Battle of Pea Ridge

Command Structure And Leadership

On the 4th of March 1862 instead of attacking Curtis's position head on Van Dorn split his army into two divisions under Price and McCulloch ordering a march north along the Bentonville Detour to get behind Curtis and cut his lines of communication. For speed Van Dorn left his supply trains behind which proved a crucial decision. Amid a freezing storm the Confederates made a three-day forced march from Fayetteville through Elm Springs and Osage Spring to Bentonville arriving stretched out along the road hungry and tired. Warned by scouts and Arkansas unionists Curtis rapidly concentrated his outlying units behind Little Sugar Creek placing William Vandever's seven hundred-man brigade who marched in sixteen hours from Huntsville to Little Sugar Creek. But Curtis's right flank also suffered from Sigel's having sent a three hundred sixty-man task force to the west where they would miss the next three days of fighting. Sigel also withdrew a cavalry patrol from the road on which the Confederate army was advancing however Colonel Frederick Schaefer of the Second Missouri Infantry on his own initiative extended his patrols to cover the gap. When Van Dorn's advance guard blundered into one of these patrols near Elm Springs the Federals were alerted. Still Sigel was so slow in evacuating Bentonville that his rear guard was nearly snared by Van Dorn on March 6 as he advanced. Waiting until the Confederate advance was nearly upon him Sigel ordered his six hundred men and six guns to fall back on a road leading northeast toward Curtis's position. The Confederate First Missouri Cavalry led by Elijah Gates attacked from the south to cut off Sigel's retreat. They managed to surprise and capture a company of the Thirty-Sixth Illinois but many were freed when Sigel's withdrawing men unexpectedly bumped into them. Sigel managed to fight his way through Gates' men helped by a blunder by Confederate Brigadier General James M. McIntosh. McIntosh had planned to envelop Sigel's force from the northwest while Gates closed the trap on the south. However McIntosh mistakenly took his three thousand-man cavalry brigade too far up a northerly road. After marching three miles out of his way he turned his troopers onto the road leading east into the Little Sugar Creek valley. By the time they reached the site where Sigel's northeast road met McIntosh's east-bound road the Federal general's men had already passed the intersection thus avoiding a disaster. When the Third Texas Cavalry charged they ran smack into Sigel's main line. The Confederates lost ten men while twenty or more were wounded by Federal artillery and rifle fire and the Union position held.

Tactical Movements On Day One

Van Dorn had planned for both his divisions to reach Cross Timber Hollow but by dawn only the head of Price's division had made it that far. Because of the delay Van Dorn instructed McCulloch's division to take the Ford Road from Twelve Corner Church and meet Price at Elkhorn. That morning Federal patrols detected both threats. Not knowing where the Confederate main body was located Curtis sent Dodge's brigade of Colonel Eugene A. Carr's Fourth Division northeast up the Wire Road to join the Twenty-Fourth Missouri Infantry at Elkhorn Tavern. But Dodge still worried about the threat to the Federal rear had disobeyed orders and pulled his brigade back to Pratt's Store available to immediately reinforce Elkhorn. Curtis also sent a task force under Colonel Peter J. Osterhaus north to reconnoiter along Ford Road. Osterhaus' force consisted of Colonel Nicholas Greusel's brigade of his own First Division several cavalry units led by Colonel Cyrus Bussey and twelve cannons. McCulloch's force consisted of a cavalry brigade under Brigadier General James McIntosh an infantry brigade under Colonel Louis Hébert and a combined force of Cherokee Chickasaw Choctaw Creek and Seminole cavalry under Brigadier General Albert Pike. McCulloch's troops swung west on the Ford Road and plowed into elements of the Federal army at a small village named Leetown where a fierce firefight erupted. At 11:30 a.m. Osterhaus rode north through a belt of timber onto Foster Farm and witnessed an astonishing sight. McCulloch's entire division was marching east on Ford Road only a few hundred yards away. Despite the odds Osterhaus ordered Bussey's small force to attack to buy time for his infantry brigade to deploy. Three Federal cannon began shelling the Southerners killing at least ten. McCulloch wheeled McIntosh's three thousand horsemen to the south to attack. The massed Confederate charge overwhelmed Bussey's force stampeding them and capturing the cannons. A little further west two companies of the Third Iowa ran into Pike's Cherokee and were similarly routed. The Iowa unit's unusual killed-to-wounded ratio twenty-four killed and seventeen wounded suggests that the Native American warriors killed a number of wounded Northerners. This incident tarnished Pike's image and reputation for the duration of his life giving evidence that the Native Americans laid finishing blows on the wounded as well as scalped and mutilated some in the surprised Union troop.

