Operation Uranus

• 1. The Overextended Front

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  On the 28th of June 1942, the Wehrmacht began its offensive against Soviet forces opposite of Army Group South. This campaign, codenamed Case Blue, aimed to capture the Caucasus oil fields and the city of Stalingrad. By the 13th of July, German forces had broken through Red Army lines and captured Rostov. Hitler then split his southern forces to pursue both objectives simultaneously. The Sixth Army was tasked with taking Stalingrad while other units moved toward the oil fields in the Caucasus. On the 7th of August, two German panzer corps encircled a Soviet force of 50,000 personnel and approximately 1,000 tanks. By the 22nd of August, German forces crossed the Don River to complete their advance toward the Volga. The following day, the Battle of Stalingrad began when vanguards of the Sixth Army penetrated the suburbs of the city. By November, the Sixth Army occupied most of Stalingrad, pushing the defending Red Army to the banks of the Volga River. The length of the front lines created by this summer offensive left Axis forces over-extended. The decision to transfer several mechanized divisions from the Soviet Union to Western Europe exacerbated their situation. Furthermore, Axis units in the area were depleted by months of fighting, especially those which had taken part in the struggle for Stalingrad.

• 2. Stavka's Deception Campaign

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  Planning for Operation Uranus commenced in September 1942, developed simultaneously with plans to envelop and destroy German Army Group Center. The Stavka (high command) placed command of Soviet efforts under General Aleksandr Vasilevsky. Preparations for the offensive were far from perfect; on the 8th of November, Stavka issued orders to postpone the launch date because transportation delays prevented many units from moving into place. Units at the front went through war games to practice repelling an enemy counterattack. These movements were masked through a deception campaign by the Soviets. They decreased radio traffic and used camouflage and operational security measures. Couriers replaced radio communication to avoid detection. Active deception included increasing troop movements around Moscow to draw German attention away from Stalingrad. Troops built defensive fortifications to offer false impressions to the Germans. Fake bridges were put up to divert attention from real bridges being constructed across the Don River. The Red Army also stepped up attacks against Army Group Center and set up dummy formations to maintain the idea of a main offensive against German forces in the center. On the 17th of November, Vasilevsky was recalled to Moscow where he saw a letter from General Volsky urging him to call off the offensive due to the state of the forces earmarked for the operation.

• 3. Disparity Of Forces

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  The Red Army allocated an estimated 1,100,000 personnel, 804 tanks, 13,400 artillery pieces and over 1,000 aircraft for the upcoming offensive. In contrast, Axis units lacked heavy equipment to deal with Soviet armor. For example, the First Romanian Armored Division was equipped with around 100 Czech-built R-2 tanks armed with a gun ineffective against the armor of Soviet T-34 tanks. Their PaK anti-tank guns were also antiquated and they were largely short of ammunition. Only after repeated requests did the Germans send the Romanian units PaK guns; six per division. These units were extended over very large sections of front. The Third Romanian Army occupied a line long, while the Fourth Romanian Army protected a line no less than long. Generally, German forces were in no better shape; they were weakened by months of fighting the Red Army. During the course of the German offensive between May and November 1942, two motorized divisions, the elite Leibstandarte and the Großdeutschland, were redeployed from Army Group A to the West. The Sixth Army had also suffered many casualties during the fighting in the city of Stalingrad proper. In some cases, such as that of the 22nd Panzer Division, their equipment was no better than that of the First Romanian Armored Division.

• 4. The Northern Flank Assault

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  At 07:20 Moscow time on the 19th of November, Soviet forces assaulted the northern flank of the Axis forces at Stalingrad. At 07:30, the Katyusha rocket-launchers fired the first salvos and were soon joined by the 3,500 guns and mortars stretching along the few breakthrough sectors in front of the Third Romanian Army. Although thick fog prevented the Soviet artillery from correcting their aim, their weeks of preparation allowed them to lay down accurate fire on enemy positions. Communication lines were breached, ammunition dumps destroyed and forward observation points shattered. Many Romanian personnel who survived the bombardment began to flee to the rear. Against the Third Romanian Army and the northern flank, the offensive began at 08:50 led by the 21st and 65th Soviet Armies and the 5th Tank Army. The first two assaults were repulsed by the Romanian defenders, but a lack of heavy anti-tank artillery caused the Romanian defense to collapse. A breakthrough by the 4th Tank Corps and 3rd Guards Cavalry Corps was established by noon. Soon after, the 5th Tank Army gained a breakthrough against the Second Romanian Corps. As Soviet armor navigated through the thick fog by compass, three Romanian infantry divisions began to fall back in disarray.

