Deterrence theory
In 1966, Thomas Schelling published a book titled Arms and Influence that redefined how scholars understood the use of threats in international relations. He argued that deterrence is not about winning battles but about preventing actions through fear of consequences. This definition separated deterrence from compellence, which seeks to force an actor to change their behavior rather than simply stop them. Deterrence aims to maintain the status quo by convincing an adversary that the cost of attacking outweighs any potential gain. Compellence attempts to alter the status quo by forcing a specific action upon another state. Both strategies fall under the broader category of coercion, yet they operate with different objectives and levels of difficulty. Successful deterrence requires a prospective attacker to believe that the probability of success is low while the costs of failure are high. It does not necessarily require military superiority over an opponent. The central challenge lies in communicating a credible threat without actually executing it.
The Cold War marked the peak of deterrence internationalization as superpowers deployed nuclear weapons in allied territories to extend credibility. In 1949, NATO was founded with deterring aggression as one of its primary goals. By 1966, NATO had deployed 7,200 U.S. tactical warheads across Europe to create a nuclear umbrella for allies. These measures aimed to psychologically deter adversaries by projecting power beyond national borders. The United States and Soviet Union engaged in a nuclear arms race where warheads evolved from fission weapons to thermonuclear devices. Delivery systems became equally important, creating perceptions of bomber gaps and missile gaps between the two powers. Deterrence drove the proliferation of nuclear weapons to ten nations in total during this era. Chemical weapons were also maintained in large stockpiles until destruction began following the 1993 Chemical Weapons Convention. Offensive biological weapons programs were pursued by both countries in the first two decades of the Cold War before the United States program ended under President Richard Nixon in 1969. Most innovative work on deterrence theory occurred from the late 1940s to mid-1960s when scholars focused heavily on nuclear strategies.
Thomas Schelling brought his background in game theory to study international deterrence in his classic 1966 work. He argued that military strategy was now equally the art of coercion rather than just the science of victory. Rational deterrence theory assumes actors are rational unitary entities making cost-benefit calculations about strategic interactions. A threat is considered credible if the defending state possesses both the military capabilities to inflict substantial costs and the resolve to use them. Huth outlined four key factors for consideration: the military balance, signaling and bargaining power, reputations for resolve, and interests at stake. The American economist Michael Kinsley summarized Schelling's approach as dancing closer to the edge of a cliff to convince an opponent you are prepared to take higher risks. States must communicate credible deterrent threats through diplomatic or military actions while avoiding bluffs that can be discounted. Costly signals increase the risk of conflict but also raise the costs of backing down from a deterrent position. Reputations for resolve have a powerful causal impact on whether an attacking state challenges general or immediate deterrence policies.
In November 1945, General Curtis LeMay stated that no air attack could be completely stopped once launched, requiring an air force capable of immediate retaliation. The Cuban Missile Crisis stands as one of the most significant examples of extended deterrence in action during the Cold War. NATO's Double-Track Decision demonstrated how nuclear sharing programs altered strategic calculations by projecting power beyond borders. During the Korean War, proxy conflicts occurred throughout Africa, Asia, Central America, and South America under containment policies. The doctrine of mutual assured destruction characterized relations between the United States and Soviet Union until the onset of the New Cold War in the early 2010s. In 1985, Ronald Reagan and Mikhail Gorbachev agreed that a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought. They emphasized preventing any war between them, whether nuclear or conventional, without seeking to achieve military superiority. The Stuxnet attack on Iran's nuclear program became the most prominent cyber attack to date by 2019. The 2015 Ukraine power grid hack was the only publicly acknowledged case of a cyber attack causing a power outage at that time.
Since the early 2000s, there has been increased focus on cyber deterrence with two distinct meanings for scholars and practitioners. Cyber capabilities alter traditional understandings of deterrence given that attribution of responsibility may be harder and risks lower for attackers. The trilemma where speed, intensity, and control are negatively correlated poses constraints for actors engaging in cyberspace operations. Latent nuclear deterrence refers to states' ability to rapidly develop nuclear weapons through civilian nuclear technology programs. These states use their nuclear latency status for coercive purposes against adversaries who do not wish to see them develop weapons. By the beginning of the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine, many western hawks expressed views that deterrence worked but only in favor of Russia. Former U.S. security advisor John Bolton stated that deterrence is working in the Ukraine crisis just not for the right side. Putin threatens, blusters, uses the word nuclear, and the West wilts under these pressures. Russia has convinced the West that even a whisper of NATO military action would bring disastrous consequences.
