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— CH. 1 · INTRODUCTION —

Paul von Hindenburg

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  • Paul von Hindenburg stood at 1.98 meters tall, with a muscular frame and striking blue eyes, an imposing figure at the Palace of Versailles when the German Empire was proclaimed on the 18th of January 1871. He was there as his regiment's elected representative, a young officer who had survived a bullet grazing his skull at the Battle of Koniggratz just five years before. Few in that gilded hall could have imagined that this towering Prussian soldier would one day become president of a republic he privately despised, or that his final act in office would hand the chancellorship to Adolf Hitler. How did a man who rose to national heroism on the Eastern Front, who commanded six million men across a dozen battlefronts, end up opening the door to a regime that would destroy everything he claimed to stand for? And how did a soldier who reportedly stayed calm while Erich Ludendorff wept and screamed during Germany's darkest hours become the decisive figure not in a military victory, but in a political catastrophe?

  • At age eleven, Paul entered the Cadet Corps School at Wahlstatt, and by sixteen he had been transferred to the school in Berlin. By eighteen, he was serving as a page to the widow of King Frederick William IV of Prussia. The path was fixed early: graduates entering the army were formally presented to King William I, who asked only for their father's name and rank. Hindenburg's father was a Prussian junker, a member of the minor landed nobility, and that lineage opened every door. His full name ran to nine words: Paul Ludwig Hans Anton von Beneckendorff und von Hindenburg.

    The Austro-Prussian War of 1866 gave Hindenburg his first taste of combat. He wrote to his parents before the fighting began: "I rejoice in this bright-coloured future. For the soldier, war is the normal state of things. If I fall, it is the most honorable and beautiful death." At the Battle of Koniggratz, a bullet pierced his helmet and creased the top of his skull, briefly knocking him unconscious. He wrapped his head in a towel and resumed leading his detachment, winning a decoration.

    Four years later, during the Franco-Prussian War, his regiment attacked the village of Saint Privat near Metz, climbing a gentle slope into heavy fire from superior French rifles. After four hours, Prussian artillery broke the French lines. His regiment suffered 1,096 casualties that day. He then watched the proclamation of the German Empire from Versailles, and afterward observed from a distance the suppression of the Paris Commune.

    In 1873, he passed the competitive entrance examination for the Kriegsakademie in Berlin. His grades were high enough to earn a General Staff appointment. He was promoted to captain in 1878, and the following year he married Gertrud von Sperling, the daughter of General Oskar von Sperling. Together they would have two daughters and a son. One of his section chiefs at the General Staff was Count Alfred von Schlieffen, whose ideas about encirclement battles drawn from the ancient engagement at Cannae would shape German military thinking for decades. Hindenburg taught those same tactics at the Kriegsakademie for five years.

  • When World War I broke out in July 1914, Hindenburg was living in retirement in Hannover. He had left the army in 1911, after 46 years of service including 14 in General Staff positions, stepping aside, as he put it, to make way for younger men. He was recalled on the 22nd of August 1914, assigned to command the German Eighth Army in East Prussia, with General Erich Ludendorff as his chief of staff.

    The situation was precarious. The Eighth Army had been beaten by the Russian First Army at Gumbinnen and risked encirclement as the Russian Second Army advanced from the south. The previous commander, Maximilian von Prittwitz, had already told headquarters he intended to withdraw to Western Prussia. He was immediately relieved and replaced by Hindenburg.

    Arriving at Marienburg on the 23rd of August, Hindenburg met Lieutenant Colonel Max Hoffmann, an expert on the Russian army, who outlined a plan to shift most of the Eighth Army south to strike the exposed left flank of the advancing Russian Second Army. Hindenburg approved the plan and authorised the transfer, leaving only two cavalry brigades to face the Russian First Army in the north. He described the defensive line as "thin, but not weak", because the men were defending their homes.

