Battle of Mindanao
The island of Mindanao offered very little inspiration for soldiers who would have to fight there. It boasted a long and irregular coastline, and the topography was generally characterized as rugged and mountainous. Rain forests and numerous crocodile-infested rivers covered the terrain. The rest by either lake, swamp or grassland. These grassland regions, along with dense groves of abacá trees, a source of hemp fiber, offer the worst obstacles. They limited vision and sapped the strength of soldiers. The few roads in Mindanao further complicated the problem of movement. The generously named Highway 1 cut across the southern portion of the island from just south of Parang on Illana Bay in the west to Digos on Davao Gulf in the east. Then it ran north to Davao. The other road, Sayre Highway, started at Kabacan midway between Illana Bay and Davao Gulf. It then ran north through the mountains of Bukidnon and Macajalar Bay off Misamis Oriental Province on the northern coast.
On the 10th of March 1945, the U.S. Eighth Army under Lieutenant General Robert L. Eichelberger received formal orders from General Douglas MacArthur to clear the rest of Mindanao. Expectations were that the campaign would take four months. Eichelberger had misgivings about the projected timetable. His Eighth Army staff came up with a more effective plan. Instead of the expected headlong frontal assault on the Japanese defenses, the plan called for securing a beachhead at Illana Bay in the undefended west. Then they drove eastward more than 30 miles through jungles and mountains to strike from the rear. The objective called for achieving surprise and pressing forward quickly and aggressively by the invading forces. Eichelberger deemed this could unhinge the Japanese both physically and psychologically. The key to success involved the beachhead performance of the landing force and the ability of units to maintain the momentum of their attack. They needed to preempt Japanese reactions before the rainy season started which would impede movement. Ground operations were assigned to X Corps under Major General Franklin C. Sibert. Major General Roscoe B. Woodruff's 24th Infantry Division and Major General Clarence A. Martin's 31st Infantry Division served as the principal combat units.
On the same day Eichelberger's forces were ordered to invade Mindanao, remnants of Major General Jens A. Doe's 41st Infantry Division carried out Operation VICTOR IV. This operation seized Zamboanga, the large peninsula that extended to the southwest. Concurrently occurred the recapture of Palawan dubbed Operation VICTOR III. A sizable force numbering about 8,900 men of Lt. Gen. Tokichi Hojo's 54th Japanese Independent Mixed Brigade had established strong defensive positions around Zamboanga City at the southern tip of the peninsula. After the bombing of the landing areas by the 13th Air Force and a three-day bombardment by the U.S. Navy, the 162nd and 163rd Infantry Regiments landed west of Zamboanga City at San Mateo. Japanese opposition to the landings were minimal. The 41st Division troops quickly captured the city which was decimated by the pre-invasion bombardments. The next day, the 11th of March, the Americans encountered strong resistance when they attacked Japanese positions in the hills overlooking the coastal plain. For two weeks American infantry fought the Japanese along a front in terrain so rugged that tanks could not be used. On the 23rd of March after heavy fighting the center of the Japanese line finally broke. Alongside the Zamboanga operation smaller units of the 41st Division invaded the Sulu Archipelago. Rapidly taken in succession were Basilan Malamaui Tawi-Tawi Sanga Sanga and Bangao.
As Rear Admiral Noble's TG 78.2 moved toward Illana Bay to prepare the landings at Parang Colonel Wendell Fertig commander of guerrilla forces in Mindanao sent word that his guerrillas controlled Malabang and its airstrip. Starting on the 5th of April Colonel Jerome's Marine aviators from Dipolog moved to the Malabang airstrip. With targeting information from the guerrillas they proceeded to bomb the Japanese positions. By the 11th of April the remaining Japanese forces fled toward Parang and friendly forces were in complete control of Malabang. Sibert Woodruff and Noble realized they had the opportunity to speed up the initial penetration of central Mindanao. They quickly changed their plans to take advantage of the new developments. The 24th Division would come ashore at Parang much closer to Highway 1 thus speeding up the operation. While the Parang landings proceeded on the 17th of April and the 24th Division quickly headed inland, the Eighth Army planners assumed correctly that the Japanese might destroy the bridges along Highway 1. They decided to use the 533rd Engineer Boat and Shore Regiment 3rd Engineer Special Brigade to exploit the Mindanao River. This waterway ran roughly parallel to Highway 1 and was navigable for 60 miles. A small fleet of gunboats under the command of Lieutenant Colonel Roberto Amputs sailed upriver and seized Kabacan and the junction of Highway 1 and Sayre Highway on the 22nd of April.
