Battle of the Wilderness

• 1. Grant's Strategic Overland Campaign

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  On the 4th of May 1864, the Army of the Potomac crossed the Rapidan River at three places and converged on the Wilderness of Spotsylvania in east central Virginia. This marked the start of Lieutenant General Ulysses S. Grant's coordinated offensive against General Robert E. Lee and the Confederate Army of Northern Virginia. President Abraham Lincoln had summoned Grant from the Western Theater in March 1864, promoting him to lieutenant general and giving him command of all Union armies. Grant believed that previous strategies required too many resources to conquer territory. His new strategy was to attack with all forces simultaneously, making it difficult for Confederates to transfer troops between battlefronts. The two largest Confederate armies became the major targets: Lee's Army of Northern Virginia and Joseph E. Johnston's Army of Tennessee. By May 2, Grant had four corps positioned to begin Meade's portion of his plan against Lee's army. Three of these corps plus cavalry composed Meade's Army of the Potomac. A fourth corps reported directly to Grant, adding additional firepower. The Rapidan River divided the two foes. Grant and Meade would cross the river a few days later to begin what became known as the Overland Campaign.

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• 2. The Wilderness Terrain And Tactics

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  Much of the vegetation in the region was a dense second-growth forest consisting of small trees, bushes, shrubs, and pines. Clearings were scarce, and the region had only a few narrow winding roads. Mounted cavalry fighting was nearly impossible under these conditions. The dense woods often filled with smoke made it difficult to see enemy soldiers. This put attackers at a disadvantage because soldiers often fired at sounds instead of visual cues. Infantry units had difficulty keeping alignment and often became lost or involved in friendly-fire incidents. The terrain also diminished the effectiveness of artillery. Grant was aware of how the Wilderness made his advantages in size and artillery less effective. He preferred to move his army further south to fight Lee in open ground. At the time of the battle, the region was described as a patchwork of open areas and vegetation of varying density. While the maximum area for the Wilderness varied, historians typically used 10 square miles when discussing the battles fought there. The eastern border was less definite, causing estimates of the size to vary.

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• 3. May Fifth Infantry Engagements

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  At 6:00am on May 5, Warren's V Corps began moving south over farm lanes toward Parker's Store. The Confederate infantry was observed in the west near the Orange Turnpike. Meade halted his entire army, stopping exactly what Lee wanted him to do. The Confederate force was Ewell's Second Corps, whose men erected earthworks on the western end of Saunders Field. By 12:00pm, Meade ordered Warren to attack before Sedgwick's VI Corps could arrive. Warren's troops arrived at Saunders Field around 1:00pm. As Griffin's division advanced, Ayres's brigade held the right but had difficulty maintaining lines in a blizzard of lead. They received enfilading fire from Leroy A. Stafford's brigade, causing all but two regiments to retreat east across Saunders Field. On the left, Bartlett's brigade made better progress and overran John M. Jones' position. However, since Ayres's men were unable to advance, Bartlett's right flank was exposed and forced to flee back across the clearing. Bartlett's horse was shot out from under him, and he barely escaped capture. Further to the Union left, Colonel Roy Stone's brigade was ambushed in waist-high swamp water.

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• 4. Longstreet's Flanking Counterattack

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  Starting from near Poague's guns, Longstreet counterattacked with divisions led by Charles W. Field and Joseph B. Kershaw. At 10:00am, Lee's chief engineer Martin L. Smith reported an unfinished railroad bed south of the Plank Road offered easy access to the Union left flank. The flank was unguarded due to a mix-up in orders. Hancock had ordered John Gibbon to take his division into action, but the order was not acted upon. Gibbon insisted he never got the order. Longstreet assigned Lieutenant Colonel Moxley Sorrel to lead three fresh brigades for a surprise attack. An additional brigade volunteered to join them. Sorrel and Brigadier General William Mahone struck at 11:00am while Longstreet resumed his main attack. The Union line was broken and driven back. Wadsworth was mortally wounded, and Hancock reorganized his line in trenches near the Brock Road. Hancock later wrote that the flanking attack rolled up his line like a wet blanket. Meanwhile, Burnside had gotten the IX Corps into action but fought to a stalemate along the Plank Road. By noon, a Confederate victory seemed likely. Longstreet rode forward on the Orange Plank Road with several officers when another fire caused Mahone's 12th Virginia Infantry Regiment to become separated from its brigade. As the Virginians moved through the woods back to the road, their brigade mistook them for Union soldiers. Longstreet's mounted party was caught in the crossfire, and Longstreet was severely wounded in his neck.