    On the night of the 25th of August, he told his staff: "Gentlemen, our preparations are so well in hand that we can sleep soundly tonight." The battle that followed resulted in the destruction of the Russian Second Army. Some 92,000 Russians were captured along with four hundred guns, while German casualties numbered only 14,000. British field marshal Edmund Ironside later called it the "greatest defeat suffered by any of the combatants during the war."

    Hindenburg suggested naming the battle "Tannenberg" as a deliberate act of symbolic vengeance, invoking the defeat inflicted on the Order of the Teutonic Knights by Polish and Lithuanian forces in 1410, even though the actual fighting took place nowhere near the original Tannenberg field. On the 1st of November 1914, he was promoted to field marshal and named commander of all German forces in the East.

  • By 1916, Hindenburg's popularity had grown to the point where influential army officers lobbied openly against the current Chief of the Army, General Erich von Falkenhayn. The tipping point came when Falkenhayn ordered a Bulgarian attack in Macedonia that failed with heavy losses, and Romania then declared war on Austro-Hungary, sending 650,000 trained soldiers into Hungarian Transylvania. This directly contradicted Falkenhayn's assurances to Kaiser Wilhelm II that Romania would stay neutral. On the 29th of August 1916, Hindenburg was summoned to Pless and named Chief of the Great General Staff.

    With Ludendorff as his deputy, the two men took full advantage of Kaiser Wilhelm's extensive delegation of authority to establish what amounted to a military dictatorship. Hindenburg was also appointed Supreme War Commander of the Central Powers, with nominal control over six million men. Crown Prince Rupprecht of Bavaria reportedly welcomed the change, delighted that two competent men had replaced what he called the "dilettante" Falkenhayn.

    Under this command, the German Army issued a Textbook of Defensive Warfare that reorganised front-line tactics around light machine guns, flexible retreat, and eight-man infantry platoons under non-commissioned officers. Hindenburg called these small units "the greatest evidence of the confidence which we placed in the moral and mental powers of our army, down to its smallest unit." A reserve division was always positioned immediately behind the front.

    The pair also launched the Hindenburg Programme, setting ambitious production targets for weapons and munitions. Major goals included a new light machine gun, updated artillery, and motor transport. Hindenburg wanted universities closed except for medical training, contraceptives banned, bachelors taxed, and Jews excluded from any Polish army being formed. Few of these proposals were adopted. Admiral Muller of the Military Cabinet observed: "Old Hindenburg, like Ludendorff, is no politician, and the latter is at the same time a hothead."

    Hindenburg's 70th birthday on the 2nd of October became a public holiday, an honour that until then had been reserved only for the Kaiser himself.

  • Operation Michael began on the 21st of March 1918, striking a British salient near Saint-Quentin. By day two the Germans had broken through artillery lines. The Kaiser prematurely awarded Hindenburg the Grand Cross of the Iron Cross on day four. Yet the encirclement that was the plan's core aim failed: British resistance gave the targeted corps time to withdraw. The Germans advanced a maximum of 65 km but could not seize Amiens or cut the railway connections that sustained the Allied line.

    Paris was being shelled by naval guns mounted on rail carriages 120 km away, and Hindenburg hoped civilian morale would crack. He underestimated French resilience. By the time German forces crossed the Marne in subsequent attacks, they had lost 977,555 of their best men between March and the end of July, while American troops continued to reinforce the Allies. The German horses were close to starvation, and the infantry thought constantly of food.

    After the retreat from the Marne, Ludendorff became severely unstable, shrieking orders and often in tears. At dinner on the 19th of July, when Ludendorff responded to a suggestion of Hindenburg's by shouting "I have already told you that is impossible", Hindenburg quietly led him from the room. On the 8th of August, the British attack at Amiens broke well into the German lines; Ludendorff called it the "black day in the history of the German Army." On the 29th of September, Hindenburg and Ludendorff told the Kaiser that the war was lost and that an armistice was urgently needed.

