Skip to content
— CH. 1 · ORIGINS AND POLITICAL CONTEXT —

Catilinarian conspiracy

~11 min read · Ch. 1 of 6
6 sections
  • Lucius Sergius Catilina stood for the consulship three times by 63 BC and was rejected every time. Only after his defeat at the consular comitia in 63 did he start planning a coup to seize the consulship which had been denied to him. He enlisted into his circle a number of disreputable senators including Publius Cornelius Lentulus Sura, a former consul ejected from the senate for immorality in 70 BC. Gaius Cornelius Cethegus joined as a Sertorian sympathiser with few prospects for promotion. Publius Autronius Paetus was a winning consular candidate in the elections of 66 BC who had his victory annulled and senate seat stripped after conviction on bribery charges. Other malcontents who had expected but had been denied advancement joined the conspiracy such as Lucius Cassius Longinus, who had been praetor in 66 and defeated in consular elections in 63 BC. Non-senatorial men also filled the ranks. The classicist Erich Gruen describes these men as mixed, adding that single-minded purpose cannot readily be ascribed to them. Some were frustrated candidates for municipal elections, some may have been motivated by debts, some sought profit in the chaos, and others were members of declining aristocratic families like Catiline. What allowed them to raise a meaningful threat to the state was their mobilisation of men displaced by Sulla's civil war. Joining those dispossessed in the Sullan proscriptions were landed Sullan veterans who expected monetary rewards and had fallen into debt after poor harvests. The ancient sources generally credit their involvement in the conspiracy with large debts that Catiline's putsch supposedly would have erased. But scholars reject this as sole cause and consider the shame of unmet political ambitions indispensable. None of the ancient sources except Dio mention any connection between Catiline and land reform. It is likely Dio is wrong; if Catiline had advocated for land reform Cicero would likely have alluded to it. Three of the conspirators had been repulsed at the consular elections. Another three had been ejected from the senate. Others found themselves unable to attain the same offices as their ancestors. The defeat of the Rullan land reform bill early in 63 BC also must have stoked resentment. The bill would have confirmed Sullan settlers on their land and allowed them to sell it to the state. It would have distributed new lands to poor dispossessed citizens. The failure of the relief bill at Rome contributed to the uprising's support among the poor. This was coupled with a general financial and economic crisis stretching back at least to the First Mithridatic War, a quarter-century earlier. With renewed demand for capital in the aftermath of stability secured by Pompey's victory in the Third Mithridatic War moneylenders would have called in debts and increased interest rates driving men into bankruptcy.

  • The consul Cicero heard rumours of a plot from a woman named Fulvia in the autumn in 63 BC. The first concrete evidence was provided by Marcus Licinius Crassus who handed over letters on 18 or the 19th of October which described plans to massacre prominent citizens. Crassus' letters were corroborated by reports of armed men gathering in support of the conspiracy. In response the senate passed a decree declaring a state of emergency and after receipt of the reports of armed men gathering in Etruria carried the instructing the consuls to do whatever it took to respond to the crisis. By the 27th of October the senate had received reports that Gaius Manlius a former centurion and leader of an army there had taken up arms near Faesulae. Some modern scholars have argued that Manlius' revolt was initially independent of Catiline's plans but others reject this. In response Cicero dispatched two nearby proconsuls and two praetors to respond to the possibility of armed insurrection with permission to levy troops and orders to maintain night watches. Catiline remained in the city while named in the anonymous letters sent to Crassus. This was insufficient evidence for incrimination. But after messages from Etruria connected him directly to the uprising he was indicted under the public violence in early November. The conspirators met probably on the 6th of November and found two volunteers to make an attempt on Cicero's life. Cicero alleged that the conspirators plotted to engulf Rome in flames and destroy the city. Sallust reports this allegation allowed Cicero to turn the urban plebs against Catiline but modern scholars do not believe that Catiline credibly wanted to destroy the city. After the attempts on Cicero's life failed on the 7th of November 63 BC he assembled the senate and delivered his first oration against Catiline publicly denouncing the conspiracy. Catiline attempted to speak in his defence attacking Cicero's ancestry but was shouted down and promptly left the city to join Manlius' men in Etruria. Writing a letter likely preserved in Sallust he committed his wife to the protection of a friend and left the city justifying his actions in terms of honours unjustly denied to him and denying any alleged indebtedness.

