FOREST

• 1. Introduction

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  FOREST, short for the Freedom Organisation for the Right to Enjoy Smoking Tobacco, was born not from a grassroots uprising of smokers, but from a 1978 conversation between a retired Air Chief Marshal and the major British tobacco companies. The man who started that conversation, Sir Christopher Foxley-Norris, was a pipe and cigar smoker who worried that governments and what he called "do-gooding bodies" were crowding out personal choice. He also, candidly, wanted a salaried job to top up his pension after leaving the RAF in 1974. That admission set the tone for everything that followed. How does an industry fund a campaign group while making it look independent? How do you measure the success of an organisation whose real victories, by its own account, cannot be publicised? And what happens when the people running the group start making their own headlines for the wrong reasons?

• 2. An Awkward Birth

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  At roughly the same time Foxley-Norris was pitching the tobacco companies, Lieutenant-General Sir Geoffrey Charles Evans, a cigarette smoker and former General Secretary of the National Union of Retail Tobacconists, was making identical proposals to industry figures. Two retired military men, independently, had arrived at the same idea. The Tobacco Advisory Committee, the British tobacco industry's trade association at the time, concluded the moment was right for a pro-smoking group. Its condition was pointed: the new organisation had to be "closely controlled and supported by the industry, but be seen to be sufficiently independent to maintain its credibility." That sentence captures the central tension FOREST would never fully escape. After debate over which man should lead, FOREST launched on the 19th of June 1979, with Foxley-Norris as chairman and Evans as chief executive. They were the group's first two members.

  The early years were troubled. A March 1980 memo from the Tobacco Advisory Committee revealed industry frustration: there was confusion about the organisation's purpose, doubts about whether its activities were effective, and no clear answer on whether FOREST should chase mass membership or simply serve the industry directly. By 1981, some tobacco companies were questioning whether to keep funding FOREST at all, or dissolve it in favour of something more effective. The industry ultimately chose to restructure rather than replace, agreeing that a new model for a pro-smoking pressure group would be grafted onto the existing organisation.

• 3. Control and the Libertarian Turn

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  Stephen Eyres was brought in as Director of the restructured group in 1981. The restructuring proposal was candid about power: "If money invested is to be properly effective then control and management are essential," it stated, specifying that contact between the Executive Director of FOREST and the Tobacco Advisory Council should occur "on an almost daily basis." At the same time, the proposal acknowledged that "nobody of worth to a campaigning organisation can be run on too tight a rein," so funding would be guaranteed annually rather than held as a conditional threat.

  From the Eyres appointment onward, FOREST's leadership gravitated toward the libertarian movement. Chris Tame was recruited in 1988, succeeding Eyres as the organisation's effective leader. Tame was a non-smoker. His argument against restrictions on second-hand smoke exposure was not about tobacco itself but about individuals' right to make their own health decisions, a framing drawn from libertarian philosophy. Lord Harris of High Cross, general director of the Institute of Economic Affairs, replaced Foxley-Norris as the public figurehead in 1989; Harris was a pipe smoker and remained chairman until his death in 2006. The ideological current running through FOREST's leadership was consistent across these years: personal freedom mattered more than collective health outcomes.

• 4. Scandal and Succession

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  September 1989 brought a crisis. Eyres, still employed by FOREST, was accused of misusing the organisation's funds to purchase first-class flights to Australia and a property in Spain. The tobacco industry's priority was avoiding publicity, not transparency. Eyres resigned effective the 1st of October 1989, and a High Court judgement confirmed in November 1989 included an agreement that neither side would discuss the circumstances of his departure. Eyres died in 1990, the year after leaving the organisation.

  Tame continued as Director after the Eyres affair, but his tenure ended in 1995 when the tobacco industry removed him following concerns about his approach. He was replaced by Marjorie Nicholson, who had been the organisation's campaign manager and had previously stood for Parliament at the 1994 Dudley West by-election under the FOREST name. Simon Clark took over from Nicholson in 1999 and remains the current director. Clark launched a spin-off campaign called The Free Society, extending FOREST's remit beyond tobacco to what he described as the broader problem of the "nanny state," arguing that eating choices, like smoking choices, should be left to individuals.

• 5. The Astroturf Problem

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  FOREST marketed itself as "the voice and friend of the smoker," but critics described it as an astroturf front group created and primarily funded by the tobacco industry. The membership campaigns that might have grounded that claim in genuine public support never succeeded. In one documented attempt, 10,000 cigarette retailers were solicited to join FOREST; only four did. Financial support from the tobacco industry remained the main funding source throughout.

  The gap between public image and private reality was not accidental. FOREST's 1985 Directors' Report acknowledged that "the arms-length relationship with the industry has worked to the benefit of both parties." The same report noted that letter-writers were "retained" to maintain an active presence in local media, creating the appearance of organic public concern. In its internal communications to the tobacco industry, FOREST argued that measuring its work purely through media coverage missed the point: its real successes "cannot be publicised." Persuading others to "sing the same tune" was, the document stated, more valuable than anything FOREST or the tobacco industry could say directly. Foxley-Norris's first television interview, given to BBC London on the 25th of July 1979, asked members of the public to join for just one pound a year. The public largely did not take up the offer.

• 6. Defeat and Regrouping

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  February 2006 marked FOREST's most significant legislative defeat. Comprehensive smoke-free workplace regulations for England passed via a House of Commons free vote, with implementation set for the 1st of July 2007. Scotland had already introduced similar regulations in March 2006; Northern Ireland and Wales followed in April 2007. The legislation covered pubs, bars, cafes, restaurants, private members' clubs, and all indoor workplaces.

  FOREST responded by regrouping around a freedom-of-choice banner. Its 2009 Save Our Pubs and Clubs campaign, which called for licensed premises to decide for themselves whether to permit smoking, drew support from Conservative MP Greg Knight, Labour MP David Clelland, Liberal Democrat MP John Hemming, and Nigel Farage, then UKIP leader and an MEP. The Working Men's Club and Institute Union, the Adam Smith Institute, thinktank Progressive Vision, and the Manifesto Club were listed as backers. In 2010, FOREST launched an Irish branch, Forest Éireann, focusing on the Republic of Ireland, which had introduced nationwide smoke-free workplace rules in March 2004. A September 2010 Forest Éireann report argued the indoor smoking ban had caused a decline in Irish pub trade. The Irish group's spokesman at the time was John Mallon, a sales manager and former oil rigger, a detail that speaks to the organisation's persistent struggle to present a genuinely popular face.