HearLore
ListenSearchLibrary

Follow the threads

Every story connects to a hundred more

Topics
  • Browse all topics
  • Featured
  • Recently added
Categories
  • Browse all categories
  • For you
Answers
  • All answer pages
Journal
  • All entries
  • RSS feed
Terms of service·Privacy policy

2026 HearLore

Preview of HearLore

Free to follow every thread. No paywall, no dead ends.

ListenSearchLibrary

Adapted from Battle of Forts Jackson and St. Philip, licensed under CC BY-SA 4.0. Modified for audio. This HearLore entry is also licensed under CC BY-SA 4.0.

— Ch. 1 · Strategic Context And Geography —

Battle of Forts Jackson and St. Philip.

~6 min read · Ch. 1 of 7
The Mississippi River bends sharply south of New Orleans in April 1862. Two stone forts sit on opposite banks, Fort Jackson on the right and Fort St. Philip on the left. They stand about 70 miles below the city and 130 miles above Head of Passes where the river meets the Gulf of Mexico. A ship passing this bend must slow down to navigate the curve. This slowdown turns vessels into stationary targets for the 177 guns mounted within the two fortifications. Confederate planners believed these positions would keep Federal forces from moving upriver toward the largest city in the Confederacy. Without these forts, there were no fall-back positions to stop an enemy advance. The geography itself dictated that control of the river depended entirely on holding these two points.
7 sections
Ship Island in the Gulf of Mexico served as the assembly point for the Union expedition in early 1862. Flag Officer David G. Farragut arrived at this location on the 20th of February 1862 to begin command operations. Assistant Secretary of the Navy Gustavus V. Fox pushed for a direct assault on New Orleans despite opposition from General-in-Chief George B. McClellan. McClellan argued that 30,000 to 50,000 troops were needed for success and wanted those men for his Peninsula Campaign against Richmond. Secretary of the Navy Gideon Welles bypassed this objection by coopting political general Benjamin F. Butler. Butler received orders on the 23rd of February 1862 to lead land forces destined to cooperate with the Navy. The number of available troops was reduced to 18,000 soldiers before the campaign began. Farragut moved his ships across the shallow bar at the river mouth in mid-March. Water depth proved only 14 feet instead of the expected 21 feet. At least one ship named USS Colorado drew too much water to cross. This delay cost valuable time but did not stop the fleet from entering the river.
The Mississippi River bends sharply south of New Orleans in April 1862. Two stone forts sit on opposite banks, Fort Jackson on the right and Fort St. Philip on the left. They stand about 70 miles below the city and 130 miles above Head of Passes where the river meets the Gulf of Mexico. A ship passing this bend must slow down to navigate the curve. This slowdown turns vessels into stationary targets for the 177 guns mounted within the two fortifications. Confederate planners believed these positions would keep Federal forces from moving upriver toward the largest city in the Confederacy. Without these forts, there were no fall-back positions to stop an enemy advance. The geography itself dictated that control of the river depended entirely on holding these two points.
7 sections
Ship Island in the Gulf of Mexico served as the assembly point for the Union expedition in early 1862. Flag Officer David G. Farragut arrived at this location on the 20th of February 1862 to begin command operations. Assistant Secretary of the Navy Gustavus V. Fox pushed for a direct assault on New Orleans despite opposition from General-in-Chief George B. McClellan. McClellan argued that 30,000 to 50,000 troops were needed for success and wanted those men for his Peninsula Campaign against Richmond. Secretary of the Navy Gideon Welles bypassed this objection by coopting political general Benjamin F. Butler. Butler received orders on the 23rd of February 1862 to lead land forces destined to cooperate with the Navy. The number of available troops was reduced to 18,000 soldiers before the campaign began. Farragut moved his ships across the shallow bar at the river mouth in mid-March. Water depth proved only 14 feet instead of the expected 21 feet. At least one ship named USS Colorado drew too much water to cross. This delay cost valuable time but did not stop the fleet from entering the river.
Richmond War Department officials believed the primary threat to New Orleans came from the north rather than the Gulf. Confederate Major General Mansfield Lovell commanded Department No. 1 along the lower Mississippi River. He sent guns and men to distant strongpoints like Island Number 10 and Fort Pillow while leaving the immediate vicinity of the city weak. Brigadier General Johnson K. Duncan led local defenses at the forts but lacked sufficient resources. The average quality of soldiers in the garrison suffered because militant units had been drawn off for other fields. Foreign-born soldiers made up a greater proportion of the ranks than usual due to New Orleans international character. Two defensive chains stretched across the river to prevent passage. One chain broke under debris washed down during spring floods and was repaired poorly by Lovell. Confederate naval command fractured when Flag Officer George N. Hollins was called away to Richmond. Commander William C. Whittle took over but passed command of key vessels to his executive officer John K. Mitchell. Captain John A. Stephenson leading the River Defense Fleet refused to accept Navy orders. This refusal created a fragmented command structure that prevented coordinated action against Farragut's approaching fleet.