    The Kaiser accepted Ludendorff's resignation on the 26th of October but refused Hindenburg's, judging him indispensable for holding the army together. Hindenburg replaced Ludendorff with Wilhelm Groener. After the Kaiser's abdication, it was Groener who telephoned the Social Democrat leader Friedrich Ebert that same evening, promising military support for the new government in exchange for maintaining the officer corps in command of the troops. In the west, 1.25 million men and 500,000 horses were brought home within the time allotted by the armistice.

  • On the 18th of November 1919, Hindenburg and Ludendorff appeared together before the parliamentary commission investigating responsibility for the war's outbreak and the 1918 defeat. They had been strangers since Ludendorff's dismissal, but they arrived prepared. Hindenburg refused to take the oath until Ludendorff was permitted to read a statement declaring that they were under no obligation to testify, since their answers might expose them to criminal prosecution, but that they were voluntarily waiving that right.

    On the stand, Hindenburg read a prepared statement and ignored the chairman's repeated demands that he answer direct questions. He testified that the German Army had been on the verge of winning in the autumn of 1918 and that defeat had come from a stab in the back from disloyal elements at home and unpatriotic politicians. He cited a dinner conversation that Ludendorff had had with the British officer Sir Neill Malcolm. When he finished reading, Hindenburg walked out of the hearings despite a threat of contempt, confident that no one would dare charge a war hero.

    His memoir, Aus meinem Leben ("From My Life"), became a huge bestseller. It presented Hindenburg as a staunch, uncomplicated, steadfast soldier and emphasised two main themes: the need for Germany to maintain a strong military, and the need to restore the monarchy under the House of Hohenzollern. The Kaiser was treated with great respect throughout. Hindenburg wrote that it was "against my inclination to take any interest in current politics," a claim his intimates found at odds with his demonstrated knowledge of Prussian political life.

    Many military historians dismissed the memoir as a boring account that skipped over the controversial issues. It served its purpose anyway. A 1929 film glorifying his life as a dedicated patriot reinforced the carefully crafted public image.

  • President Friedrich Ebert died on the 28th of February 1925. When no candidate won a majority in the first round of the election to replace him, the democratic parties of the Weimar Republic united behind a single candidate for the second round. The nationalist camp chose Hindenburg. He wrote to Kaiser Wilhelm II, then in exile in the Netherlands, asking permission to run; Wilhelm approved. Hindenburg won and became the second elected president of the Weimar Republic.

    Opposed to Hitler and the Nazi Party, Hindenburg nonetheless became central to the instability that enabled their rise. After twice dissolving the Reichstag in 1932, he found himself in an increasingly constrained political position. No stable governing coalition could be formed without the Nazis, and the right-wing advisers around Hindenburg argued that Hitler could be controlled from within a coalition government. On the 30th of January 1933, Hindenburg reluctantly appointed Hitler as chancellor in coalition with the German National People's Party.

    What followed moved with startling speed. In response to the Reichstag fire of February 1933, Hindenburg signed the Reichstag Fire Decree, suspending civil liberties across Germany. He likewise signed the Enabling Act of 1933, which gave the Nazi regime emergency powers to govern without parliamentary consent. Hindenburg died on the 2nd of August 1934. Before that day was out, Hitler combined the offices of president and chancellor and declared himself Fuhrer of Germany.

    The man who had refused to stay in the Kaiser's palace at Kassel because he had not received the Kaiser's permission, who had settled into a humble inn so as not to give offence to either monarchists or revolutionaries, had signed the documents that made a totalitarian dictatorship possible. His son Oskar, who had served as his liaison officer and remained at his side, was among those present at the end.

  • Winston Churchill wrote in 1923 that Hindenburg was a figurehead awed by the mystique of the General Staff, concluding that "Ludendorff throughout appears as the uncontested master." Others went further: one historian called him a "beloved figurehead" while another dismissed him as "an old military booby." These judgements drew heavily on Ludendorff's own comprehensive memoir, written immediately after the war with himself at the center of every decision.

