Arakan campaign (1942–1943)

• 1. Strategic Prelude And Setup

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  In May 1942, the Allies retreated from Burma, accompanied by many refugees, mainly Indian and Anglo-Burmese. The Japanese halted their advance on the Chindwin River because heavy monsoon rains made roads through the mountainous frontier impassable. Yet leadership of the British Indian Army feared a renewed attack once the monsoon ended. The Government of India and state governments in Bengal, Bihar, and Orissa faced widespread disorder and a growing famine that would become the disastrous Bengal famine of 1943. The British reorganised command in eastern India with headquarters at Ranchi in Bihar under Lieutenant General Charles Broad. This army command was originally a peacetime administrative headquarters for depots and units stationed in Eastern India. It unexpectedly found itself controlling a very large rear communications area and troops on the frontier with Burma. Its fighting formations included IV Corps commanded by Lieutenant General Noel Irwin at Imphal in Manipur. A newly formed XV Corps came under Lieutenant General William Slim from the 9th of June 1942 with its headquarters at Barrackpore near Calcutta.

• 2. Operation Cannibal Planning

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  General Archibald Wavell planned to mount offensives into Burma even as Allied troops were retreating into India. On most parts of the front, roads and lines of communication had to be improved or built from scratch before attacks could be considered. That task would take at least a year. On the Arakan front, distances were comparatively short and necessary communications could theoretically be completed by the time the monsoon ended. In fact, delays in improving poor roads delayed the start of the offensive until mid-December 1942. The limited goal of the British advance in Arakan in 1942 and 1943 was Akyab Island. This held a port and all-weather airfield prominent in Allied plans to recover Burma. Fighters and transport aircraft operating at a radius from Akyab could cover most of Central Burma. Medium bombers from Akyab could range as far as Rangoon, the capital of Burma, distant. The island lay at the end of the Mayu Peninsula marked by narrow but precipitous jungle-covered hills known as the Mayu Range. The only permanently established route across the range was a disused railway track converted into a road linking Buthidaung with Maungdaw on the west coast.

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• 3. The Battle For Donbaik

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  The 14th Indian Division commanded by Major General Wilfrid Lewis Lloyd began advancing south from Cox's Bazar near the frontier between India and Burma on the 17th of December 1942. Japanese defenders occupying well-prepared positions repeatedly repulsed British and Indian forces. Miyawaki Force consisted of two battalions of the 213rd Regiment part of the Japanese 33rd Division plus a mountain artillery battalion and various supporting arms detachments under Colonel Kosuke Miyawaki. Although the forward unit had spent fifty days digging defensive positions covering the Maungdaw-Buthidaung road they were ordered to pull back to join the main body near the tip of the Mayu peninsula. Lloyd's division captured the road on the 22nd of December. At this point Miyawaki was informed that another division the Japanese 55th Division less a regiment serving in western New Guinea had been dispatched from Central Burma to Arakan. Its commander was Lieutenant General Takeshi Koga. Miyawaki was ordered to move forward to Donbaik on the Mayu peninsula and Rathedaung on the east bank of the Mayu River to secure positions for this division to operate.

• 4. Japanese Counter-Attack And Collapse

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  On the 28th of December the Isagoda Battalion occupied Rathedaung and forestalled attempts by the 123rd Indian Infantry Brigade to capture the town. On 9, the 10th of January renewed attacks on Rathedaung were thrown back. While most of Miyawaki's remaining troops occupied Akyab, a single Japanese company occupied the narrow front between sea and foothills of the Mayu Range north of Donbaik protected by a chaung with steep banks high. They constructed well-concealed mutually supporting bunkers of timber and earth. Between 7 and the 9th of January 1943 the 47th Indian Infantry Brigade attacked this line but were repulsed. The bunkers could not be penetrated by field artillery. If British or Indian infantry reached the bunkers defenders could call down artillery and mortar fire on their own position. On the 1st of February 55th Indian Infantry Brigade supported by only eight Valentine tanks attacked the Donbaik position. Some tanks became stuck in ditches while others were knocked out by Japanese shellfire. The brigade's attack subsequently failed. A renewed attack by the Indian 123rd Brigade on Rathedaung two days later briefly gained some outlying positions before being forced to withdraw.

• 5. Command Failures And Leadership Changes

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  Following defeats at Donbaik the Indian 47th and 55th Brigades had been moved east of the Mayu Range. In the first week of March the third battalion of the Japanese 213th Regiment crossed the Mayu River and attacked Indian 55th Brigade forcing it to retreat. This left the Indian 47th Brigade isolated north of Rathedaung. Despite growing threat to the left flank of 14th Division General Irwin demanded another attack on the Donbaik position using the powerful and well-trained British 6th Brigade. On the 10th of March Lieutenant General Slim reported that with so many brigades to command 14th Indian Division was unable to control the front. Morale was low in some units reflected in unnecessary panics. However Irwin made no changes at this point. For the next assault Lloyd planned to use the 71st Indian Brigade in a flanking move along spine of Mayu Range but by this time Irwin lost confidence in Lloyd and his brigadiers and laid down plan of attack himself. He diverted 71st Brigade to Mayu Valley and ordered British 6th Brigade reinforced to six battalions to make attack on narrow front.

• 6. Logistical And Training Deficiencies

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  On the 25th of March Lloyd ordered isolated 47th Indian Brigade to fall back across Mayu Range despite Irwin's instructions to hold all ground until monsoon. Irwin rescinded Lloyd's order and dismissed Lloyd on the 29th of March taking command of 14th Division in person until headquarters of Indian 26th Division commanded by Major-General Cyril Lomax could take over. On the 3rd of April while Uno Force pressed northwards up Mayu River valley main body of Japanese 55th Division crossed Mayu Range at point where British officers had regarded range as impassable and cut coastal track behind leading British troops. They attacked night of the 5th of April and captured village Indin where they also overran headquarters of British 6th Brigade capturing its commander Brigadier Ronald Cavendish plus adjutant and six staff officers. The 47th Indian Brigade forced to retreat across Mayu Range in small parties abandoning all equipment and ceasing to exist as fighting force. Indian XV Corps headquarters under Lieutenant General Slim belatedly took charge of Arakan front although British 6th Brigade still formidable in spite recent defeats.