Invasion of Lingayen Gulf
On the 22nd of December 1941, the Japanese 14th Army under Lieutenant General Masaharu Homma landed on the northeastern shores of Lingayen Gulf at Agoo, Caba, Santiago and Bauang. They engaged in relatively minor skirmishes with a poorly equipped contingent of predominantly American and Filipino troops. Facing limited opposition, the larger Japanese forces successfully invaded and occupied the gulf. The day after this defeat, General Douglas MacArthur issued the order to retreat from Luzon and withdraw to Bataan. Following their defeat at the Battle of Bataan, U.S. and Filipino prisoners of war were forced into the Bataan Death March. Their destination was Capas, Tarlac, not far from the capital city of Manila. William L. O'Neill noted in A Democracy at War that this period marked a critical turning point for Allied control in the Philippines. After attempting to establish an independent Allied government supported by American troops under General McArthur on Corregidor, Japanese troops forced the surrender of the remaining American and Filipino forces there at the Battle of Corregidor on the 6th of May 1942. On the 11th of March 1942, Lieutenant John D. Bulkeley had picked up MacArthur, his family, and his immediate staff who had been ordered to flee the Philippines. For the next three years, the gulf remained under Japanese occupation prior to the Lingayen Gulf landings.
At 09:30 on the 9th of January 1945, about 68,000 GIs under General Walter Krueger of the U.S. 6th Army landed at the coast of Lingayen Gulf meeting no opposition. A total of 203,608 soldiers were eventually landed over the next few days establishing a beachhead stretching from Sual and San Fabian at the far East to Dagupan in the center and then to Lingayen at the far West. The location of XIV Corps is shown by the blue line at the center of the map figures. The San Fabian Assault force (I Corps) had landing areas shown as rectangles and a blue line indicating assault forces on the right side near San Fabian. While aboard ship, Task Force 78 commanded by Vice Admiral Daniel E. Barbey was three days behind Admiral Oldendorf's Naval convoys. Task Force 79 commanded by Vice Admiral Theodore Wilkinson was an equal distance behind Oldendorf. Once disembarking, these two ground-based assault Task Forces put more U.S. troops ashore on the first day than those arriving on Normandy beaches on D-Day one. Within a few days, the assault forces quickly captured coastal towns and secured the beachhead while penetrating inland. Heavy losses occurred on land and sea despite their success in driving out Japanese forces stationed there.
Commander Tadashi Nakajima, head of kamikaze operations and training for the Philippines, carefully trained pilots regarding dive angles, target selection, and navigation methods. There were two basic angles of dives strongly preferred; a high altitude approach and a low altitude approach. A high altitude approach could commence at altitudes as high as 10,000 feet ending with a dive angle of 45, 55 degrees once reaching above a sighted target. These directions required considerable skill to implement. A low altitude approach ended with a brief climb followed by a quick dive. The low altitude approach offered reduced radar detection and sighting at very low altitudes above the waterline. Nakajima suggested that a kamikaze might cruise as low as 200 feet if they had adequate skill. He cautioned that in high altitude approaches caution must be taken to ensure final dive angles were not too steep. Once the target was sighted on a low altitude approach, pilots were advised to climb sharply to 400 or 500 meters before going into a steep dive. Points of aim included carrying full fuel tanks to increase odds of starting fires. Against destroyers and smaller transports, Nakajima informed pilots that hits between bridge and center of ship were usually fatal. Small warships having no deck protection were extremely vulnerable to aerial attack.
On the 3rd of January 1945, the escort carrier USS Ommaney Bay was severely damaged by a Yokosuka P1Y kamikaze carrying two bombs. At 17:12, the plane penetrated a Destroyer screen undetected and made for Ommaney approaching directly towards the ship's bow. Captain Young later reported the kamikaze's approach was concealed by blinding glare of sun. The plane sliced across superstructure with its wing collapsing it onto flight deck then veered into her forward starboard side releasing two bombs. Fires and explosions continued until decision was made to scuttle her with torpedo later in day. Her kamikaze strike represented greatest loss of life to single ship with 93 killed and 65 wounded. On the 5th of January, two kamikazes dove at Manila Bay from portside hitting flight deck to starboard abaft bridge causing fires destroying radar transmitting spaces and wiping out all communications. Eight Grumman TBM Avenger torpedo bombers and one Grumman FM-2 Wildcat fighter were destroyed. Firefighting parties promptly brought blazes under control. Within 24 hours she resumed limited air operations. Most repairs completed by the 9th of January when amphibious invasion got underway. HMAS Australia struck five times during operation though only first two strikes caused serious damage.
During initial stages of approach cloudy weather and intermittent rain prevailed overcast conditions due to intermediate type cloudiness. Occasional areas of very light precipitation were encountered. Intermittent rain combined with thick smoke caused by bombardment groups by mid-day the 6th of January may have affected visibility on critical days 6, the 7th of January. This significantly reduced ability of ships within gulf to sight kamikazes. Light to moderate winds hampered maneuverability of smaller ships evading attacks. Wave activity on East side of gulf somewhat reduced ability of smaller ships to effectively aim anti-aircraft guns. Samuel Cox noted that at least on the 6th of January there was an overcast that hampered both U.S. and Japanese operations. U.S. ships could not see Japanese aircraft until they broke through overcast with very little time to react. By mid-morning in January 10, second day of assault, 6 to 8-foot surf resulting from increased swell had caused landing operations to come to a halt. It was not until third day of assault the 11th of January that swell diminished allowing continued landing operations. Strong winds rough seas heavy swells recorded on the 6th of January through the 9th of January definitely hampered landing planes and work deck crews.
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Common questions
When did the Japanese 14th Army land on the northeastern shores of Lingayen Gulf?
The Japanese 14th Army landed on the northeastern shores of Lingayen Gulf at Agoo, Caba, Santiago and Bauang on the 22nd of December 1941. They engaged in relatively minor skirmishes with a poorly equipped contingent of predominantly American and Filipino troops.
Who led the Allied invasion force that returned to Lingayen Gulf in January 1945?
Admiral Jesse B. Oldendorf commanded the ships of the invasion force that took a lengthy circuitous route through previously captured islands of Leyte Gulf from the 3rd of January 1945. General Walter Krueger led about 68,000 GIs under the U.S. 6th Army who landed at the coast of Lingayen Gulf at 09:30 on the 9th of January 1945.
What specific dates marked the kamikaze attacks on the USS Ommaney Bay during the operation?
On the 3rd of January 1945, the escort carrier USS Ommaney Bay was severely damaged by a Yokosuka P1Y kamikaze carrying two bombs. The ship was scuttled later that day after fires and explosions continued until the decision was made to sink it.
How many mines were found by Underwater Demolition Teams during the sweep of approach channels to Lingayen Gulf?
Only one mine was encountered initially by Underwater Demolition Teams before Lieutenant Commander W. R. Loud claimed to have found around ten additional mines by end of day the 7th of January. Smith wrote that exploratory sweeps during the morning turned up only two floating mines and none of the moored type for a total of less than 12 mines.
Why did landing operations halt between the 6th of January and the 11th of January 1945?
Landing operations came to a halt due to 6 to 8-foot surf resulting from increased swell by mid-morning in January 10. It was not until third day of assault the 11th of January that swell diminished allowing continued landing operations despite strong winds and rough seas recorded on the 6th of January through the 9th of January.