On the 3rd of May 1945 the first combat elements of the 24th Division entered Davao City against less opposition than had been expected. The Japanese had contented themselves with destroying the city as best they could before withdrawing inland. While it took just 15 days despite severe heat and humidity and constant rain with an entire division travelling 30 miles and seizing the last major Philippine city under Japanese control the real battle for Mindanao had begun. Up to this point X Corps had deliberately bypassed the main Japanese defenses which they planned to turn to eliminate them. A chronicler for the 24th Division wrote: The soldiers of the 24th Infantry considered the post-Davao operations to be the hardest bitterest and most exhausting battle of the ten island campaigns. In addition to the tenacious defense put up by the Japanese another punishing aspect of the subsequent combat was the proliferous fields of abaca. To the foot soldiers fighting in the Davao province the word abaca was synonymous with hell. Countless acres around Davao are covered with these thick-stemmed plants fifteen to twenty feet high. The plants grow as closely together as sugar cane and their long lush green leaves are in a welter of green so dense that a strong man must fight with the whole weight of his body for each foot of progress.
On the 6th of May the 124th Infantry Regiment continued to move up Sayre Highway without the Talomo trail reconnaissance operation in full swing. It moved into its toughest fight of the Mindanao campaign. A Japanese battalion ordered by Morozumi to delay the 124th at Maramag some 30 miles south enabled the regrouping of his 30th Division. It did so with such ferocity that it took six days for the 124th to reach Maramag. The battle area from Talomo to Maramag was later renamed Colgan Woods by the troops in remembrance of Captain Thomas A. Colgan an Army chaplain who was killed during one of his repeated efforts to aid wounded soldiers in the line of fire. Firing from dugout positions camouflaged spider holes with connecting tunnels and virtually invisible pillboxes the defending Japanese chose to die in place rather than retreat. Banzai charges struck the 124th fighting without supporting artillery first on the 7th of May and then on the night of the 14th of May. The latter ended in a rout as American automatic weapons stopped the attackers killing 73 Japanese marking the end of the battle.
The final stages of the battle for Mindanao culminated with the 155th Infantry Regiment of Colonel Walter J. Hanna occupying Malaybalay on the 21st of May. They took control of the Sayre Highway together with the 108th Infantry Regiment of Colonel Maurice D. Stratta after a stiff fight with the Japanese. Morozumi's 30th Division continued their retreat up the Agusan Valley after a vicious encounter with the pursuing 31st Division on the 5th of June where they eventually made it into the jungle. Farther south on Mindanao smaller X Corps units seized Sarangani and Balut islands situated off its southern tip. On the 12th of July the 1st Battalion 24th Division's 21st Infantry arrived at the northwest shore of Sarangani Bay to reinforce a reconnaissance patrol which located a strong Japanese force in the interior. Operations in these areas continued until mid-August when American planes heavily bombed the land resulting in large Japanese casualties. While mopping up operations by small American units and Filipino guerrillas continued for some time General Eichelberger announced the end of organized Japanese resistance. Throughout Mindanao pockets of Japanese troops protected by the impenetrable terrain of the island's unexplored jungle expanses survived until the end of the war.
When the war ended some 22,250 troops and 11,900 civilians emerged to surrender that signalled the total liberation of the Philippines. Some 12,865 Japanese troops were killed and another 8,235 appeared to have succumbed to starvation and disease. The Americans lost only 820 men and 2,880 wounded for the entire campaign. The seemingly low cost in battlefield casualties for the Americans in the Mindanao campaign stemmed aside from the skill of the Eighth Army planners and leaders from increasing assistance by Filipino guerrillas. In military terms this constituted a valuable force multiplier for the Eighth Army units. Before landings guerrillas harassed Japanese units provided valuable intelligence about enemy dispositions and the relative suitability of landing beaches. And after each landing the Filipinos fought alongside the Americans and pursued the Japanese through the island's interior. By mid-June 1945 the 163rd suffered 35 dead and 125 wounded while some 2,000 Japanese perished during operations in the Sulu Archipelago.
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Common questions
When did the U.S. Eighth Army receive orders to clear Mindanao?
The U.S. Eighth Army received formal orders from General Douglas MacArthur on the 10th of March 1945 to clear the rest of Mindanao.
Who commanded the X Corps during the Battle of Mindanao?
Ground operations were assigned to X Corps under Major General Franklin C. Sibert.
What terrain features made the Battle of Mindanao difficult for soldiers?
Rain forests, crocodile-infested rivers, swamps, and dense groves of abacá trees limited vision and sapped the strength of soldiers.
How many Japanese troops were killed in the Battle of Mindanao?
Some 12,865 Japanese troops were killed and another 8,235 appeared to have succumbed to starvation and disease.
Which division captured Davao City on the 3rd of May 1945?
The first combat elements of the 24th Division entered Davao City against less opposition than had been expected on the 3rd of May 1945.