Battle of the Bzura

• 1. Introduction

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  The Battle of the Bzura, also known as the Battle of Kutno, was the largest battle of the German invasion of Poland. It was fought from the 9th to the 19th of September 1939, west of Warsaw, along the Bzura River. One description calls it the bloodiest and most bitter battle of the entire Polish campaign. It began as a Polish counter-attack, launched by armies that had spent the first days of the war falling back. Why would two battered armies choose to strike first? What did the German command fail to notice while its eyes were fixed on Warsaw? And what did the attempt cost the men on both sides of the river?

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• 2. Defending the Borders

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  Plan West, the Polish scheme for meeting a German invasion, called for holding the frontier itself. Politics shaped that choice more than military logic did. The Poles feared that Germany would seize back the lands lost under the Treaty of Versailles and then try to end the war while keeping them. Defending the borders was risky, and Polish planners were counting on a British and French counteroffensive. It never came.

  Army Pomorze, under General Władysław Bortnowski, soon found itself surrounded in the Polish Corridor, with German forces pressing from two directions. Army Poznań, under General Tadeusz Kutrzeba, was pushed to the far western fringe of Poland. It was cut off from its main defensive positions and from the other Polish armies.

  At the Battle of Bory Tucholskie, Army Pomorze was beaten and fell back to the south-east. Army Poznań met no heavy assault, yet defeats on either side forced it east as well. Army Pomorze lay to its north and Army Łódź to its south. With both neighbours retreating, Poznań risked being flanked and surrounded. On the 4th of September it marched through the city of Poznań and left it to the enemy, although no significant German force was in contact with it. By the 6th of September the two armies had linked up. Together they formed the strongest Polish operational unit of the campaign, and Bortnowski accepted Kutrzeba's command. That combined force was the one the Germans were about to lose track of.

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• 3. Kutrzeba's Gamble

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  On the 7th of September, Polish commanders learned of a German push toward Łęczyca. If it succeeded, it could cut the road by which their forces were retreating. By the 8th, advance German units had reached Warsaw, and the Siege of Warsaw began.

  That same day, German commanders lost contact with Army Poznań. They guessed it had been moved by rail to help defend the capital. They did not realise that it had joined forces with Army Pomorze, which they considered finished after its earlier defeat. Certain that organised Polish resistance west of the Vistula was over, they prepared to cross that river and fight the Poles on the far bank.

  Kutrzeba and his staff had suspected, even before the invasion, that the neighbouring armies would take the brunt of the German blow. They had therefore drawn up plans for an offensive to the south, meant to relieve Army Łódź. Marshal Edward Rydz-Śmigły, the Polish commander-in-chief, rejected those plans during the first week of the campaign. By the 8th of September he had moved his command center from Warsaw to Brest, and Kutrzeba had lost contact with him. Kutrzeba decided to go ahead anyway.

  The German 8th Army held the southern bank of the Bzura. The German 4th Army held the northern bank of the Vistula from Włocławek to Wyszogród, and its elements were attacking the rear of both Polish armies from the direction of Inowrocław. Some of them were already crossing the Vistula near Płock.

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• 4. Order of Battle

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  Facing Army Poznań and Army Pomorze stood the German 8th Army under Johannes Blaskowitz and the 10th Army under Walther von Reichenau, both belonging to Army Group South. Elements of the 4th Army under Günther von Kluge, from Army Group North, were also drawn in. Overhead were two air fleets, Luftflotte 1 and Luftflotte 4. The 10th Army included General Hoepner's XVI Corps, which held the 1st and 4th Panzer Divisions.

  Army Poznań fielded the 14th, 17th, 25th and 26th Infantry Divisions. It also had two cavalry brigades, the Wielkopolska Cavalry Brigade under General Roman Abraham and the Podolska Cavalry Brigade under Colonel L. Strzelecki. Their regiments included the 15th, 17th, 6th, 9th and 14th Uhlans. Army Pomorze contributed the 4th, 15th, 16th and 27th Infantry Divisions. Those cavalry brigades were the first Polish units to move.

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• 5. The Night Offensive

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  On the night of the 9th of September, Army Poznań struck north across the Bzura from the south of the river. Kutrzeba had noticed that Blaskowitz's 8th Army was weakly protected on its northern side. Most of the army was advancing toward Warsaw, and only the 30th Infantry Division guarded that side, stretched across a line some 30 km long. The Polish target was the German force moving between Łęczyca and Łowicz toward Stryków.

  General Edmund Knoll-Kownacki's operational group delivered the main blow. It was built from the 14th, 17th, 25th and 26th Infantry Divisions. On the right wing, near Łęczyca, advanced Strzelecki's Podolska brigade. On the left, moving from Łowicz toward Głowno, went Abraham's Wielkopolska brigade. Both were reinforced with TKS and TK-3 reconnaissance tanks, and they pushed around the flanks and rear of the German units.