  • When Catiline arrived in Manlius' camp he assumed consular regalia. The senate responded immediately by declaring both Catiline and Manlius public enemies. Cassius Dio's history adds that Catiline was promptly convicted on the pending charges of public violence. The senate dispatched Cicero's co-consul Gaius Antonius Hybrida to lead troops against Catiline and put Cicero in charge of defending the city. At this time Cicero then discovered a plot led by Publius Cornelius Lentulus Sura one of the sitting praetors to bring in the Allobroges a Gallic tribe to support the Catilinarians but the Allobroges revealed Lentulus' plans. Cicero using the Allobroges' envoys as double agents sought their cooperation in identifying as many members of the conspiracy in the city as possible. With evidence provided by their help on 2 or the 3rd of December five men were arrested: Lentulus Cethegus Statilius Gabinius and Caeparius. After the Gallic envoys divulged all they knew with promises of immunity before the senate the prisoners confessed their guilt; Lentulus was forced to resign his magistracy and the others were committed to house arrest. An informer on the 4th of December attempted to incriminate Crassus in the Catilinarian plot but the informer was not believed and imprisoned. The same day an attempt was also made to free the prisoners; the senate responded by scheduling a debate on their fate along with the fates of four other conspirators who had escaped for the following day. The debate on the fate of the prisoners occurred in the Temple of Concord. Cicero as consul had been empowered by the previously passed decree to take whatever steps he thought necessary to safeguard the state but such decrees while lending moral support for consular action did not grant any kind of formal immunity. Cicero's goal in requesting senatorial advice was probably to transfer responsibility for any executions to the senate as a whole. When later charged with killing citizens without trial he justified his actions in terms of following the senate's non-binding advice. Calling the senate in order of seniority the consuls-elect and ex-consuls all spoke in favour of the death penalty. But when Julius Caesar who then was praetor-elect was called he proposed either life imprisonment or custody pending trial. Caesar's lenient position won many senators over to his side although it too was illegal life sentences not being permitted without trial and impractical. Cicero purports he then interrupted proceedings to deliver a speech urging immediate action but the tide did not turn towards execution until Cato the Younger spoke. Plutarch's summary indicates that Cato gave a passionate and forceful speech inveighing against Caesar personally and implying that Caesar was in league with the conspirators. Sallust's version has Cato rail against moral decline in the state and has him criticising the senators for failing to be strict and harsh like their ancestors. With the appeal that swift execution would cause defections among the Catilinarians and exaggerated claims that Catiline was to be upon them imminently Cato's speech carried the day. With the senate ratifying Cicero's proposal to execute the conspirators without trial Cicero had the sentences carried out proclaiming at their conclusion I have lived. He was then hailed by his fellow senators as father of the fatherland.

  • After the five prisoners were killed support fell away from Catiline and his army. Some in Rome such as the then-tribune Metellus Nepos proposed transferring command from Antonius to Pompey calling upon Pompey to save the state. Early the next year near Pistoria Catiline's remaining men numbering at least three thousand were engaged in battle by Antonius's forces. The now-proconsul claimed illness; with Marcus Petreius in actual command the Catilinarian army was defeated ending the crisis. Catiline was himself killed in the battle. Antonius was hailed as savior for the victory. While Cicero was initially hailed for his role in saving the state he did not accrue all the credit to his dismay. Cato was also hailed as having roused the senate to act against the conspirators. There were some turns against Cicero's actions in the immediate aftermath of the summary executions. At the close of the consular year Cicero's valedictory speech was vetoed by two tribunes of the plebs. One of the tribunes Quintus Caecilius Metellus Nepos sought to bring Cicero up on charges for executing citizens without trial. The senate prevented him from doing so by threatening to declare anyone who brought a prosecution a public enemy. In the coming years Cicero's enemies reorganised. Publius Clodius Pulcher tribune in 58 BC enacted a law banishing anyone who had executed a citizen without trial. Cicero promptly fled the city for Greece. His exile was eventually lifted and he was recalled to Rome the next year at Pompey's behest. Views on Cicero's success in defending the republic are mixed; while Cicero argued that he had saved the commonwealth and many scholars have accepted his defence of necessary exigency Harriet Flower a classicist writes he did so by circumventing due process and the civil rights of citizens while also revealing the consul's complete lack of confidence in the court system on which the New Republic of Sulla was supposed to be based.

  • The main sources for us on the conspiracy are Sallust's monograph on the conspiracy and Cicero's Catilinarian orations. As a whole the sources in ancient times almost always took anti-Catilinarian perspectives. The negative view of Catiline in the sources found its way into Roman imperial culture. Cicero's narrative is obviously one-sided and it is well established that he exaggerated the danger of Catiline's threat in his orations for political advantage. He also recounted his side of the story also an act of self-promotion in a memoir and a three-book poem. Cicero's narrative casts Catiline in terms of immorality while eliding the economic hardships of the time. The narratives also extend beyond attacks on Catiline but also into exaggerating and justifying Cicero's role and actions during the conspiracy. The orations were published to defend Cicero from political backlash for his executions without trial. Sallust who was active politically before and after the conspiracy was not present in Rome in 63 BC likely abroad on military service. His history lies somewhat parallel to Cicero's Catilinarians relying on extra-Ciceronean evidence especially contemporary oral sources but Cicero's orations and a now-lost memoir are core sources for Sallust's monograph. Sallust's overarching focus on moral decline as a cause of the republic's collapse has him paint an ahistorical portrait of Catiline that elides details in favour of his larger narrative. J. T. Ramsey in a commentary on the monograph writes that more problematically Sallust's reliance on Cicero's one-sided narrative leads him to accept Cicero's invective uncritically exacerbating the portrait's hostility.

