Adlertag

• 1. Hitler's Directive No. 17

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  On the first of August 1940, Adolf Hitler issued a written order known as Directive No. 17 to Hermann Göring and the Oberkommando der Luftwaffe. This document commanded the German air force to launch an all-out assault against Great Britain. The goal was to destroy the Royal Air Force before any invasion fleet could cross the English Channel. Göring promised Hitler that this operation would succeed within days or at most weeks. He believed the British air power would crumble under the weight of concentrated attacks. The date for the attack was set for the 13th of August 1940 after several postponements due to bad weather. By that morning, the Luftwaffe had reached acceptable serviceable rates with 71 percent of its bombers ready. Eighty-five percent of its Bf 109 units were operational. Eighty-three percent of its Bf 110 units were also ready for combat.

• 2. Schmid's Fatal Intelligence Errors

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  Joseph Schmid served as commander of the Luftwaffe Military Intelligence Branch throughout July 1940. His reports contained gross errors regarding radar systems and airfield identification. Schmid claimed the number of operational airfields in southern England was severely limited. He estimated British fighter production at only 180 to 330 per month when the true figure was 496. Crucially, Schmid failed to mention radar entirely in his assessments. This omission left German planners blind to the Chain Home Radio Direction Finding facilities along the coast. The lack of sustained attacks on these stations allowed them to direct RAF units effectively. Poor intelligence led the Germans to misidentify Coastal Command bases as Fighter Command targets. Most targets on their list would not have impaired Fighter Command even if destroyed.

• 3. The Morning Chaos Of August Thirteenth

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  On the morning of the 13th of August 1940, bad weather caused Göring to order a postponement of raids. Dornier Do 17s from Kampfgeschwader 2 took off anyway at 04:50 without receiving the cancellation order. Geschwaderkommodore Johannes Fink ignored Oberstleutnant Joachim Huth who tried to signal him by flying aerobatics. KG 2 flew toward Eastchurch airfield on the Isle of Sheppey despite having no escort. The Royal Observer Corps misjudged the direction due to low clouds and radar failed to pick up the bombers. WAAF operators plotted the course incorrectly so the RAF could not prevent the attack. For an hour after dawn there were few German tracks upon the plot tables in operations rooms. No. 151 Squadron protected a convoy while No. 111 covered Hawkinge. Controllers directed three full squadrons to intercept between 06:30 and 06:35. The first combats began at 06:30 but the raid hit a Coastal Command station instead of a fighter base.

• 4. Misidentified Targets And Strategic Futility

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  Luftflotte 3 commander Hugo Sperrle ordered attacks to commence even though most units received orders to abandon morning operations. At 05:00, 20 Junkers Ju 88s from I./KG 54 took off for RAF Farnborough. Eighteen Ju 88s from II./KG 54 headed for RAF Odiham. Eighty-eight Junkers Ju 87s of StG 77 began heading for Portland Harbour. These raids targeted airfields that belonged to other commands rather than Fighter Command. KG 2 struck Eastchurch which was used by Coastal Command and lost five Bristol Blenheims. Detling was bombed later in the day but it was not an RAF Fighter Command station. Group Captain E P Meggs-Davis was killed during the attack on Detling. The station's casualties amounted to 24 killed and 42 wounded yet the attack did not affect No. 11 Group RAF. Intelligence failures meant the Germans attacked ports like Liverpool and Glasgow while missing key fighter bases entirely.

• 5. Discrepancies In Claimed Versus Actual Losses

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  RAF Fighter Command claimed 78 German aircraft shot down on the 13th of August 1940 according to official records. Another source states that official claims amounted to 64. Actual German losses amounted to 47 aircraft destroyed and 39 severely damaged. Conversely, the Luftwaffe claimed to have destroyed 70 Hawker Hurricanes and Spitfires in the air alone. This figure represented an exaggeration of about 300 percent. Another 84 RAF fighters were claimed on the ground. Actual RAF losses in the air amounted to 13 fighters and 11 bombers. Forty-seven aircraft of various kinds were lost on the ground. KG 2 claimed 10 Spitfires destroyed on the ground when no Fighter Command fighters were actually lost. Zerstörergeschwader optimistically claimed 30 RAF fighters destroyed for a loss of 13 Bf 110s. The morning effort was described as a fiasco by historians due to these massive overclaims.

• 6. The Failure That Doomed Sea Lion

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  The failure of Adlertag did not deter the Luftwaffe from continuing its campaign throughout August and into September 1940. The assault against RAF airfields continued but the Germans failed to develop any focused strategy for defeating Fighter Command. They switched from bombing aircraft factories to attacking supporting industries and coastal ports. An attempt was even made against unrelated targets such as destroying the morale of the British population. Disputes among OKL staff revolved more around tactics than strategy. This method condemned the offensive over Britain to failure before it had even begun. Hitler postponed Operation Sea Lion indefinitely because air superiority was never achieved. By 1944, the Allies were ready to launch Operation Overlord from British soil. The Battle of Britain ensured that there would be a Western Allied presence to meet the Soviet Red Army in May 1945.