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Insurgency: the story on HearLore | HearLore
Insurgency
The 13th of May 1861 marked a turning point in how the world understood rebellion, when Great Britain granted belligerent status to the Confederate States of America, effectively treating a civil war as an international conflict without recognizing the Confederacy as a sovereign state. This legal maneuver allowed Confederate warships to operate in foreign ports with the same rights as United States warships, proving that the nature of a revolt depends less on the size of the army and more on the political recognition of the belligerents. An insurgency is not merely a fight between two armies; it is a violent, armed rebellion by small, lightly armed bands who practice guerrilla warfare against a larger authority, relying on the asymmetric nature of their struggle to survive. These irregular forces avoid large-scale direct battles, opting instead to blend in with the civilian population, often in rural areas, where they gradually expand territorial control and military forces. The key to their survival is the control of and collaboration with local populations, creating a dynamic where the line between soldier and civilian becomes dangerously blurred.
The Anatomy of Asymmetry
James Fearon and David Laitin defined insurgency as a technology of military conflict characterized by small, lightly armed bands practicing guerrilla warfare from rural base areas, yet the true complexity lies in the political and military means used to change an existing political order. Austin Long described these forces as entities that typically mingle with civilians in order to hide from the forces defending the political order, creating a situation where the state must fight an enemy that is indistinguishable from the people it seeks to protect. This asymmetry forces state attempts to quell insurgencies to frequently lead to the infliction of indiscriminate violence, while rebel control of territory often involves violence against the civilian population to enforce compliance. The insurgents' goal is to achieve control over civilians, exercising power through a variety of practices including different types of violence, dispute resolution, taxation, regulation of movement, and access to aid and services. Unlike terrorism, which may pursue political goals but replaces a political program with violence, an insurgency aims for political control and may incorporate terrorist tactics as part of a broader strategy to open a security gap.
The Politics of Survival
Barbara F. Walter presented a theory explaining the role of strong institutions in preventing insurgencies that can result in civil wars, arguing that institutions can contribute to checking the government, creating multiple peaceful routes to help the government solve problems, and making the government committed to political terms that entail preserving peace. When these institutions fail, as in autocratic governments that are less likely to accept the emergence of strong institutions due to the resulting constraint of governmental corruption and privileges, the stage is set for rebellion. Elisabeth Jean Wood explained that participants in high-risk activism are very aware of the costs and benefits of engaging in civil wars, noting that selective incentives encourage insurgency and violent movements against autocratic political regimes. The supply of safety as a material good can be provided by the insurgents, which abolishes the exploitation of the government and thus forms one of the main incentives for joining the fight. The revolutionary power can help manifest a social-political network that in return provides access to political opportunities to diverse candidates, who share a collective identity and cultural homogeneity, creating a self-sustaining cycle of resistance.
When did Great Britain grant belligerent status to the Confederate States of America?
Great Britain granted belligerent status to the Confederate States of America on the 13th of May 1861. This legal maneuver treated the civil war as an international conflict without recognizing the Confederacy as a sovereign state.
What defines an insurgency according to James Fearon and David Laitin?
James Fearon and David Laitin define insurgency as a technology of military conflict characterized by small, lightly armed bands practicing guerrilla warfare from rural base areas. These forces mingle with civilians to hide from the forces defending the political order.
What are the three gaps that must be closed to prevent insurgencies according to Stuart Eizenstat?
Stuart Eizenstat argues that a state must close three specific gaps to prevent insurgencies: security, capacity, and legitimacy. Security involves protection against threats, capacity covers survival needs like water and food, and legitimacy requires consent of the governed with minimal corruption.
How does an insurgency differ from terrorism according to the script?
An insurgency aims for political control and may incorporate terrorist tactics as part of a broader strategy to open a security gap. Terrorism may pursue political goals but replaces a political program with violence, whereas an insurgency seeks to exercise power through various practices including dispute resolution and taxation.
What are the four elements of an insurgency described by Robert R. Tomes?
Robert R. Tomes identifies four elements that typically encompass an insurgency: cell-networks that maintain secrecy, terrorism used to foster insecurity, multifaceted attempts to cultivate support in the general population, and attacks against the government.
What is the information-centric framework proposed by Berman and Matanock?
Berman and Matanock propose an information-centric framework where civilians can anonymously share local information with government forces to target rebels. This framework assumes civilians respond to incentives and that security and service provision are complementary activities to influence their decision about sharing information.
