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— CH. 1 · STRATEGIC CONTEXT AND TARGET SELECTION —

Bombing of Hamburg in World War II

~6 min read · Ch. 1 of 7
7 sections
  • In August 1941, the War Cabinet received a report that exposed the failure of early bombing operations. The Butt Report analyzed 600 photographs from three months of raids and found that only one third of crews who claimed to reach their targets had actually dropped bombs within five miles of them. This data forced a shift in strategy away from precision attacks on military sites toward area bombing of civilian populations. By November 1940, opinion was developing that the German people were legitimate targets in total war. Air Marshal Arthur Harris took command of RAF Bomber Command in February 1942 with political backing from Winston Churchill and Franklin Roosevelt. They needed a significant success to justify the campaign after telling the Soviet Union that no second front would open in Europe during summer 1942. Hamburg emerged as the ideal target because its construction made it particularly vulnerable to incendiary weapons. The city contained high numbers of industrial targets supporting the war effort including shipyards and U-boat pens. Its location near the coast and on a prominent river made navigation easier for pilots flying from British bases.

  • Britain's experience of being bombed during the Blitz contributed directly to how the Royal Air Force planned future campaigns. Detailed study by the Research and Experiment unit RE8 established that incendiaries could inflict far more damage than high-explosive bombs alone. Tests carried out on models determined the precise ratio of explosive to incendiary ordnance required to create a firestorm. High explosives were used to blow out windows and make firefighting dangerous while delayed-action fuses suppressed any attempt to extinguish flames. The Americans added their own expertise by introducing oil-based incendiaries which were preferred over magnesium-cased thermite bombs used by the British. Large quantities of these American-made devices entered service with the Eighth Bomber Command shortly before the raid began. This extensive research proved that effectiveness relied on scientific planning rather than accidental weather conditions. The goal was to deliver enough incendiaries to totally overwhelm firefighting capabilities so that a conflagration could become established without intervention.

  • The campaign known as Operation Gomorrah began on the 24th of July 1943 and lasted for eight days and seven nights. It remains the heaviest assault in the history of aerial warfare at that time. The name derived from one of the two Canaanite cities of Sodom and Gomorrah whose destruction is recorded in the Bible. On the night of the 24th of July, 791 bombers took off between 21:45 and 23:00 hours. Pathfinder aircraft guided only by H2S radar started dropping yellow target indicators at 00:57 followed by red flares dropped visually. No. 35 Squadron led the marking effort while the main force began bombing at 01:02 until 01:50 in six waves. Less than half the bombers dropped their bombs within five miles of the aiming point. During this first raid approximately 1,500 people died according to local police estimates. A second daylight attack occurred on the 25th of July when 127 Boeing B-17 Flying Fortresses reached Hamburg despite fighter attacks en route. Only 54 aircraft managed to bomb targets on the 26th of July due to formation problems and early returns. The third major raid on 27/the 28th of July involved 787 RAF aircraft including Vickers Wellingtons Short Stirlings Handley Page Halifaxes and Avro Lancasters.

  • Unusually dry and warm weather combined with concentrated bombing created a tornadic fire that generated winds up to 100 miles per hour and temperatures exceeding 1,000 degrees Fahrenheit. This vortex drew oxygen from above and sucked carbon monoxide into basement shelters where thousands sought safety. Asphalt streets appeared to burst into flame because phosphorus from fire bombs was burning rather than the pavement itself. Fuel oil spilled from damaged ships and storage tanks ignited the canals and harbor waters. In just over thirty minutes an estimated 550 to 600 bomb loads fell into an area measuring only two square miles. The firestorm consumed approximately 16,000 multi-storeyed apartment buildings during its three-hour duration. An estimated 18,474 people died on the night of the 27th of July alone while many more suffocated in cellars converted into air protection rooms. By December 1943 there were 31,647 confirmed dead but only 15,802 bodies had been identified. Those who died represented about 2.4 percent of Hamburg's total population at the time.

  • The massive destruction precipitated large changes to German air defense systems within weeks of the initial attacks. Priority shifted immediately to fighter production as research intensified for more effective radar technology. Both aircraft and guns were diverted away from front-line combat to defend Germany directly. By August 1943 forty-five percent of all German fighters were located on the home front with additional units stationed in northern France. Heavy anti-aircraft guns increased by over twenty-five percent across the Reich. Anti-aircraft units made greatly increased demands for personnel and later used twenty-five percent of all ammunition produced. Documents show that German officials were thoroughly alarmed by the scale of devastation. Hitler reportedly stated that further raids of similar weight would force Germany out of the war. The reallocation of industrial war production to home defense became an unintended consequence that left fighting fronts suffering from lack of air support.