Deterrence theory faces skepticism from numerous scholars regarding whether decision makers act rationally as assumed by classical models. Frank C. Zagare argued that deterrence theory is logically inconsistent and empirically inaccurate when compared to observed state behavior. Leaders often behave inconsistently with predictions due to emotions, psychological biases, accidents, or loss of self-control. In 1969, President Richard Nixon ended the United States offensive biological weapons program after two decades of pursuit. The Nuclear Security Project created by Sam Nunn, William Perry, Henry Kissinger, and George Shultz called for embracing a world free of nuclear weapons. They featured in a documentary film entitled Nuclear Tipping Point in 2010 proposing steps toward disarmament. Robert L. Holmes noted that implementation of deterrence theories contradicts fundamental deontological presumptions prohibiting killing innocent life. Scholars argue it is both irrational and immoral to utilize methodologies relying on continuous development of new weapon iterations designed to prohibit such weapons. The concept of minimum deterrence allows states to possess no more nuclear weapons than necessary to deter an adversary from attacking.
Continue Browsing
Common questions
When did Thomas Schelling publish Arms and Influence?
Thomas Schelling published the book Arms and Influence in 1966. This work redefined how scholars understood the use of threats in international relations.
What was NATO's primary goal when founded in 1949?
NATO was founded with deterring aggression as one of its primary goals. By 1966, NATO had deployed 7,200 U.S. tactical warheads across Europe to create a nuclear umbrella for allies.
Who ended the United States offensive biological weapons program in 1969?
President Richard Nixon ended the United States offensive biological weapons program in 1969 after two decades of pursuit. The program pursued by both countries during the first two decades of the Cold War concluded under his administration.
Which year marked the start of the New Cold War affecting mutual assured destruction doctrine?
The onset of the New Cold War occurred in the early 2010s. The doctrine of mutual assured destruction characterized relations between the United States and Soviet Union until this period began.
How many nations possessed nuclear weapons during the Cold War era according to deterrence theory?
Deterrence drove the proliferation of nuclear weapons to ten nations in total during this era. These states developed capabilities through various means including civilian nuclear technology programs known as latent nuclear deterrence.
All sources
104 references cited across the entry
- 1bookA Dictionary of AviationDavid W. Wragg — Osprey — 1973
- 2bookIntroduction: Cross-Domain Deterrence, from Practice to TheoryJon R. Lindsay et al. — Oxford University Press — 2019
- 3bookDeterrence: A Conceptual AnalysisPatrick M. Morgan — SAGE Publications — 1977
- 4bookCross-Domain Deterrence: Strategy in an Era of ComplexityEric Gartzke et al. — Oxford University Press — 2019
- 5bookThe Use of Force: Military Power and International PoliticsRobert J. Art et al. — Rowman & Littlefield Publishers — 2015
- 6bookArms and InfluenceThomas C. Schelling — Yale University Press — 1966
- 7bookBombing to Win: Air Power and Coercion in WarRobert A. Pape — Cornell University Press — 1996
- 8bookConventional DeterrenceJohn J. Mearsheimer — Cornell University Press — 1983
- 9bookIsrael and Conventional DeterrenceJonathan Shimshoni — Cornell University Press — 1988
- 10newsTaiwan and the True Sources of DeterrenceBonnie S. Glaser et al. — 2023-11-30
- 11journalActive Denial: Redesigning Japan's Response to China's Military ChallengeEric Heginbotham et al. — 2018
- 12journalThe Internationalization of Deterrence: The Case Study of Iran's Biaxial Deterrence in the Middle EastRahim Baizidi — 2025
- 13journalSelection Effects and DeterrenceJames Fearon — 2002
- 14citationGeneral deterrenceCambridge University Press — 2003
