Morrill Tariff

• 1. Legislative Origins And Passage

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  The Morrill Tariff took effect one month after it was signed into law on the 2nd of March 1861. This date marked the final days of President James Buchanan's term as a Democrat. Representative Justin Smith Morrill of Vermont drafted the bill with advice from economist Henry Charles Carey. The House Ways and Means Committee had previously blocked similar efforts during the 35th Congress of 1857, 1859. John S. Phelps, a Democrat from Missouri, wrote a plan that retained most low rates from the Tariff of 1857. Morrill and Henry Winter Davis produced a Republican proposal to raise tariffs drastically. They replaced ad valorem schedules with specific duties on goods like iron and textiles. The bill passed the House on the 10th of May 1860, by a vote of 105 to 64. Republicans voted 89 to 2 for the measure. Seven northern Democrats joined them in support. Thirty-five southern Democrats and three Oppositionists voted against it. The Senate remained controlled by Democrats until seven southern states seceded in late 1860. Their senators withdrew from Congress, allowing Republicans to take control of the Finance Committee. Robert M. T. Hunter of Virginia lost his hold on the committee chairmanship. The bill reached the Senate floor on February 20 and passed 25 to 14. Twelve Senators abstained, including five Southern Democrats and two Republicans. Final approval came by unanimous consent on March 2.

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• 2. Economic Rationale And Design

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  The tariff increased effective rates collected on dutiable imports by approximately 70% in its first year. Average American tariff rates had been around 17% overall between 1857 and 1860. The new schedule raised those averages to about 26% overall or 36% on dutiable items only. Morrill rejected traditional protection systems by proposing duties on agricultural products like sugar, wool, flaxseed, hides, beef, pork, corn, grain, hemp, and minerals. He also included coal, lead, copper, zinc, and other minerals produced by northwestern states. Eastern fishing industries received duties on dried, pickled, and salted fish. Henry C. Carey emphasized that the success of Lincoln's administration depended entirely on passing this bill. Carey warned that without it there would be much suffering among people and trouble for the Republican Party. Representative John Sherman later wrote that no national taxes except import duties were imposed at the time of passage. The change from ad valorem to specific duties allowed protectionists to set higher actual rates than before. Taussig noted that specific duties established by the act were considerably above the ad valorem duties of 1846. The most important direct changes involved increased duties on iron and wool. These increases aimed to attach Pennsylvania and some Western States to the Republican party.

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• 3. Fiscal Impact During Civil War

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  The United States needed $3 billion to pay for armies and fleets raised to fight the Civil War. Over $400 million was required just for 1862 alone. Customs revenue from tariffs totaled $345 million from 1861 to 1865. This amount represented 43% of all federal tax revenue collected during those years. Military spending reached $3,065 million over the same period. Bond sales provided $2.8 billion in funding, far exceeding tariff contributions. Secretary of the Treasury Salmon P. Chase worked with Morrill to pass a second tariff bill in summer 1861. That bill raised rates another 10% to generate more revenue. The original Morrill Tariff proved too low for war needs and was quickly superseded. Further increases by 1865 left comparable rates at 38% overall or 48% on dutiable items. The Treasury held less than $500,000 on hand when Congress began its second session in December 1860. Millions in unpaid bills created an urgent financial crisis. Bray Hammond described the situation as an empty purse requiring immediate action. Jane Flaherty concluded that revising the tariff arose as an attempt to augment revenue and stave off ruin.

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• 4. International Reception And Diplomacy

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  The Morrill Tariff met intense hostility in Britain where free trade dominated public opinion. Southern diplomats sought British recognition for the Confederacy using this policy against them. The new schedule heavily penalized British iron, clothing, and manufactured exports. Public outcry erupted among many British politicians who viewed protective tariffs as immoral. Economist William Stanley Jevons denounced it as a retrograde law. Novelist Charles Dickens used his magazine All the Year Round to attack the tariff. On the 28th of December 1861, Dickens published a lengthy article blaming the Civil War on the Morrill Tariff. He argued that every year Southern states declared they would submit only while lacking strength for resistance. Palmerston told Adams that England disliked slavery but wanted cotton and also disliked the Morrill Tariff. Karl Marx wrote extensively in the British press arguing instead that slavery induced secession. He stated that the Morrill Tariff went through Congress only after rebellion had already broken out. Seven of eleven Confederate states had already seceded before signing occurred. British shippers hastened deliveries before new rates took effect in early summer 1861. The Senate Finance Committee chairman responded to complaints by asking what right a foreign country had to question American decisions.

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• 5. Historiographical Debates On Causality

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  Historians James Huston notes have been baffled by the role of high tariffs over time. One school says Republicans were willing tools of monopolists. A second school argues Republicans truly believed tariffs promoted nationalism and prosperity. A third emphasizes the importance of cementing party loyalty especially in industrial states. Another approach highlights factory workers eager to protect wages from European competition. Charles A. Beard argued in the 1920s that long-term economic issues were critical. He claimed pro-tariff Northeast formed coalitions with anti-tariff agrarian Midwest against plantation South. Richard Hofstadter led historians away from Beard's thesis in the 1950s toward social causes centered on slavery. A 2002 study by economists Robert McGuire and T. Norman Van Cott concluded tariff issues may be more important than currently believed. Marc-William Palen notes how the tariff passed only through Southern state secession. Allan Nevins and James M. McPherson downplay significance arguing it was peripheral to slavery. Alexander Stephens disputed Toombs claims about severity while later citing slavery as cornerstone for support. None of compromise seekers in 1860, 61 suggested the tariff might be key solution or cause.

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• 6. Long Term Protectionist Legacy

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  The Morrill Tariff inaugurated a period of continuous protectionism lasting until Revenue Act adoption in 1913. That later act became known as Underwood Tariff. The schedule remained retained long after Civil War ended. Average rates between 1825 and 1830 had sometimes exceeded 50%. New rates stayed significantly lower than those earlier peaks despite being higher than antebellum periods. Further increases by 1865 left comparable rates at 38% overall or 48% on dutiable items. Two additional tariffs sponsored by Morrill raised revenue urgently needed during war. The second Morrill Tariff, also called Revenue Act of 1861, came later that Fall. Taussig wrote that the first Morrill should not be considered Civil War legislation since House passed it before serious expectation of war existed. Senate accepted session without material change according to his analysis. The law's critics compared it to 1828 Tariff of Abominations sparking Nullification Crisis though average rate was much lower. Robert Barnwell Rhett railed against pending tariff before South Carolina convention adopting Address the 25th of December 1860. Enforcement contributed to Union support among industrialists and merchant interests.

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