2008 Russo-Georgian diplomatic crisis

• 1. Introduction

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  The 2008 Russo-Georgian diplomatic crisis began not with a gunshot but with a piece of paper. On the 6th of March 2008, Russia cancelled the Commonwealth of Independent States economic sanctions it had imposed on Abkhazia back in 1996, declaring them outdated. Georgia's government in Tbilisi protested immediately. The other CIS members did not embrace the cancellation. And European foreign ministers issued alarmed statements about the possibility of de facto annexation. Within weeks, Russian railroad troops were repairing rail lines inside Abkhazia, tanks inscribed with the words "On Tbilisi" were rolling down a Moscow avenue, and a military expert named Pavel Felgenhauer was writing that Vladimir Putin had already decided to start a war. How did a dispute over breakaway regions become one of the most dangerous crises in post-Soviet history? The answers lie in the collision of NATO's eastern expansion, the precedent set by Kosovo's independence, and a sequence of provocations, drone incidents, and armed skirmishes that made war feel, to many observers on all sides, like the only remaining option.

• 2. The Kosovo Precedent

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  On the 14th of February 2008, Vladimir Putin told his audience that Russia had "homework" prepared in case Kosovo declared independence. That declaration came, and almost immediately Abkhazia and South Ossetia submitted formal requests for recognition to both Russia and the international community, explicitly citing Kosovo as a precedent. Russia's State Duma called a session for the 13th of March to discuss recognition of unrecognized republics in the former Soviet Union.

  Boris Gryzlov, chairman of the State Duma, met with the presidents of Abkhazia and South Ossetia in February and declared that Russia should reshape its relations with these self-proclaimed republics. The Duma's committee on CIS affairs subsequently recommended deepening links with Abkhazia, South Ossetia, and Transnistria. Nezavisimaya Gazeta described that hearing as "the launch of a procedure of recognition."

  Konstantin Zatulin, Deputy Chairman of the State Duma Committee on CIS Affairs, put the strategic calculation plainly. He said that Russia's steps toward the unrecognized republics would "meet with understanding in the world as a response to the US recognition of Kosovo." He also warned that if Russia did not act, the problem would "remind of itself closer to the Olympics," a reference to the 2014 Winter Games scheduled for Sochi.

• 3. NATO and the Bucharest Summit

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  On the 1st of April 2008, George W. Bush visited Kyiv and voiced support for Georgia's and Ukraine's accession to NATO. Two days later, the heads of Abkhazia and South Ossetia received a letter from Putin at the exact moment the NATO summit was opening in Bucharest. The letter addressed the separatist leaders as "presidents" and promised "practical, not declaratory" assistance from Russia.

  At the Bucharest Summit, Belgium and Germany had already raised questions about whether Georgia was acting in a conciliatory manner toward the separatists, in contrast to Eastern European members who fully supported granting Georgia a Membership Action Plan. Afterward, Russian diplomats and journalists at the summit suggested that war in the Caucasus before December was inevitable, according to journalist Petru Bogatu.

  Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov announced that Russia would "do everything" to prevent Georgia's and Ukraine's NATO membership. Chief of the General Staff Yuri Baluyevsky said on the 11th of April that Russia would carry out "steps of a different nature" in addition to military action. Russian media noted that Baluyevsky had never been known for making unsanctioned statements. Members of the Georgian parliament read his words as a direct threat of military incursion.

  Dmitry Rogozin, Russian ambassador to NATO, argued that Georgia's pursuit of NATO membership would increase international support for recognizing Abkhazia and South Ossetia. He made the same argument about Ukraine, warning it would lose its eastern territories if it continued seeking NATO membership.

• 4. The Drone War

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  On the 20th of April 2008, an unarmed Georgian unmanned aerial vehicle was shot down over the Abkhaz conflict zone. Georgia alleged that a MiG-29 Fulcrum from the Gudauta military base carried out the attack. Russia's Air Force denied any Russian planes were flying in the area. Abkhazia said their own L-39 aircraft destroyed the drone, identifying it as an Israeli-made Hermes 450.

  Georgia released video footage the following day. The recording showed what appeared to be a Russian MiG-29 attacking the unarmed drone over the Black Sea. NATO Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer quipped that he would eat his tie if a NATO MiG-29 had appeared in Abkhazia and shot down the drone, pointedly countering Russian ambassador Rogozin's suggestion that NATO itself was responsible.

  On the 26th of May 2008, the United Nations Observer Mission in Georgia released the conclusion of its independent investigation. It confirmed that the Georgian video footage and radar data were authentic, and that the jet which destroyed the drone was indeed Russian. The report identified the Gudauta base as a possible point of origin, noting the jet flew toward Russian territory after the attack. Russia dismissed the findings.

  By early June, Georgia had officially halted drone overflights over Abkhazia, though Abkhazia accused Georgia of continuing the flights. The drone episode produced the first confirmed Russian combat action over Georgian-controlled airspace in the crisis, and it would not be the last.

• 5. Railway Troops and Military Buildup

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  On the 31st of May 2008, Russia deployed railroad troops to repair a rail line in Abkhazia. The Russian Defense Ministry insisted the troops were unarmed. Georgia called the move "aggressive." Georgian deputy foreign minister Grigol Vashadze said bluntly: "Nobody needs to bring Railway Forces to the territory of another country, if a military intervention is not being prepared." The US Department of State said the move "dismayed" them.