Porter's mortar schooners opened fire on the 18th of April 1862 from positions downstream from the barrier chain. Twenty-one mortar schooners sat close to the river banks with tops covered in bushes for camouflage. Porter specified a rate of one shot every ten minutes from each mortar. More than 1400 shots were fired on the first day alone. Fuses in the shells proved unreliable and many exploded prematurely. Porter ordered all fuses cut to full length starting on the second day so shells would sink into soft earth before exploding. Fort Jackson suffered more damage than Fort St. Philip because it lay closer to the Federal mortars. Only seven pieces of artillery became disabled and only two men died during the entire bombardment period. Brigadier General Duncan recorded 2997 mortar shells fired on the first day. Life inside Fort Jackson became miserable when combined with constant flooding from high water within the fort. Crews could find safety only within dank and partially flooded casemates. Lack of shelter, food, blankets, sleeping quarters, drinkable water, and days of heavy unanswered shelling drained morale severely. These factors contributed directly to the mutiny of the Fort Jackson garrison on April 28.
The Union fleet got under way at approximately 3:00 AM on the 24th of April 1862 heading for the gap in the chain blocking the channel. Farragut divided his ships into three sections with Captain Theodorus Bailey leading the first division and Captain Henry H. Bell commanding the third. His own gunboats formed the second section. When passing the forts, the fleet formed two columns firing on Fort St. Philip and Fort Jackson simultaneously. They did not stop to slug it out but aimed to pass by as quickly as possible. Darkness and smoke obscured the aim of gunners in the forts as hoped. Their aim proved poor and Farragut's fleet suffered little significant damage. Three gunboats turned back after dawn broke including the disabled Itasca which drifted out of action. The Confederate fleet did very little during this stage of the battle. CSS Louisiana finally used her guns with little effect while the armored ram Manassas tried to engage but found itself caught between two Union ships. Captain Warley ordered Manassas run ashore where the crew abandoned and set fire to the vessel. Later she floated free still afire before sinking in view of Porter's mortar schooners. The tug USS Genesee pushed a fire raft against flagship Hartford sending it to the bottom.
General Butler prepared soldiers for an attack on the forts now behind Farragut's fleet. Commodore Porter delivered demands to surrender to the forts but General Duncan refused. Porter began bombardment again on the 29th of April 1862 preparing for Butler's assault. Enlisted garrison in Fort Jackson mutinied that night refusing to endure any more conditions. Fort St. Philip was not involved in the mutiny but interdependence meant it was also affected. Unable to continue the battle Duncan capitulated the next day. Commander John K. Mitchell representing Confederate States Navy was not included in surrender negotiations. He ordered CSS Louisiana destroyed rather than be surrendered. Set afire she soon became undocked and floated down the river. Louisiana blew up as she passed Fort St. Philip killing one soldier in the fort. The fourteen vessels remaining from Farragut's fleet arrived at New Orleans in the afternoon of April 25. Panic-stricken citizens broke into stores burning cotton and other supplies while destroying much of the waterfront. Farragut sent two officers ashore with sailors and marines who hauled down state flag and ran up United States flag at Custom House. That signified official return of city to Union after three days of fruitless negotiations.
Forts Jackson and St. Philip had been shell of Confederate defenses on lower Mississippi River leaving nothing between Gulf and Memphis. After repairing battle damage his ships suffered Farragut sent expeditions north to demand surrender of other cities on river. Baton Rouge and Natchez complied without effective means of defense. Vicksburg remained unconquered because guns could not reach fortifications atop bluffs. Fall of New Orleans may have swayed European powers primarily Great Britain and France not to recognize Confederacy diplomatically. Confederate agents abroad noted they were generally received more coolly if at all after word of loss reached London and Paris. Historian John D. Winters wrote in 1963 that Confederate fleet made sorry showing due to self-destruction lack cooperation cowardice untrained officers and murderous fire Federal gunboats reduced fleet to demoralized shambles. Allan Nevins argued Confederate defenses defective due to tardy ill-coordinated effort poverty disorganization lack skilled engineers craftsmen friction State authorities Richmond want foresight. The battle marked serious even fatal blow from which Confederacy never recovered despite remaining forts standing after fleet passed.
