Operation Queen

• 1. Strategic Context And Planning

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  Allied high command believed total victory could be achieved by Christmas 1944. This optimism followed the rapid advance after the Normandy breakout in June 1944. The Falaise pocket disaster had shattered German defenses in northern and western France. A hasty retreat of German forces left a vacuum that Allied armies rushed to fill. The Red Army's ongoing march in the east added pressure on Berlin. General Omar Bradley commanded the 12th Army Group overseeing First and Ninth U.S. Armies. They planned a large offensive against the Roer River as a staging point for a thrust over the river to the Rhine. The operation was codenamed Queen and intended to establish bridgeheads at Linnich, Jülich and Düren. Long term targets included reaching the Rhine and establishing bridgeheads at Krefeld and Düsseldorf. A great number of American and British strategic bombers were assigned to cut supply lines and destroy enemy infrastructure. The entire ground offensive was scheduled to begin immediately after air raids. Initial starting dates set for the 5th of November and later the 10th of November were delayed until the 16th of November due to bad weather.

• 2. The Hürtgen Forest Campaign

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  The main effort of Operation Queen ran through the dense Hürtgen Forest from early September onward. VII Corps under J. Lawton Collins led the attack with the 1st Infantry Division and 104th Infantry Division. The terrain forced fighting mainly in thick woods where American artillery and aerial support proved ineffective. Bloody trench warfare emerged within the forest canopy. German defenders held favorable heightened positions overlooking Allied approach routes. On the 2nd of November the 28th Division launched an offensive against Schmidt that captured the town but lost it days later. Reinforcements from the 89th Infantry Division and mobile reserves from the 116th Panzer Division drove Allies out. Casualties mounted as Americans took hill after hill in heavy fighting. By the 21st of November Collins moved virtually all available artillery to blast a way for the 1st Division. The armored CCB of the 3rd Armored Division lost 49 out of 69 tanks while moving through heavy mud. The 1st Division suffered about 6,000 casualties by early December before pushing out of the forest. Total fighting for the Hürtgen Forest had cost Americans about 32,000 men since September.

• 3. Tactical Air Power And Bombing

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  Allied bombers conducted one of the heaviest tactical bombings of the war on the 16th of November 1944 between 11:13 and 12:48. 1,204 heavy bombers of the U.S. 8th Air Force hit Eschweiler, Weisweiler and Langerwehe with 4,120 bombs. 339 fighter bombers of the U.S. 9th Air Force attacked Hamich, Hürtgen and Gey. 467 Handley Page Halifax and Avro Lancaster heavy bombers struck Düren and Jülich. 180 British bombers targeted Heinsberg. German communications were heavily impaired after the bombing and morale suffered among younger units. Direct damage to frontline troops remained low and casualties were few. Allied air commanders admitted that the bombing did not measure up to expectations. About 12 aircraft were shot down during the initial bombing by meager anti-aircraft fire. Later in December hundreds of aircraft were thrown against the Roer dams but caused only negligible damage. A rare massive Luftwaffe raid occurred on the 2nd of December with about 60 planes causing minor damage.

• 4. German Defensive Strategies

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  The Wehrmacht planned an all-out counteroffensive codenamed Wacht am Rhein mirroring the successful campaign in 1940. The first draft was completed in secret in October 1944 aimed against the Ardennes. Best divisions were held back from autumn fighting to build strength for the planned offensive. Holding the Roer river line was deemed absolutely important to prevent a flanking attack. General der Infanterie Gustav-Adolf von Zangen commanded the 15th Army positioned in the Hürtgen Forest. General der Panzertruppe Erich Brandenberger led the 7th Army in the north Roer plains. Generalfeldmarshall Gerd von Rundstedt and Generalfeldmarshall Walter Model commanded German forces overall. Most German units were seriously understrength with some divisions consisting of only a few thousand men. Heavy entrenchment and considerable tank and artillery support compensated for manpower shortages. Mobile reserves like the 116th Panzer Division mounted several counterattacks during early fighting. The 3rd Parachute Division was transferred to the front while bled out divisions were withdrawn.

• 5. The Roer River Dams

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  Control over dams on the Roer allowed Germans to release water and flood the valley downstream as far as the Meuse. Flooding would destroy Allied bridges and isolate all troops east of the river. The Allies did not fully recognize strategic importance until days before the end of the offensive. First specific actions toward the dams began when RAF bombing started in early December. Hundreds of aircraft attacked the dams but damage remained negligible. On the 13th of December V Corps was tasked to start an offensive to seize the dams from various directions including the Ardennes sector. The offensive took Germans by surprise initially but resistance soon stiffened. Allied planners estimated earliest date for large thrust into Germany as mid-January without knowing of upcoming German offensive. No bridgehead over the river had been made and important dams remained in German hands threatening further operations.

• 6. Catastrophic Casualties And Stalemate

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  Allied advance through Hürtgen Forest proved unexpectedly slow against heavy German resistance. VII Corps suffered about 27,000 casualties in one month while reaching the Roer. Ninth Army lost 1,133 killed, 6,864 wounded and 2,059 missing during Operation Queen. The 1st Division alone suffered about 6,000 casualties by early December. CCB of 3rd Armored Division lost 49 out of 69 tanks moving through heavy mud. The 4th Infantry Division lost about 6,000 men and became unable to conduct further offensive operations. Total fighting cost Americans about 32,000 men since September in the forest. By the 28th of November XIX Corps reached the Roer on a broad front with only two German bridgeheads remaining. These were not taken until the 9th of December. Even after one month of heavy fighting Americans had barely made it to the Roer. No bridgehead over the river had been established and Germans still held portions west of the river.

• 7. Interruption By The Ardennes Offensive

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  On the 16th of December 1944 Germans launched their final all-out offensive Wacht am Rhein on western front. This led to immediate end of all Allied offensive efforts in this sector. The Battle of the Bulge caused cessation of Allied offensive into Germany until February 1945. Allies were taken by complete surprise when Germans achieved quick breakthrough. Later between 14 and the 26th of January 1945 the Roer triangle was cleared during Operation Blackcock. Only in February 1945 did Allies finally cross the Roer. The road to the Rhine remained clear after that point. The successful holding of Roer river line allowed Germany to build up enough troops in secrecy for sufficient blow. Superiority of Allies in numbers could not be overcome by Germany despite lengthened war causing additional destruction and loss of life.