- 15journalStrategies of Extended Deterrence: How States Provide the Security UmbrellaDo Young Lee — 2021
- 16bookAnalyzing Strategic Nuclear PolicyCharles L. Glaser — Princeton University Press — 1990
- 17webHitler and Chemical WeaponsRobert Farley et al. — 2017-04-12
- 18journalThe Concept of Deterrence in the Postwar EraRichard K. Betts — 1991
- 19bookNL ARMS Netherlands Annual Review of Military Studies 2020Sten Rynning — T.M.C. Asser Press — 2021
- 20journalHow Does Nuclear Deterrence Differ from Conventional Deterrence?James Wirtz — 2018
- 21bookNL ARMS Netherlands Annual Review of Military Studies 2020: Deterrence in the 21st Century—Insights from Theory and PracticeKarl Mueller — T.M.C. Asser Press — 2021
- 22journalConventional Deterrence and Conventional Retaliation in EuropeSamuel P. Huntington — 1983
- 23journalWhy the Soviets Can't Win Quickly in Central EuropeJohn J. Mearsheimer — 1982
- 24journalTHE GHOST OF MUNICH: America's Appeasement ComplexFredrik Logevall et al. — 2010
- 25magazineThe General and World War IIIRichard Rhodes — 1995-06-11
- 26citationDeterrence and International Conflict: Empirical Findings and Theoretical DebateP. K. Huth — 1999
- 27bookDeterrence and DefenseGlenn H. Snyder — Princeton University Press — 1966
- 28citationWho Won LibyaB.A. Jentleson et al. — 2005
- 29citationThe General Theory and Logic of Coercive DiplomacyA George — United States Institute of Peace Press — 1991
- 30journalRational Deterrence Theory and Comparative Case StudiesChristopher H. Achen et al. — 1989
- 31journalWhat Makes Deterrence Work? Cases from 1900 to 1980Paul Huth et al. — 1984
- 32journalTesting Deterrence Theory: Rigor Makes a DifferencePaul Huth et al. — 1990
- 33citationThe Diplomacy of ViolenceT. C. Schelling — Yale University Press — 1966
- 35journalDeterrence and PerceptionRobert Jervis — 1982
- 37bookUntied Hands: How States Avoid the Wrong WarsCambridge University Press — 2025
- 38journalAdvancing without Attacking: The Strategic Game around the Use of ForceDan Altman — 2018
- 39journalTrivial Tripwires?: Military Capabilities and Alliance ReassuranceBrian Blankenship et al. — 2022
- 40bookThe Spread of Nuclear Weapons: A DebateScott Sagan et al. — W.W. Norton — 1995
- 41bookThe Balance of Power and the Balance of TerrorGlenn Herald Snyder — 1965
- 42journalWhy Nuclear Superiority Doesn't MatterRobert Jervis — 1979
- 43bookThe Meaning of the Nuclear Revolution: Statecraft and the Prospect of ArmageddonRobert Jervis — Cornell University Press — 1989
- 44webThe Stability-Instability Paradox, Misperception, and Escalation Control in South Asia (essay)Michael Krepon — The Henry Stimson Center
- 45citation"The Anatomy of Deterrence" as found in Strategy in the Missile AgeBernard Brodie — Princeton University Press — 1959
- 46webAustralia Nautilus Institute for Security and Sustainability2011-12-19
- 47bookThe Logic of American Nuclear Strategy: Why Strategic Superiority MattersMatthew Kroenig — Oxford University Press — 2018
- 48journalNuclear Superiority and the Balance of Resolve: Explaining Nuclear Crisis OutcomesMatthew Kroenig — 2013
- 49journalCrisis Bargaining and Nuclear BlackmailTodd S. Sechser et al. — 2013
- 50bookNuclear Weapons and Coercive DiplomacyTodd S. Sechser et al. — Cambridge University Press — 2017
- 51journalThe Nuclear Balance Is What States Make of ItDavid C. Logan — 2022
- 52journalNuclear Weapons and Low-Level Military ConflictKyung Suk Lee et al. — 2023
- 53journalNuclear balance and the initiation of nuclear crises: Does superiority matter?Kyungwon Suh — 2022
- 54journalThe Spread of Nuclear Weapons and International Conflict: Does Experience Matter?Michael Horowitz — 2009
- 55bookWhen Proliferation Causes Peace: The Psychology of Nuclear CrisesMichael D. Cohen — Georgetown University Press — 2017
- 56bookThe Fragile Balance of TerrorMark S. Bell et al. — Cornell University Press — 2022
- 57webLessons from America's First War with Iran2013-05-22
- 59magazineHow Russia Is Beating the West at Deterrence2022-03-09