Richmond War Department officials believed the primary threat to New Orleans came from the north rather than the Gulf. Confederate Major General Mansfield Lovell commanded Department No. 1 along the lower Mississippi River. He sent guns and men to distant strongpoints like Island Number 10 and Fort Pillow while leaving the immediate vicinity of the city weak. Brigadier General Johnson K. Duncan led local defenses at the forts but lacked sufficient resources. The average quality of soldiers in the garrison suffered because militant units had been drawn off for other fields. Foreign-born soldiers made up a greater proportion of the ranks than usual due to New Orleans international character. Two defensive chains stretched across the river to prevent passage. One chain broke under debris washed down during spring floods and was repaired poorly by Lovell. Confederate naval command fractured when Flag Officer George N. Hollins was called away to Richmond. Commander William C. Whittle took over but passed command of key vessels to his executive officer John K. Mitchell. Captain John A. Stephenson leading the River Defense Fleet refused to accept Navy orders. This refusal created a fragmented command structure that prevented coordinated action against Farragut's approaching fleet.
Porter's mortar schooners opened fire on the 18th of April 1862 from positions downstream from the barrier chain. Twenty-one mortar schooners sat close to the river banks with tops covered in bushes for camouflage. Porter specified a rate of one shot every ten minutes from each mortar. More than 1400 shots were fired on the first day alone. Fuses in the shells proved unreliable and many exploded prematurely. Porter ordered all fuses cut to full length starting on the second day so shells would sink into soft earth before exploding. Fort Jackson suffered more damage than Fort St. Philip because it lay closer to the Federal mortars. Only seven pieces of artillery became disabled and only two men died during the entire bombardment period. Brigadier General Duncan recorded 2997 mortar shells fired on the first day. Life inside Fort Jackson became miserable when combined with constant flooding from high water within the fort. Crews could find safety only within dank and partially flooded casemates. Lack of shelter, food, blankets, sleeping quarters, drinkable water, and days of heavy unanswered shelling drained morale severely. These factors contributed directly to the mutiny of the Fort Jackson garrison on April 28.
The Union fleet got under way at approximately 3:00 AM on the 24th of April 1862 heading for the gap in the chain blocking the channel. Farragut divided his ships into three sections with Captain Theodorus Bailey leading the first division and Captain Henry H. Bell commanding the third. His own gunboats formed the second section. When passing the forts, the fleet formed two columns firing on Fort St. Philip and Fort Jackson simultaneously. They did not stop to slug it out but aimed to pass by as quickly as possible. Darkness and smoke obscured the aim of gunners in the forts as hoped. Their aim proved poor and Farragut's fleet suffered little significant damage. Three gunboats turned back after dawn broke including the disabled Itasca which drifted out of action. The Confederate fleet did very little during this stage of the battle. CSS Louisiana finally used her guns with little effect while the armored ram Manassas tried to engage but found itself caught between two Union ships. Captain Warley ordered Manassas run ashore where the crew abandoned and set fire to the vessel. Later she floated free still afire before sinking in view of Porter's mortar schooners. The tug USS Genesee pushed a fire raft against flagship Hartford sending it to the bottom.
General Butler prepared soldiers for an attack on the forts now behind Farragut's fleet. Commodore Porter delivered demands to surrender to the forts but General Duncan refused. Porter began bombardment again on the 29th of April 1862 preparing for Butler's assault. Enlisted garrison in Fort Jackson mutinied that night refusing to endure any more conditions. Fort St. Philip was not involved in the mutiny but interdependence meant it was also affected. Unable to continue the battle Duncan capitulated the next day. Commander John K. Mitchell representing Confederate States Navy was not included in surrender negotiations. He ordered CSS Louisiana destroyed rather than be surrendered. Set afire she soon became undocked and floated down the river. Louisiana blew up as she passed Fort St. Philip killing one soldier in the fort. The fourteen vessels remaining from Farragut's fleet arrived at New Orleans in the afternoon of April 25. Panic-stricken citizens broke into stores burning cotton and other supplies while destroying much of the waterfront. Farragut sent two officers ashore with sailors and marines who hauled down state flag and ran up United States flag at Custom House. That signified official return of city to Union after three days of fruitless negotiations.
Forts Jackson and St. Philip had been shell of Confederate defenses on lower Mississippi River leaving nothing between Gulf and Memphis. After repairing battle damage his ships suffered Farragut sent expeditions north to demand surrender of other cities on river. Baton Rouge and Natchez complied without effective means of defense. Vicksburg remained unconquered because guns could not reach fortifications atop bluffs. Fall of New Orleans may have swayed European powers primarily Great Britain and France not to recognize Confederacy diplomatically. Confederate agents abroad noted they were generally received more coolly if at all after word of loss reached London and Paris. Historian John D. Winters wrote in 1963 that Confederate fleet made sorry showing due to self-destruction lack cooperation cowardice untrained officers and murderous fire Federal gunboats reduced fleet to demoralized shambles. Allan Nevins argued Confederate defenses defective due to tardy ill-coordinated effort poverty disorganization lack skilled engineers craftsmen friction State authorities Richmond want foresight. The battle marked serious even fatal blow from which Confederacy never recovered despite remaining forts standing after fleet passed.