  • Both ancient and modern accounts have focused on the ways that Cicero turned the affair to his political advantage. The Pseudo-Sallustian Invective against Cicero alleges Cicero cynically transformed civil strife for his own political benefit. Many scholars also dismiss the conspiracy and its clean-up as being a minor affair that did not present a serious threat to the republic. For example Louis E. Lord in the introduction to the 1937 Loeb Classical Library translation of Cicero's Catilinarian orations calls it one of the best known and least significant episodes in Roman history. Scholars have also criticised over-estimation of the importance of Catiline's insurrection but others also stress that the affair was not meaningless and that it jolted the republic into action. Erich Gruen in Last generation of the Roman Republic writes that some older historiography has viewed the conspiracy in terms of a party-political conflict between the so-called optimates and populares. This view is criticised as uncritically accepting confusing and empty ancient political slogans while ignoring Catiline's Sullan bona fides. While sources sometimes put speeches into the mouths of Catiline and others the dyadic nature of the Roman constitution forced justification of anti-senatorial policies by appeal to popular sovereignty. Neither popular or senatorial advocates questioned the legitimacy of the other. Scholars also dispute whether Catiline had a following among the urban plebs at all and question whether later Ciceronean speeches connecting Clodius with Catiline are merely political invective. While scholars accept that Catiline may have received some support from Crassus and Caesar at least during his campaigns for the consulships of 63 and 62 BC their support did not extend to the conspiracy. Some older scholarship conceived of Catiline as being a puppet of Julius Caesar or Marcus Crassus; this position has long been discredited.

Common questions

Who were the main conspirators in the Catilinarian conspiracy of 63 BC?

The main conspirators included Publius Cornelius Lentulus Sura, Gaius Cornelius Cethegus, Publius Autronius Paetus, Lucius Cassius Longinus, and Gaius Manlius. These men were disreputable senators or former candidates who had been denied political advancement.

When did Cicero discover the details of the Catilinarian plot in 63 BC?

Cicero heard initial rumors from Fulvia in autumn 63 BC and received concrete evidence via letters from Marcus Licinius Crassus on the 18th or the 19th of October. The senate declared a state of emergency by the 27th of October after reports of armed men gathering near Faesulae.

Why did Catiline join the conspiracy against the Roman Republic in 63 BC?

Catiline joined the conspiracy because he was rejected three times for the consulship and sought to seize power through force. He mobilized men displaced by Sulla's civil war and those burdened by large debts that his putsch promised to erase.

How many conspirators were executed without trial during the Catilinarian crisis?

Five conspirators including Lentulus Sura, Cethegus, Statilius, Gabinius, and Caeparius were arrested and subsequently executed without formal trial. The senate ratified Cicero's proposal to execute them immediately following a debate where Cato the Younger urged swift action.

Where did the final battle of the Catilinarian conspiracy take place in 62 BC?

The final battle occurred near Pistoria early in 62 BC between Catiline's remaining forces and troops led by Gaius Antonius Hybrida. Catiline himself was killed in this engagement which ended the military phase of the uprising.

All sources

23 references cited across the entry

  1. 1harvnbGruen (1995) p. 416Gruen — 1995
  2. 2harvnbGruen (1995) p. 417Gruen — 1995
  3. 3harvnbBerry (2020) p. 9Berry — 2020
  4. 4journalThe First Catilinarian ConspiracyRobin Seager — 1964
  5. 5encyclopediaSpartacusET Salmon et al. — Oxford University Press — 2012
  6. 6harvnbGruen (1995) p. 428–49Gruen — 1995
  7. 7harvnbBerry (2020) p. 38–40Berry — 2020
  8. 8harvnbBerry (2020) p. 44–46Berry — 2020
  9. 9bookThe constitution of the Roman RepublicAndrew Lintott — Clarendon Press — 1999
  10. 10harvnbBeard (2015) p. 35Beard — 2015
  11. 11harvnbDrogula (2019) p. 71Drogula — 2019
  12. 12harvnbGruen (1995) p. 430Gruen — 1995
  13. 13webTullius Cicero, Marcus, lifeKathryn Tempest — Oxford University Press — 2022-01-28
  14. 14harvnbFlower (2010) p. 147Flower — 2010
  15. 15harvnbBeard (2015) p. 42–43Beard — 2015
  16. 16journalThe Early Career of SallustDC Earl — 1966
  17. 17bookCatilinariansCicero — Cambridge University Press — 2008
  18. 18harvnbBeard (2015) p. 48, 540Beard — 2015
  19. 19harvnbGolden (2013) p. 126Golden — 2013
  20. 20journalThe failure of Catiline's conspiracyZ Yavetz — 1963
  21. 22bookPolitics in the Roman republicH Mouritsen — Cambridge University Press — 2017
  22. 24harvnbBeard (2015) p. 48Beard — 2015