Battle of Eckmühl

• 1. Strategic Context And Intelligence Failure

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  On the 10th of April 1809, hostilities erupted between France and Austria without either side knowing the true strength of their opponent. Napoleon I found himself unprepared for this sudden start to the War of the Fifth Coalition. For the first time since taking his Imperial Crown, he had to surrender the strategic initiative to Archduke Charles of Austria. Operating over a fifty-mile front from Regensburg to Pfaffenhofen, commanders on both sides lacked adequate intelligence about dispositions or intentions. The terrain featured rugged stretches of wooded land that hid troop movements from view. On the 20th of April 1809, Napoleon launched most of his army southwest based on faulty assumptions. He believed the bulk of the Austrian army was covering their bridgehead at Landshut and the main highway to Vienna. This miscalculation led directly to the Battle of Abensberg, which became a clear French victory. Following that success, Napoleon ordered all forces except Davout's III Corps and Lefebvre's VII Corps to pursue what he thought were the remains of the Austrian Army. In reality, the French attack had only split the Austrian forces. Two corps withdrew north while another part remained hidden behind the Danube river. Unbeknownst to Napoleon, the Austrians captured the French garrison at Regensburg on the same day. They seized the strategic bridge over the Danube, allowing Archduke Charles to re-establish contact with separated wings of his own army.

• 2. Austrian Envelopment Plans And Deployment

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  Archduke Charles moved to concentrate his remaining forces after seizing the bridge at Regensburg. He no longer needed to defend the Landshut bridgehead and instead aimed to envelop and destroy Marshal Davout's exposed corps. Prince Friedrich of Hohenzollern-Hechingen commanded III A.K., which contained 15,700 men. Prince Franz Seraph of Rosenberg-Orsini led IV A.K. with 21,460 men under his command. These two units held the Austrian left flank to pin Davout in place. Meanwhile, Johann Kollowrat's fresh II A.K. advanced south from Regensburg with 28,168 soldiers. The elite grenadiers and cuirassiers of Prince Johann of Liechtenstein's I Reserve A.K. also deployed against Davout's exposed left flank. This formation created a nine-mile line stretching from Abbach on the Danube to Eckmühl on the Grosse Laber. Inexplicably, no orders were issued to Count Heinrich von Bellegarde during this critical phase. His powerful I A.K. remained on the north bank of the Danube with 27,653 men. That unit played no role in the subsequent fighting despite its size. Napoleon intended to envelop and destroy the Austrian forces retiring southwest toward Landshut. Masséna directed II and IV Corps across the Isar upstream from Landshut to block the Austrians. Lannes commanded a force of approximately 51,000 men including Württemberg troops and two cuirassier divisions. Napoleon ordered Davout to attack the Austrians on his front in the morning. He promised that Lefebvre's equally depleted corps would support him if needed. The total force available for both French corps amounted to approximately 36,000 men.

• 3. French Counterattack And Tactical Maneuvers

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  Napoleon set the French army into motion around 2 a.m. on the 22nd of April 1809. His men marched north in just a few short hours to reinforce Davout. These reinforcements arrived faster than promised when they brushed aside Rosenberg's flank guard. The vanguard of the assault consisted of German troops under General Vandamme. These soldiers stormed the bridge at Eckmühl after ferocious Austrian resistance. They even captured the town's chateau during the initial push. At this point, Davout launched his men against the Austrian center at the village of Unterlaichling. The famous 10th Legere Regiment became involved in vicious fighting around the woods nearby. Eventually, the regiment was strengthened by Bavarians under Deroy who managed to capture the positions. North of Unterlaichling, Louis Friant and St. Hilaire steadily pushed back defenders of Oberlaichling. Their forces overran a redoubt held by Hungarian grenadiers. This pressure prompted Charles to order a general retreat from the area. Napoleon had hoped to catch the Austrian army between Davout and the Danube river. He did not know that Ratisbon had fallen and thus gave the Austrians a means of escape over the water.

• 4. Cavalry Charges And The Bettelberg Ridgeline

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  The leading elements of the Austrian attack ran into Montbrun's determined cavalry on the morning of the battle. Those horsemen managed to reduce the impetus of the charge thanks to hilly and wooded terrain. Rosenberg displayed serious concern when he realized that Davout's troops were not moving to account for the ongoing battle. He rightly assumed that more French troops were on the way. The struggle now devolved into a series of major cavalry clashes as the Austrians attempted to extricate their army without losing too many prisoners. Perhaps the best cavalry in the Habsburg army occupied the Bettelberg ridgeline between Eckmühl and the woods above Unterlaichling. These elite units included the Vincent Chevau-légers and the Stipsic Hussars. They demolished some German light cavalry before being stopped by Bavarian infantry. Napoleon was insistent on the immediate capture of this position and ordered forward two heavy cavalry divisions under St. Sulpice and Nansouty. These horsemen were pummeled by Austrian artillery but came on nonetheless. They managed to saber the gunners after having seen off the enemy cavalry. Three French cuirassier divisions supported by additional German light cavalry attacked a chokepoint in the road. A swirling melee developed where the Austrians fought but were heavily outnumbered. During this part of the conflict, more French cavalry struck in their flank. The remaining Austrian horse fled north to Ratisbon with great celerity.

• 5. Casualties And Strategic Realignment

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  The French had won the battle, but it was not a decisive engagement in the traditional sense. Nevertheless, the French inflicted 10,700 casualties at the cost of just 3,000 men. Napoleon's speedy arrival witnessed an entire axial realignment of his army from a north, south axis to an east, west one. This shift permitted the eventual defeat of the Austrians in subsequent campaigns. Subsequent campaigning led to the French recapture of Ratisbon and the Austrian eviction from Southern Germany. The fall of Vienna followed these victories as momentum shifted decisively toward France. Napoleon is alleged to have remarked of the series of manoeuvers that culminated at Eckmühl that it was "the finest" he ever conducted. Following the victory at Eckmühl, Napoleon's council of war led directly to the Battle of Ratisbon. The strategic initiative returned to the French side for the remainder of the war thanks to the dogged defense waged by Marshal Davout and Marshal Lefebvre. Their actions allowed Napoleon to defeat the principal Austrian army despite being unprepared for the start of hostilities on the 10th of April 1809.