— Ch. 1 · Strategic Origins And Planning —
Peninsula campaign.
~7 min read · Ch. 1 of 6
On the 17th of March 1862, an armada of ships departed Alexandria carrying 121,500 men and thousands of horses toward Fort Monroe. This massive movement dwarfed all previous American expeditions in scale. Major General George B. McClellan had spent months organizing the Army of the Potomac into a formidable force with 48 forts protecting Washington. He believed he could outmaneuver Confederate forces by bypassing their defenses near the capital entirely. President Abraham Lincoln initially supported this plan to transport troops via water to Urbanna on the Rappahannock River. The strategy aimed to flank Confederate positions and approach Richmond overland from the east. However, Confederate General Joseph E. Johnston withdrew his forces before Washington on March 9, nullifying the original route. McClellan then adjusted his plans to land at Fort Monroe instead and advance up the Virginia Peninsula. Political pressure mounted as Congress demanded offensive action begin by February 22, Washington's birthday. McClellan submitted a detailed letter objecting to the president's timeline while advocating for his own amphibious approach. The White House council of war held on March 8 revealed mixed confidence among subordinates about the new plan. Despite these tensions, Lincoln reluctantly approved the revised strategy that would define the campaign.
Deception At Yorktown
On April 5, Union forces made initial contact with Confederate defensive works at Lee's Mill without expecting resistance. Brigadier General John B. Magruder employed theatrical tactics to mislead the enemy about troop strength. He moved one company in circles through a glen to create the appearance of endless reinforcements marching to relieve him. Artillery was spread far apart and fired sporadically to suggest a much larger force than actually existed. Federal reconnaissance reported an army of 100,000 men blocking their path when only 11,000 Confederates were present. McClellan ordered siege fortifications constructed rather than attempting an immediate assault. For ten days, Union troops dug parallel trenches while Magruder received additional reinforcements. By mid-April, Magruder commanded 35,000 men defending the Warwick Line stretching from Yorktown to Mulberry Island. The river itself became a significant obstacle after dams were enlarged to flood low-lying areas. On April 16, Union forces probed a point in the Confederate line at Dam No. 1 on the Warwick River. Three regiments under Howell Cobb crossed the dam but were routed by defenders behind the lines. A subsequent attack by the 6th Vermont Infantry failed as they came under heavy fire and some wounded men drowned in the shallow pond behind the dam. Escaped slaves reported that Confederate supply wagons were moving toward Richmond on May 3, but McClellan refused to believe them. He remained convinced that an army he estimated at 120,000 would stay and fight despite evidence to the contrary.