the 1st Ukrainian Front. A main thrust would occur on the western wing with combined-arms armies and tank armies following valleys of the Elbe and Vltava Rivers. By the 5th of May, lead units of the U.S. V Corps had reached Plzen. Word of American advance reached residents of Prague playing a part in their decision to rise up against occupation. Fighting in desperate circumstances, Czechs gained control of a radio station. They broadcast an appeal in Russian and English for air support to hold off German armored units. These developments prompted Stalin to hasten the start of the Soviet offensive. It was ordered to commence one day earlier on the 6th of May. Adding confusion but providing assistance, the 1st Division of the Russian Liberation Army moved into Prague. Under General Bunyachenko, it engaged combat with erstwhile German allies. By the 7th of May, this division occupied the airport and radio station. The Czech National Council denounced the ROA. The Soviet government labeled all ROA soldiers as traitors sentencing them to prison camps. On the morning of May 9, first Soviet tanks arrived in Prague. First tanks of the 1st Czechoslovak Tank Brigade entered the city on May 10. By May 11, troops were clearing areas of hidden remaining German forces. At that point events external to formal military planning erupted. Marshal Konev refused offers from American commanders like Omar Bradley because such proposals violated previously agreed borderlines between liberation zones. He promised the USSR alone would destroy local German forces as soon as possible.

• 4. Operational Phases Of The Offensive

  ›

  The Soviet offensive commenced on the 6th of May and concluded on the 11th of May. Konev's 1st Ukrainian Front opened with attacks by tank armies and combined-arms armies pushing south from Riesa. Facing these thrusts were troops of the German 4th Panzer Army. An artillery barrage preceded a powerful attack moving forward some 23 kilometers by evening. Ending a separate operation, forty thousand German troops surrendered to the Soviet 6th Army after a two-month siege. On the 7th of May, continuing the main attack, the 3rd Guards Army captured Meissen home of famous German porcelain. The 13th Army and 4th Guards Tank Army pushed another 45 kilometers reaching northern slopes of the Ore Mountains. Farther east, the second attack developed as other armies advanced south. Following a thirty-minute artillery barrage, the 7th Guards Army led an attack northwest opening the offensive of the 2nd Ukrainian Front. By end of day, the front had pushed twelve kilometers into German lines along an advance twenty-five kilometers in breadth. In Prague, German troops reached Old Town Square but were later pushed back. Buildings of Town Hall remained in insurgent hands despite severe damage. On the 8th of May, Colonel Wilhelm Meyer-Detring was escorted through American lines to see Schörner. He reported that formal capitulation meant withdrawal as large formations was out of question. Schörner ordered operational command to observe surrender but could not guarantee obedience everywhere. Pushing forward another 40 kilometers, main thrust broke through resistance approaching within 70-80 kilometers of Prague. Advance of 4th Guards Tank Army came upon headquarters capturing or killing personnel except Schörner who fled to Bavaria. By evening Dresden fell while 4th Ukrainian Front pushed Germans out of Olomouc. During night of 8/the 9th of May armored units pushed eighty kilometers entering Prague at daybreak. With help from Czech population, city was freed around 10:00 hours. Red Army casualties were only ten men killed described as easiest victory of war.

• 5. Postwar Political Consequences For Czechoslovakia

  ›

  The Prague Offensive destroyed Army Group Centre and parts of Army Group Ostmark. These groups were last large intact military formations of Germany. Following the offensive all surviving German soldiers became prisoners of war or fugitives. Number of German prisoners taken by Soviet Union reached almost nine hundred thousand. Other Axis soldiers numbering tens of thousands surrendered to U.S. forces in western Czechoslovakia and Austria. Czechoslovakia was free of German occupation regime for first time since late 1938. Country's prewar borders would not be completely restored as Soviets engineered cession of Carpathian Ruthenia to USSR in July 1945. Western Czechoslovakia split by military frontier between superpowers. On one side stood Soviet Army and on other side U.S. Army. Although both armies departed by end of 1945, Stalin achieved goal ensuring strong Soviet presence in Prague at surrender time. Communist influence in postwar army and government mounted. Czech soldiers fighting with Western Allies found themselves increasingly sidelined. Country itself forced to become Soviet satellite state in 1948 by communist coup. Even before start of Soviet offensive Emanuel Moravec died of suicide known as Czech Quisling. SS-Obergruppenführer Konrad Henlein leader of Nazi Party Sudeten Germans died of suicide in American captivity on the 10th of May. Count Pückler-Burghauss commander of Waffen-SS in Protectorate died after signing capitulation. Dr. Emil Hácha State President arrested in Prague beaten by NKVD transferred to hospital wing of Pankrác Prison where he died on the 27th of June 1945.

• 6. Casualties And Human Cost Analysis

  ›

  Allied nations suffered significant losses during the operation. Personnel figures showed eleven thousand nine hundred ninety-seven irrecoverable deaths plus forty thousand five hundred one wounded and sick totaling fifty-two thousand four hundred ninety-eight. Material losses included three hundred seventy-three tanks and self-propelled guns alongside one thousand six artillery pieces and eighty aircraft. Losses varied across different fronts. The 1st Ukrainian Front fielded eight hundred six thousand four hundred troops suffering twenty-three thousand three hundred eighty-three total losses averaging three thousand eight hundred ninety-seven daily. The 2nd Ukrainian Front counted six hundred thirteen thousand four hundred men losing fourteen thousand four hundred thirty-six averaging two thousand four hundred six per day. The 4th Ukrainian Front had three hundred fifty thousand nine hundred personnel with eleven thousand five hundred twenty-nine losses averaging one thousand nine hundred twenty-two daily. Polish 2nd Army lost eight hundred eighty-seven men from sixty-nine thousand five hundred strength. Romanian Armies lost one thousand seven hundred thirty from one hundred thirty-nine thousand five hundred. Czechoslovak Army Corps lost five hundred thirty-three from forty-eight thousand four hundred. German losses in men taken prisoner by Soviets amounted to some eight hundred sixty thousand. Soviets claimed capture of nine thousand five hundred guns and mortars plus eighteen hundred armored vehicles and eleven hundred aircraft.

• 7. Historiographical Debates And Interpretations

  ›

  Volume 10 of Soviet official history treats Prague Offensive as primarily military event identifying major formations and axes of advance. Authors praised operation for international efforts of Soviet, Polish, Czech, and Romanian soldiers on behalf of freedom. No mention was made of Stalin's political intentions regarding Czechoslovakia. Final push during night of 8-the 9th of May presented as necessary to relieve struggling insurgents while authors accused former officers abandoning barricades. Over fifty thousand casualties suffered by Allies from 6 to the 11th of May confirmed seriousness of combat. Published in 2008 Volume 10/1 of German official history criticized Soviet view noting percentage of casualties far lower than Berlin Offensive. During Berlin Operation 1st Ukrainian Front averaged loss of eighty-four point six men per divisional equivalent daily. Corresponding figure for same formation during Prague Offensive was forty-five point three. Soviet losses may have declined following announcement of German surrender on 8/the 9th of May. German official history noted Stalin's political intentions and desire prevent Army Group Centre surrender to U.S. forces. Actual surrender discussion remained brief despite section title The End of Army Group Centre. John Erickson's The Road to Berlin discussed offensive including Stalin's intentions and role of Russian Liberation Army. Unofficial histories touched upon end of war in Czechoslovakia somewhere between official German and Soviet views. There does not appear single comprehensive work presenting combat actions and capitulations of German units in Army Groups Centre and Ostmark during period 6-the 11th of May.