• 5. Southern Breakthrough And Linkup

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  In the early morning of the 20th of November Stavka telephoned Stalingrad Front commander Andrei Yeremenko asking if he would begin his portion of the offensive on schedule. He responded he would do so only if the fog lifted; although the 51st Army opened its artillery barrage on time, the rest of the forces received orders to postpone the attack until 10:00. The 57th Army joined the attack at 10:00, allowing the Stalingrad Front to throw its armored corps into battle. The German 297th Infantry Division watched as its Romanian support failed to put up resistance. However, confusion and lack of control caused the Soviet 4th and 13th Mechanized Corps to stumble as they began to exploit the breakthroughs achieved by the opening offensive. On the 22nd of November Soviet forces began to cross the Don River and continued their advance towards the town of Kalach-on-the-Don. The task of taking the bridge at Kalach was given to the Soviet 26th Tank Corps, which used two captured German tanks and a reconnaissance vehicle to approach it. Soviet forces broke into the town by mid-morning and drove the defenders out. They linked up with the Red Army's 4th Mechanized Corps approaching from the south. At around 16:00 near the village of Sovetsky, forward detachments of 36th Mechanized Brigade sighted the approaching tanks of 45th Brigade from the Southwestern Front's 4th Tank Corps.

• 6. Hitler's Fortress Decision

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  As German forces in and around Stalingrad were at risk, Hitler ordered German forces in the area to establish an all-around defensive position. He designated forces between the Don and Volga rivers as Fortress Stalingrad rather than allow the Sixth Army to attempt to break out. The Sixth Army, other Axis units, and most of the Fourth Panzer Army's German units were caught inside the growing Soviet encirclement. Only the 16th Panzergrenadier Division began to fight its way out. Although German military commanders believed Heer forces should break out, between 23 and the 24th of November Hitler decided instead to hold the position and attempt to resupply the Sixth Army by air. The personnel trapped in Stalingrad would require at least of supplies per day, a task which the depleted Luftwaffe was in no condition to carry out. Furthermore, the revived Red Air Force was a threat to German aircraft attempting to fly over the encirclement. Although by December the Luftwaffe had assembled a fleet of around 500 aircraft, this was still insufficient to supply the Sixth Army. During the first half of December the Sixth Army received less than 20% of their daily requirements.

• 7. Strategic Consequences

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  Operation Uranus trapped between 250,000 and 300,000 Axis soldiers within an area stretching from east to west and north to south. The pocket contained four infantry corps, a panzer corps belonging to the Fourth Panzer and Sixth Armies, and surviving elements of two Romanian divisions. Trapped equipment included around 100 tanks, 2,000 artillery pieces and mortars and 10,000 trucks. The withdrawal to Stalingrad left lines of retreat littered with helmets, weapons and other equipment. Bridges spanning the Don River were jammed with traffic as surviving Axis soldiers hastily made their way westwards. Many wounded Axis personnel were trampled, and many of those who attempted to cross the river on foot on the ice fell through and drowned. Hungry soldiers filled Russian villages scouring for supplies while supply dumps were often looted in search of cans of food. The last stragglers crossed the Don River by the 24th of November and demolished the bridges to seal off the Fourth Panzer and Sixth Armies from the Soviets in Stalingrad. In the meantime, the Red Army strengthened its outer encirclement with the intention of destroying the encircled German units. The Soviet high command also began planning for Operation Saturn, which was aimed at destroying the Italian Eighth Army and cutting off German forces in the Caucasus.