  • Both The Times of London and The New York Times ran stories on the 26th of July 1943 emphasizing the coordinated British-American nature of the campaign. Military expert George Fielding Eliot analyzed the subject at length in his syndicated column published in US newspapers by the 3rd of August 1943. Newspaper editorials and cartoons referred to the complete destruction of Hamburg with headlines like Hamburg Is No More. A report from the Newspaper Enterprise Association's London correspondent on the 9th of August speculated how quickly Berlin could be eliminated in the same fashion. Initial eyewitness accounts described the event as beyond belief without attempting numerical figures. One Swiss merchant called it a hell released by a devil's concert amounting to ceaseless inescapable destruction. Even the German press which had previously downplayed bombings emphasized the effects on Hamburg and numbers of refugees fleeing. Later in August a Swiss dispatch to Swedish newspapers gave a figure of 152,000 killed without explaining the source. Just months after the European war ended newspaper accounts described findings of the United States Strategic Bombing Survey publicly released on the 30th of October 1945 giving German estimates between 60,000 and 100,000 deaths.

  • The totally destroyed quarter of Hammerbrook was rebuilt not as housing but as a commercial area while Rothenburgsort shared that fate. The underground line connecting both areas with the central station remained unbuilt after the war. Hills of the Öjendorfer Park were formed by debris of destroyed houses piled high over decades. In January 1946 Major Cortez F. Enloe stated that fire effects of the atomic bomb dropped on Nagasaki were not nearly as bad as RAF raids on the 27th of July 1943. He estimated more than 40,000 people died during those attacks. Several memorials now stand in Hamburg including ruins of the Nikolaikirche where the spire survived the attacks. A memorial at Hamburger Strasse marks those who died under Karstadt department store hit on the 29th of July. Victims buried in mass graves at Ohlsdorf Cemetery are honored by Passage over the Styx sculpture showing Charon ferrying souls across the river. Many houses rebuilt after World War II bear plaques inscribed Destroyed 1943 , 19** Rebuilt to remind residents of destruction during July 1943.

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Common questions

When did the bombing of Hamburg in World War II begin and how long did it last?

The campaign known as Operation Gomorrah began on the 24th of July 1943 and lasted for eight days and seven nights. It remains the heaviest assault in the history of aerial warfare at that time.

Why was Hamburg chosen as a target for British and American bombers during World War II?

Hamburg emerged as the ideal target because its construction made it particularly vulnerable to incendiary weapons. The city contained high numbers of industrial targets supporting the war effort including shipyards and U-boat pens while its location near the coast and on a prominent river made navigation easier for pilots flying from British bases.

How many people died during the bombing of Hamburg in World War II according to official records?

By December 1943 there were 31,647 confirmed dead but only 15,802 bodies had been identified. Later newspaper accounts described findings of the United States Strategic Bombing Survey publicly released on the 30th of October 1945 giving German estimates between 60,000 and 100,000 deaths.

What specific weather conditions contributed to the firestorm during the bombing of Hamburg in World War II?

Unusually dry and warm weather combined with concentrated bombing created a tornadic fire that generated winds up to 100 miles per hour and temperatures exceeding 1,000 degrees Fahrenheit. This vortex drew oxygen from above and sucked carbon monoxide into basement shelters where thousands sought safety.

How did the bombing of Hamburg in World War II affect German air defense systems and military production?

Priority shifted immediately to fighter production as research intensified for more effective radar technology. By August 1943 forty-five percent of all German fighters were located on the home front with additional units stationed in northern France while heavy anti-aircraft guns increased by over twenty-five percent across the Reich.

All sources

45 references cited across the entry

  1. 2webTarget map for Hamburg, 1943Royal Air Force Museum
  2. 5bookThe Bomber War: Theallied Air Offensive on GermanyRobin Neillands — The Overlook Press — 2001
  3. 7newsTwo Raids On Hamburg26 July 1943
  4. 9bookBodies and Ruins: Imagining the Bombing of Germany, 1945 to the PresentDavid F. Crew — University of Michigan Press — 2017
  5. 10newsThe Military Situation3 August 1943
  6. 12newsAnxiety Grows In Germany((Our Diplomatic Correspondent)) — 9 August 1943
  7. 13newsHamburg Scene of Horror9 August 1943
  8. 14newsEvacuation Of Hamburg((Our Special Correspondent)) — 2 August 1943
  9. 18bookSuper Bomb: Organizational Conflict and the Development of the Hydrogen BombCornell University Press — 2019
  10. 19magazineNews in Brief10 January 1946
  11. 20harvnbRAF staff (2005) p. [http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20070706011932/http://www.raf.mod.uk/bombercommand/diary_france.html The Battle of France (May–Jun 1940)]RAF staff — 2005
  12. 21harvnbRAF staff (2005) p. [http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20070706011932/http://www.raf.mod.uk/bombercommand/diary_bob.html The Battle of Britain (June–October 1940)]RAF staff — 2005
  13. 22harvnbRAF staff (2005) p. [http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20070706011932/http://www.raf.mod.uk/bombercommand/diary1941_1.html Jan–Apr 41]RAF staff — 2005
  14. 23harvnbRAF staff (2005) p. [http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20070706011932/http://www.raf.mod.uk/bombercommand/diary1941_2.html May–Aug 41]RAF staff — 2005
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  19. 28harvnbPreller (2014) p. 384th BG Mission 2Preller — 2014
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