- 61webWhat Russia Got by Scaring Elon MuskAnne Applebaum — 2023-09-11
- 62webNATO Must Re-Learn DeterrenceBen Hodges — 2022-05-05
- 63bookCross-Domain DeterrenceJacquelyn G. Schneider — Oxford University Press — 2019
- 64journalDeterrence and Dissuasion in CyberspaceJoseph S. Nye — 2017
- 65journalThe Logic of Coercion in CyberspaceErica D. Borghard et al. — 2017
- 66journalDeterrence by denial in cyberspaceErica D. Borghard et al. — 2021-08-03
- 67journalStuxnet and the Limits of Cyber WarfareJon R. Lindsay — 2013
- 68journalWeaving Tangled Webs: Offense, Defense, and Deception in CyberspaceErik Gartzke et al. — 2015
- 69journalThe role of effects, saliencies and norms in US Cyberwar doctrineHenry Farrell et al. — 2017
- 70journalInvisible Digital Front: Can Cyber Attacks Shape Battlefield Events?Nadiya Kostyuk et al. — 2019-02-01
- 71journalConstructing Norms for Global CybersecurityMartha Finnemore et al. — 2016
- 72journalConstructing Norms for Global CybersecurityMartha Finnemore et al. — 2016
- 73journalSorryNotSorry: Why states neither confirm nor deny responsibility for cyber operationsJoseph M. Brown et al. — 2021
- 74journalEscalation Dynamics and Conflict Termination in CyberspaceHerbert Lin — 2012
- 75bookCyber Mercenaries: The State, Hackers, and PowerTim Maurer — Cambridge University Press — 2018
- 76journalThe Subversive Trilemma: Why Cyber Operations Fall Short of ExpectationsLennart Maschmeyer — 2021
- 77journalEmerging technology and intra-war escalation risks: Evidence from the Cold War, implications for todayCaitlin Talmadge — 2019
- 78bookCooperation Under Fire: Anglo-German Restraint During World War IIJeffrey Legro — Cornell University Press — 1995
- 79bookSecret WarsAustin Carson — Princeton University Press — 2018
- 80webU.S. Allies and Adversaries Are Attempting Nuclear Deterrence without Weapons — Will It Work?Matthew Fuhrmann — 2025-04-07
- 81bookPerception and Misperception in International Politics: New EditionRobert Jervis — Princeton University Press — 1976
- 82journalUtility-based predictions of military escalation: Why experts forecasted Russia would not invade UkraineJonas J. Driedger et al. — 2023
- 83journalA New Concert for Europe: Security and Order After the WarKarsten Jung — 2023
- 84bookThe Revolution that Failed: Nuclear Competition, Arms Control, and the Cold WarBrendan Rittenhouse Green — Cambridge University Press — 2020
- 85bookBefore and After the Fall: World Politics and the End of the Cold WarRobert Jervis — Cambridge University Press — 2021
- 86journalThe Perils of Proliferation: Organization Theory, Deterrence Theory, and the Spread of Nuclear WeaponsScott D. Sagan — 1994
- 87webDon't Be So Confident in Nuclear Decision-Making2023-02-26
- 88journalThe Psychology of Nuclear Brinkmanship2023
- 89citationReconciling Rationality with Deterrence: A Re-examination of the Logical Foundations of Deterrence TheoryFrank C. Zagare — 2004
- 90bookThe Oxford Handbook of History and International RelationsRichard Ned Lebow et al. — Oxford University Press — 2023
- 91bookCommand and Control: Nuclear Weapons, the Damascus Accident, and the Illusion of SafetyEric Schlosser — Allen Lane — 2013
- 92journalThe False Promise of Nuclear Risk ReductionBenoît Pelopidas et al. — January 2024
- 93webGeneral Lee Butler Addresses The Canadian Network Against Nuclear WeaponsGeorge Lee Butler — March 11, 1999
- 94newsNuclear endgame: The growing appeal of zeroJune 16, 2011
- 97webCold Warriors say no nukesBen Goddard — 2010-01-27
- 98webThe new abolitionistsHugh Gusterson — 30 March 2012
- 99webIS IT TIME TO JUNK OUR NUKES? THE NEW WORLD DISORDER MAKES THEM OBSOLETEPaul Nitze — WP Company LLC
- 101journalThe Covert French ConnectionUllman, Richard H. — Summer 1989
- 102journalReviewed work: On War and Morality, Robert L. HolmesDiana T. Meyers — 1992
- 104journalReviewed work: On War and Morality., Robert L. HolmesSteven Lee — 1992
- 105bookOn War and MoralityRobert L. Holmes — Princeton University Press — 14 July 2014