The Decisive Second Day Assault

In the early morning Sigel sent Osterhaus to scout the open prairie to the west of Elkhorn. The colonel discovered a knoll that promised to make an excellent artillery position and reported it to Sigel. Osterhaus also suggested that the First and Second Divisions simply march up the Telegraph Road and deploy on Davis' left rather than retrace the route of the previous evening; Sigel agreed with his advice and his wing was put into motion. In the meantime Davis ordered an Illinois battery to fire a few salvos into the woods opposite his position. This provoked a sharp Confederate reaction. Three Southern batteries opened fire causing two Federal batteries to retreat and Davis to pull his men out of the open and back into the woods. This was followed by a Confederate probe which was quickly driven back. Soon Sigel's men extended in a long line to the left of Davis. By 8:00 a.m. Asboth's division took its place on the far left then came Osterhaus Davis and Carr with the Federal line generally facing north. It was possibly the only time during the war an entire army was visibly deployed in one continuous line of battle from flank to flank. Sigel now massed twenty-one cannons on the open knoll to the west of Elkhorn. With Sigel in personal control the Federal artillery began an extremely effective fire against the twelve Southern guns opposed to them. When the Confederate gunners pulled back under the deadly fire Van Dorn ordered two batteries to take their place. After one of the new batteries panicked and fled Van Dorn put its commander under arrest. But the Southern commander was unable to counter Sigel's devastating fire. Return fire from the Confederate artillery was ineffective and few Federals were killed. With the opposing guns rendered nearly harmless Sigel directed his gunners to fire into the woods at the Confederate infantry. Near the base of Big Mountain the projectiles created a deadly combination of rock shrapnel and wood splinters driving the Second Missouri Brigade from its positions. It was one of the few times in the Civil War when a preparatory artillery barrage effectively softened up an enemy position and paved the way for an infantry assault. During the bombardment Sigel's infantry edged forward so that by 9:30 a.m. his divisions had executed a right wheel and faced to the northeast. By this time Van Dorn found that his reserve artillery ammunition was with the wagon train a six-hour march away. The Southern commander bitterly realized that he had no hope of victory and decided to retreat via the Huntsville Road.

Casualties And Immediate Aftermath

Federal forces reported two hundred three killed nine hundred eighty wounded and two hundred one missing for a total of one thousand three hundred eighty-four casualties. Of these Carr's Fourth Division lost six hundred eighty-two almost all in its action on the first day and Davis' Third Division lost three hundred forty-four. Both Asboth and Carr were wounded but remained in command of their divisions. Van Dorn reported his losses as eight hundred killed and wounded with between two hundred and three hundred prisoners but these are probably too low. A more recent estimate is that the Confederates suffered approximately two thousand casualties in the Battle of Pea Ridge. These losses included a large proportion of senior officers. Generals McCulloch McIntosh and William Y. Slack were killed or mortally wounded and Price wounded. Among colonels Hébert was captured and Benjamin Rives was mortally wounded with two other colonels captured and one wounded. Separated from their supply train Van Dorn's main body retreated through very sparsely settled country for a week living off what little food they could take from the inhabitants. They finally reunited with their supply train south of the Boston Mountains but thousands of Price's troops deserted and returned to Missouri. Pike meanwhile believing that the Confederate army had been destroyed returned to the Indian Territory. Van Dorn refused to admit that he was defeated but only failed in my intentions. With the defeat at Pea Ridge the Confederates never again seriously threatened the state of Missouri. Within weeks Van Dorn's army was transferred across the Mississippi River to bolster the Confederate Army of Tennessee leaving Arkansas virtually defenseless. With his victory Curtis sent some of his troops east of the Mississippi and proceeded with the remainder of his army to move east to West Plains Missouri. Then he turned south into undefended northeast Arkansas. He had hopes of capturing Little Rock but this proved impossible because of a lack of supplies and because guerrillas had cut his supply lines. Instead following the approximate course of the White River Curtis continued south and seized Helena Arkansas on July 12.

Who commanded the Union Army of the Southwest at the Battle of Pea Ridge?

Brigadier General Samuel R. Curtis led the Union Army of the Southwest during the Battle of Pea Ridge in 1862. His forces included men from Iowa, Indiana, Illinois, Missouri, and Ohio with over half being German immigrants under Brigadier General Franz Sigel.

When did the Battle of Pea Ridge take place?

The Battle of Pea Ridge occurred on the 4th of March 1862 when Confederate Major General Earl Van Dorn split his army to flank Union forces near Little Sugar Creek. Fighting continued through the following days until Van Dorn retreated via the Huntsville Road after failing to break the Federal line.

Where was the main fighting located during the Battle of Pea Ridge?

Major combat took place along Little Sugar Creek and around Elkhorn Tavern within Benton County Arkansas. The battlefield is now preserved as Pea Ridge National Military Park which includes a reconstruction of the Elkhorn Tavern scene.

Why did Confederate forces lose the Battle of Pea Ridge?

Confederate forces lost because Van Dorn's army lacked supply trains and ammunition while facing effective Union artillery fire that drove them from their positions. The loss of senior officers including Generals McCulloch McIntosh and William Y. Slack further crippled their ability to continue the fight.

How many casualties were reported for the Union Army at the Battle of Pea Ridge?

Federal forces reported two hundred three killed nine hundred eighty wounded and two hundred one missing for a total of one thousand three hundred eighty-four casualties. Carr's Fourth Division suffered six hundred eighty-two losses while Davis' Third Division lost three hundred forty-four men.

Battle of Pea Ridge.