  About 1,500 German soldiers were killed or wounded in the opening push, and another 3,000 were taken prisoner. The losses fell on the 30th and 24th Infantry Divisions. The Germans were thrown back roughly 20 km. Polish troops recaptured Łęczyca, Piątek and the village of Góra Świętej Małgorzaty.

  On the 10th of September, the Polish 17th Infantry Division met the German 17th Infantry Division at Małachowicze. The next day the Poles pressed on toward Modlna, Pludwiny, Osse and Głowno. By the 12th they stood on the line between Stryków and Ozorków, where the advance would stop.

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• 6. The German Answer

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  On the 11th of September, the German command, which had first underestimated the Polish advance, turned its strength toward the Bzura. It redirected the main force of the 10th Army, the 4th Army, reserves from Army Group South and aircraft of the 4th Air Fleet. Among the forces sent were the 1st and 4th Panzer Divisions and the newly formed SS infantry regiment Leibstandarte Adolf Hitler. German air superiority made any daytime movement very costly and difficult for the Poles.

  On the 12th, Kutrzeba learned that units of Army Łódź had retreated to the Modlin Fortress. He halted the offensive. Instead he tried to break through at Sochaczew and the Kampinos Forest to reach Warsaw.

  On the morning of the 14th, Bortnowski's 26th and 16th Infantry Divisions crossed the Bzura near Łowicz. The 4th Infantry Division reached the road linking Łowicz with Głowno. Then Bortnowski ordered the 26th to retreat. He had learned that the German 4th Panzer Division was withdrawing from the outskirts of Warsaw, and he feared it threatened his men. Within two days, the full German attack would begin.

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• 7. The Closing Trap

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  On the 15th and the 16th of September, Army Pomorze dug in on the north bank of the Bzura. General Stanisław Grzmot-Skotnicki's group stood between Kutno and Żychlin. General Michał Karaszewicz-Tokarzewski's units were near Gąbin, and parts of Army Poznań held the river near Sochaczew. All were ready to begin their drive toward Warsaw.

  To encircle and destroy them, the Germans committed most of the 10th Army. It included two armoured, one motorized and three light divisions, with some 800 tanks altogether. The attack from all sides began on the 16th, backed by the Luftwaffe. The Poles had already been forced out of Sochaczew on the 15th. They were trapped in a triangle formed by the Bzura, the Vistula and the German forces.

  The German 1st Panzer Division crossed the Bzura between Sochaczew and Brochów and engaged the Polish 25th Infantry Division. It captured Ruszki, but its advance was then halted. Polish troops began crossing the Bzura near the Vistula, north of Sochaczew, and retreating toward Warsaw. They had to abandon most of their heavy equipment at the river.

  On the 17th of September, German heavy artillery shelled the crossing north of Brochów. The largest air operation of the campaign began that day, as the Luftwaffe attacked the retreating Polish forces.

  That night, the main forces of Army Poznań tried to break out of the encirclement between Witkowice and Sochaczew. The 15th Infantry Division and the Podolska Cavalry Brigade crossed the Bzura at Witkowice. At Brochów, the 25th and 17th Infantry Divisions crossed. The 14th Infantry Division gathered at Łaziska, while Army Pomorze marched toward the villages of Osmolin, Kierozia and Osiek.

  The next morning the Germans drove south along both banks of the river. More than 300 aircraft and heavy artillery supported them. German howitzers on the high ground of the Vistula's right bank shelled Polish positions all day. After two days of heavy fighting, the Poles had no ammunition or food left, and further breakout attempts became impossible.

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• 8. Aftermath

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  Only a few Polish units broke out of the ring. They crossed the Kampinos Forest and fought German units along the way, including at the Battle of Wólka Węglowa. Most reached Warsaw and Modlin around the 19th and the 20th of September. Among them were Generals Kutrzeba, Knoll-Kownacki and Tokarzewski, Abraham's two cavalry brigades, and the 15th and 25th Infantry Divisions.

  The 4th, 14th, 17th, 26th and 27th Infantry Divisions never got across the river. They surrendered with General Bortnowski between the 18th and the 22nd of September. Polish casualties are estimated at 20,000 dead, including three generals named Franciszek Wład, Stanisław Grzmot-Skotnicki and Mikołaj Bołtuć. German dead are estimated at 8,000. The battle destroyed Army Poznań and Army Pomorze.

  The remaining German divisions rushed toward Warsaw and Modlin and soon encircled both. Still, the early Polish successes on the Bzura had halted the German advance on Warsaw for several days. The Wehrmacht had to divert units from that push. This helped the defenders of Warsaw and its surroundings organise their long defence, which ultimately failed.

  The campaign also taught lessons about taking the initiative. It showed that horse cavalry could still matter on the battlefield, and it proved the value of air superiority. It also confirmed that simple numerical superiority still counted. Winston Churchill called the battle an ever-glorious struggle.

  With the battle over, the German occupation of Western Poland was complete. The survivors of the Bzura now had to continue the fight inside encircled Warsaw and Modlin.

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