Continue Browsing

1862 in Louisiana1862 in the American Civil WarApril 1862Attacks on military installations in the United StatesBattles of the American Civil War in LouisianaBattles of the lower seaboard theater of the American Civil WarMilitary operations of the American Civil War in LouisianaNaval battles of the American Civil WarNew Orleans in the American Civil WarPlaquemines Parish, LouisianaRiverine warfare in the American Civil WarUnion victories of the American Civil War

Common questions

When did the Battle of Forts Jackson and St. Philip take place?

The Union fleet passed the forts on the 24th of April 1862 while mortar schooners began firing on the 18th of April 1862.

Who commanded the Confederate forces at Fort Jackson during the battle?

Brigadier General Johnson K. Duncan led local defenses at Fort Jackson until his garrison mutinied on the 28th of April 1862.

How many ships were in Farragut's fleet that passed the forts on the 24th of April 1862?

Fourteen vessels from Farragut's fleet arrived at New Orleans after passing the forts on the afternoon of the 25th of April 1862.

Why did the Confederate fleet fail to stop the Union advance up the Mississippi River?

Confederate naval command fractured when Flag Officer George N. Hollins was called away to Richmond and Captain John A. Stephenson refused Navy orders.

What caused the mutiny inside Fort Jackson on the 28th of April 1862?

Constant flooding, lack of shelter, food, blankets, sleeping quarters, drinkable water, and days of heavy unanswered shelling drained morale severely.

See all questions about Battle of Forts Jackson and St. Philip →

In this section

Loading sources

All sources