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Deterrence theory: the story on HearLore | HearLore
— Ch. 1 · Foundations And Definitions —
Deterrence theory.
~5 min read · Ch. 1 of 6
In 1966, Thomas Schelling published a book titled Arms and Influence that redefined how scholars understood the use of threats in international relations. He argued that deterrence is not about winning battles but about preventing actions through fear of consequences. This definition separated deterrence from compellence, which seeks to force an actor to change their behavior rather than simply stop them. Deterrence aims to maintain the status quo by convincing an adversary that the cost of attacking outweighs any potential gain. Compellence attempts to alter the status quo by forcing a specific action upon another state. Both strategies fall under the broader category of coercion, yet they operate with different objectives and levels of difficulty. Successful deterrence requires a prospective attacker to believe that the probability of success is low while the costs of failure are high. It does not necessarily require military superiority over an opponent. The central challenge lies in communicating a credible threat without actually executing it.
Cold War Evolution
The Cold War marked the peak of deterrence internationalization as superpowers deployed nuclear weapons in allied territories to extend credibility. In 1949, NATO was founded with deterring aggression as one of its primary goals. By 1966, NATO had deployed 7,200 U.S. tactical warheads across Europe to create a nuclear umbrella for allies. These measures aimed to psychologically deter adversaries by projecting power beyond national borders. The United States and Soviet Union engaged in a nuclear arms race where warheads evolved from fission weapons to thermonuclear devices. Delivery systems became equally important, creating perceptions of bomber gaps and missile gaps between the two powers. Deterrence drove the proliferation of nuclear weapons to ten nations in total during this era. Chemical weapons were also maintained in large stockpiles until destruction began following the 1993 Chemical Weapons Convention. Offensive biological weapons programs were pursued by both countries in the first two decades of the Cold War before the United States program ended under President Richard Nixon in 1969. Most innovative work on deterrence theory occurred from the late 1940s to mid-1960s when scholars focused heavily on nuclear strategies.
Rational Choice Models
Thomas Schelling brought his background in game theory to study international deterrence in his classic 1966 work. He argued that military strategy was now equally the art of coercion rather than just the science of victory. Rational deterrence theory assumes actors are rational unitary entities making cost-benefit calculations about strategic interactions. A threat is considered credible if the defending state possesses both the military capabilities to inflict substantial costs and the resolve to use them. Huth outlined four key factors for consideration: the military balance, signaling and bargaining power, reputations for resolve, and interests at stake. The American economist Michael Kinsley summarized Schelling's approach as dancing closer to the edge of a cliff to convince an opponent you are prepared to take higher risks. States must communicate credible deterrent threats through diplomatic or military actions while avoiding bluffs that can be discounted. Costly signals increase the risk of conflict but also raise the costs of backing down from a deterrent position. Reputations for resolve have a powerful causal impact on whether an attacking state challenges general or immediate deterrence policies.
Strategic Implementation Examples
In November 1945, General Curtis LeMay stated that no air attack could be completely stopped once launched, requiring an air force capable of immediate retaliation. The Cuban Missile Crisis stands as one of the most significant examples of extended deterrence in action during the Cold War. NATO's Double-Track Decision demonstrated how nuclear sharing programs altered strategic calculations by projecting power beyond borders. During the Korean War, proxy conflicts occurred throughout Africa, Asia, Central America, and South America under containment policies. The doctrine of mutual assured destruction characterized relations between the United States and Soviet Union until the onset of the New Cold War in the early 2010s. In 1985, Ronald Reagan and Mikhail Gorbachev agreed that a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought. They emphasized preventing any war between them, whether nuclear or conventional, without seeking to achieve military superiority. The Stuxnet attack on Iran's nuclear program became the most prominent cyber attack to date by 2019. The 2015 Ukraine power grid hack was the only publicly acknowledged case of a cyber attack causing a power outage at that time.
Modern Deterrence Domains
Since the early 2000s, there has been increased focus on cyber deterrence with two distinct meanings for scholars and practitioners. Cyber capabilities alter traditional understandings of deterrence given that attribution of responsibility may be harder and risks lower for attackers. The trilemma where speed, intensity, and control are negatively correlated poses constraints for actors engaging in cyberspace operations. Latent nuclear deterrence refers to states' ability to rapidly develop nuclear weapons through civilian nuclear technology programs. These states use their nuclear latency status for coercive purposes against adversaries who do not wish to see them develop weapons. By the beginning of the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine, many western hawks expressed views that deterrence worked but only in favor of Russia. Former U.S. security advisor John Bolton stated that deterrence is working in the Ukraine crisis just not for the right side. Putin threatens, blusters, uses the word nuclear, and the West wilts under these pressures. Russia has convinced the West that even a whisper of NATO military action would bring disastrous consequences.
Theoretical Critiques And Failures
Deterrence theory faces skepticism from numerous scholars regarding whether decision makers act rationally as assumed by classical models. Frank C. Zagare argued that deterrence theory is logically inconsistent and empirically inaccurate when compared to observed state behavior. Leaders often behave inconsistently with predictions due to emotions, psychological biases, accidents, or loss of self-control. In 1969, President Richard Nixon ended the United States offensive biological weapons program after two decades of pursuit. The Nuclear Security Project created by Sam Nunn, William Perry, Henry Kissinger, and George Shultz called for embracing a world free of nuclear weapons. They featured in a documentary film entitled Nuclear Tipping Point in 2010 proposing steps toward disarmament. Robert L. Holmes noted that implementation of deterrence theories contradicts fundamental deontological presumptions prohibiting killing innocent life. Scholars argue it is both irrational and immoral to utilize methodologies relying on continuous development of new weapon iterations designed to prohibit such weapons. The concept of minimum deterrence allows states to possess no more nuclear weapons than necessary to deter an adversary from attacking.
When did Thomas Schelling publish Arms and Influence?
Thomas Schelling published the book Arms and Influence in 1966. This work redefined how scholars understood the use of threats in international relations.
What was NATO's primary goal when founded in 1949?
NATO was founded with deterring aggression as one of its primary goals. By 1966, NATO had deployed 7,200 U.S. tactical warheads across Europe to create a nuclear umbrella for allies.
Who ended the United States offensive biological weapons program in 1969?
President Richard Nixon ended the United States offensive biological weapons program in 1969 after two decades of pursuit. The program pursued by both countries during the first two decades of the Cold War concluded under his administration.
Which year marked the start of the New Cold War affecting mutual assured destruction doctrine?
The onset of the New Cold War occurred in the early 2010s. The doctrine of mutual assured destruction characterized relations between the United States and Soviet Union until this period began.
How many nations possessed nuclear weapons during the Cold War era according to deterrence theory?
Deterrence drove the proliferation of nuclear weapons to ten nations in total during this era. These states developed capabilities through various means including civilian nuclear technology programs known as latent nuclear deterrence.