Robert R. Tomes spoke of four elements that typically encompass an insurgency: cell-networks that maintain secrecy, terrorism used to foster insecurity among the population and drive them to the insurgents for protection, multifaceted attempts to cultivate support in the general population, and attacks against the government. While these elements fit well with Mao's Phase I, they do not deal well with larger civil wars or revolutions like the French Revolution which had no cell system. Steven Metz observed that past models of insurgency do not perfectly fit modern insurgency, in that current instances are far more likely to have a multinational or transnational character than those of the past. These modern conflicts involve third forces, such as armed militias, and fourth forces, such as international media, who may be distinct from the core insurgents and the recognized government. The nesting of insurgency within complex conflicts associated with state weakness or failure creates a shifting participation that traditional wars, where discrete belligerents seek a clear strategic victory, cannot easily accommodate.
The Gap Between Order and Chaos
Stuart Eizenstat argued that insurgencies grow out of gaps, and to be viable, a state must be able to close three specific gaps, with the first being the most important: security. If a government cannot ensure protection against internal and external threats, and preserve sovereignty over territory, rebellious armed groups or criminal nonstate actors may use violence to exploit this security gap, as seen in Haiti, Nepal, and Somalia. The second gap is capacity, covering the survival needs of water, electrical power, food, and public health, closely followed by education, communications, and a working economic system. An inability to meet these needs creates a capacity gap, which can lead to a loss of public confidence and then perhaps political upheaval. The third gap is legitimacy, which requires a government that is perceived to exist by the consent of the governed, has minimal corruption, and has a working law enforcement and judicial system that enforce human rights. When these gaps widen, as in Afghanistan and the Democratic Republic of the Congo, segments of the population are cut off from their governments because of endemic insecurity, creating fertile ground for insurgency.
The Ecosystem of Rebellion
David Kilcullen described a framework for counterinsurgency that represents conflicts as a box containing an ecosystem defined by geographic, ethnic, economic, social, cultural, and religious characteristics. Inside this box are governments, counterinsurgent forces, insurgent leaders, insurgent forces, and the general population, which is made up of three groups: those committed to the insurgents, those committed to the counterinsurgents, and those who simply wish to get on with their lives. Often, but not always, states or groups that aid one side or the other are outside the box, creating outside-the-box intervention dynamics that have their own complexities. The counterinsurgency strategy can be described as efforts to end the insurgency by a campaign developed in balance along three pillars: security, political, and economical. Unity of command becomes unity of effort at best, and collaboration or deconfliction at least, depending less on a shared command and control hierarchy and more on a shared diagnosis of the problem, platforms for collaboration, information sharing, and deconfliction.
The Myth of Global War
Francis Fukuyama argued against the term global war on terror, stating that the United States was not fighting terrorism generically, as in Chechnya or Palestine, but rather was directed at radical Islamism, a movement that makes use of culture for political objectives. He suggested it might be deeper than the ideological conflict of the Cold War, but it should not be confused with Samuel Huntington's clash of civilizations, stressing that the US and its allies need to focus on specific radical groups rather than clash with global Islam. Anthony Cordesman pointed out some of the myths in trying to have a worldwide view of terror, including the belief that cooperation can be based on trust and common values, that a definition of terrorism exists that can be accepted by all, and that intelligence can be freely shared. These myths often obscure the reality that most needs are not identical, and that social scientists, soldiers, and sources of change have been modeling insurgency for nearly a century if one starts with Mao, creating a complex web of theoretical and practical challenges.
The Information War
Berman and Matanock suggested an information-centric framework to describe asymmetric conflicts on a local level, involving government forces, rebels, and civilians, where civilians can anonymously share local information with government forces. This allows government forces to effectively use their asymmetric advantage to target rebels, while the government and rebels divert resources to provide services to civilians so as to influence their decision about sharing information with the government. The framework is based on several assumptions, including that the consequential action of civilians is information sharing, that information can be shared anonymously without endangering the civilians who do so, and that civilians are assumed to respond to incentives. If either side of the government forces or rebels causes casualties among civilians, civilians will reduce their support for that side, making security provided by the government and service provision complementary activities. Innovations that make anonymous tips to the government easier, of which are often technical, can reduce rebel violence, proving that the heart of strengthening weak nations must come from within.