  NATO Secretary General de Hoop Scheffer said on the 3rd of June that Russia had violated Georgia's sovereignty and called for the removal of the railway troops. Russia's defense minister Anatoliy Serdyukov said the troops would withdraw once the repair work was done, estimating two months. A claim emerged on the 13th of June that an anti-tank mine had been found on the section being rehabilitated, which Russia framed as a "subversive-terrorist act."

  By the 21st of July 2008, repair of the 54-kilometer line between Sukhumi and Ochamchira had been completed. Georgian political expert Mamuka Areshidze noted that the repair work centered primarily on the line leading to Ochamchira, site of a former Soviet border base well-suited for moving troops into the Kodori Gorge. Russian railroad forces began withdrawal from Abkhazia on the 30th of July, having attended an inauguration ceremony for the line that same day. Historically, Soviet and Russian military planners had deployed railway troops to future combat areas in advance of offensives; the previous instance had been in Chechnya in 1999. The Sukhumi-Ochamchira line was later used to transport military equipment by at least part of the 9,000 Russian soldiers who entered Georgia from Abkhazia during the August 2008 invasion.

  The buildup extended beyond the railway. According to a statement from the Russian Ministry of Defense issued on the 8th of May, the number of Russian peacekeepers in Abkhazia had been boosted to 2,542. Russian peacekeepers were also permitted, according to a Nezavisimaya Gazeta report, to undertake military actions independently if necessary. A non-peacekeeping airborne battalion of 400 heavily armed troops was reportedly sent to Abkhazia without Georgia's consent.

• 6. July: Violence Turns Deadly

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  On the 3rd of July 2008, a bomb killed South Ossetian police official Nodar Bibilov in the village of Dmenisi in the early morning. Hours later, a remote-detonated bomb targeted the car of Dmitry Sanakoyev, the leader of the pro-Georgian South Ossetian government. Three of Sanakoyev's bodyguards were wounded in the follow-on firefight. South Ossetia reported that Georgia started shelling Tskhinvali at around 23:40 that night, resulting in one death and seven wounded.

  By the morning of the 4th of July, South Ossetia reported three people dead and eleven wounded from what it described as a Georgian special military operation. Georgian authorities said South Ossetian forces had been shelling Georgian-controlled villages, including Tamarasheni and Nikozi, for six hours. South Ossetian military forces were mobilized, peacekeeping forces were put on alert, and Abkhaz leader Bagapsh warned that if Georgia did not stop attacking Tskhinvali, the war would spill across the entire Caucasus.

  On the 8th of July 2008, four Russian military jets flew over South Ossetia for nearly 40 minutes close to Tskhinvali, according to Georgian Air Force deputy commander Colonel Zurab Pochkhua. Russia officially acknowledged the overflight on the 10th of July, saying the fighters were sent to "let hot heads in Tbilisi cool down." This was the first time in the 2000s that Russia had confessed to an overflight of Georgian territory. The flight occurred just as US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice was visiting Georgia; Saakashvili observed drily: "Maybe that's how they welcomed Condoleezza Rice."

  On the 6th of July, a bomb in Gali in Abkhazia killed four people and wounded six. Abkhaz authorities severed all communication with Georgia in response and seized the travel documents of Georgian citizens who had the right to enter Gali. Aleksandr Dugin, known for his ties to Russian military and intelligence circles, visited South Ossetia in late June and said at a press conference: "Russia has practically decided to recognize Abkhazia and South Ossetia." He added that the recognition had to come before December to prevent the question of Georgia's NATO membership from being left open.

• 7. Warnings That Went Unheeded

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  Russian military expert Pavel Felgenhauer wrote on the 20th of June that Vladimir Putin had already decided to start a war against Georgia in Abkhazia and South Ossetia, with timing targeting late August 2008. He predicted that provocations would begin in Upper Abkhazia and South Ossetia before spreading to the rest of Georgia. Chechen separatist intelligence sources, reported by Kavkaz Center on the 4th of July, described the same sequence, identifying the expulsion of Georgian forces from the Kodori Gorge as the primary objective.

  American political scientist Zbigniew Brzezinski said on the 12th of June that Russia was attempting to gain control of the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan oil pipeline by destabilizing Georgia. Russian expert Alexander Golts wrote in early May: "Nobody wants war, but both sides are doing everything to spark a military conflict." Robert Parsons had reached the same conclusion in May, writing that "a war between Georgia and Russia would be a disaster. Yet it is a measure of Russia's ambition, and of western diffidence, that such an outcome is becoming conceivable."

  A secret report read at a closed session of the State Duma's security committee in the spring of 2008, later obtained by Nezavisimaya Gazeta, outlined Russia's options explicitly. Among them: to "passively wait as the process of aggravation of the situation takes place, and to take decisive action by intervening at the stage of armed conflict." On the 14th of July 2008, Georgian deputy defense minister Batu Kutelia said a more than 15 percent increase of the Georgian army, bringing it to 37,000 troops, was intended to protect Georgian airspace and the Black Sea coast. The crisis that had begun with lifted sanctions and diplomatic notes was now, in the assessment of nearly every observer with knowledge of the situation, on a path toward open war.