    Hindenburg's less detailed memoir never challenged Ludendorff's account, and officers at the time often felt he did little, because his method was to set objectives and appoint capable subordinates rather than to issue detailed orders himself. Yet the officers who testified before the Reichstag investigation committee agreed that Hindenburg was always in command. On the 26th of July 1918, the chief of staff of the Seventh Army, Fritz von Lossberg, traveled to headquarters and found Ludendorff loudly arguing with the field marshal. When Lossberg entered and gave his assessment, Hindenburg turned to Ludendorff and said, in effect: "Now, Ludendorff, make sure that the order goes out immediately." He then left the room.

    Ludendorff's postwar behavior, including his participation in the Beer Hall Putsch alongside Hitler in November 1923 and his attraction to eccentric political ideas, contrasted with Hindenburg's relative steadiness in adapting to changing times. Yet Hindenburg's own political record was damaging in its own way. His testimony before the parliamentary commission gave official weight to the stab-in-the-back myth, which nationalists used to delegitimize the Weimar Republic for the following decade.

    At Tannenberg in August 1924, before a crowd of 50,000, Hindenburg laid the cornerstone of an imposing memorial at the site of his 1914 victory. A decade later, he would be buried there. The Tannenberg Memorial became one of the most potent sites of nationalist mythology in interwar Germany, a monument that outlasted its creator's intentions.

Common questions

Who was Paul von Hindenburg and why is he historically significant?

Paul von Hindenburg was a German military officer and statesman who led the Imperial German Army during World War I and later served as President of Germany from 1925 until his death on the 2nd of August 1934. He is historically significant for commanding German forces at the Battle of Tannenberg, where 92,000 Russian soldiers were captured, and for appointing Adolf Hitler as chancellor of Germany on the 30th of January 1933.

What happened at the Battle of Tannenberg and what was Hindenburg's role?

The Battle of Tannenberg in August 1914 resulted in the destruction of the Russian Second Army, with 92,000 Russians captured and four hundred guns seized, while German casualties numbered only 14,000. Hindenburg commanded the German Eighth Army and authorised the flanking strategy proposed by Lieutenant Colonel Max Hoffmann, which encircled and annihilated the Russian force. British field marshal Edmund Ironside called it the greatest defeat suffered by any combatant during the war.

How did Hindenburg appoint Hitler as chancellor of Germany?

After twice dissolving the Reichstag in 1932 without producing a stable government, Hindenburg reluctantly agreed in January 1933 to appoint Hitler as chancellor in coalition with the German National People's Party. He was opposed to Hitler and the Nazis but was persuaded by advisers that Hitler could be managed within a coalition. Following the Reichstag fire, Hindenburg then signed the Reichstag Fire Decree and the Enabling Act of 1933, which suspended civil liberties and granted the Nazi regime emergency powers.

What was the Hindenburg Programme during World War I?

The Hindenburg Programme was an ambitious arms production plan launched by the German Supreme Army Command under Hindenburg's leadership. Major goals included a new light machine gun, updated artillery, and motor transport. To increase output, the army released a million men from active service to work in industry. Hindenburg proposed extensive social controls alongside the programme, but most were not adopted.

What was the stab-in-the-back myth and how did Hindenburg contribute to it?

The stab-in-the-back myth held that the German Army had been on the verge of winning World War I and was defeated not on the battlefield but by disloyal elements on the home front and unpatriotic politicians. Hindenburg testified to this effect before the parliamentary commission investigating the 1918 defeat on the 18th of November 1919, reading a prepared statement and walking out before answering questions. His testimony gave official weight to the myth, which nationalist politicians then used to delegitimize the Weimar Republic throughout the following decade.

How did historians assess Hindenburg's military leadership compared to Ludendorff?

Historical opinion on Hindenburg versus Ludendorff has shifted over time. Churchill wrote in 1923 that Ludendorff appeared as the uncontested master, a view shaped largely by Ludendorff's own comprehensive postwar memoir. However, officers who testified before the Reichstag investigation committee agreed that Hindenburg was always in command, setting overall strategy and appointing capable subordinates. Ludendorff's unstable behavior in the final months of the war, including breaking down in tears and shouting at subordinates, contrasted with Hindenburg's reported steadiness under pressure.

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