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• 5. Union Cavalry Failures And Losses

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  At Wilderness Tavern, Wilson sent a small force west on the Orange Turnpike. After the head of the V Corps reached Parker's Store around 11:00am, Wilson continued south. He arrived at Parker's Store near the Orange Plank Road at 2:00pm. Scouts were sent south to Catharpin Road and west to Mine Run where they found only small enemy squads. During that time, his squad on the Orange Turnpike skirmished with Confederate soldiers near Robertson's Tavern. Assuming they were fighting with a small group of Confederate pickets, they withdrew and rejoined the division by evening. Meade's original plan was to have Torbert's 1st Cavalry Division join Wilson, but he received an erroneous report that Confederate cavalry was operating in his army's rear. He ordered his 1st and 2nd cavalry divisions to move east to deal with that perceived threat. This left only Wilson's division to screen for three corps. Wilson had little experience with cavalry, and the 3rd Division was the smallest of the three cavalry divisions. Hammond's total force consisted of only about 500 men. Hammond understood that the dense woods and large infantry force made fighting on horseback inadvisable. The command fought dismounted and spread out as a skirmish line while utilizing their Spencer repeating rifles. Once the Confederates advanced east of Parker's Store, the remainder of Wilson's cavalry division was cut off from Meade and Warren's V Corps.

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• 6. Casualty Statistics And Human Cost

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  With over 28,000 casualties, the Battle of the Wilderness ranks in the top five American Civil War battles in terms of casualties for both sides combined. The official report for the Union listed 2,246 officers and men killed, 12,037 wounded, and 3,383 captured or missing, a total of 17,666 casualties for the Union side. Historian Gordon C. Rhea notes this number is probably larger since a lieutenant witnessed Warren lowering the casualty count. Other Union casualty estimates are typically between 17,500 and 18,000. Based on correspondence from Grant, at least six brigadier generals were among the Union casualties. Wadsworth and Alexander Hays were killed, Seymour and Shaler were taken prisoner, and Getty and Bartlett were wounded. Young's study reveals Confederate casualties of 1,477 killed, 7,866 wounded, and 1,690 missing, for a total of 11,033 casualties. Among the wounded are 233 wounded and captured who are counted herein in the wounded total and not double-counted in the missing category. Lee lost some generals as well. His report at the end of May 5 concluded with the gallant Brig. Gen. J. M. Jones was killed, and Brig. Gen. L. A. Stafford mortally wounded while leading his command with conspicuous valor. His evening report for May 6 mentions the wounding of Longstreet and John Pegram, and the death of Jenkins.

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• 7. Grant's Decision To Press Southward

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  On the morning of May 7, Grant faced the prospect of attacking strong Confederate earthworks. His cavalry was south of the infantry fighting in the Battle of Todd's Tavern. Instead of more infantry attacks, Grant chose to maneuver. By moving south on the Brock Road, he hoped to reach the crossroads at Spotsylvania Court House. This would interpose his army between Lee and Richmond, forcing Lee to fight on ground more advantageous to the Union army. He ordered preparations for a night march on May 7 that would reach Spotsylvania by the morning of May 8. Once Lee found out Grant was moving south instead of turning back, he correctly predicted Grant would move to Spotsylvania Court House. Lee got his army there first and erected formidable earthworks. Grant's infantry fought the Battle of Spotsylvania Court House before maneuvering yet again as the campaign continued south toward Richmond. Sherman called this movement the grandest act of Grant's life. He added that he now felt that the rebellion will be crushed. The battle confirmed a warning made by Longstreet to Lee about Grant, that he would fight every day and every hour till the end of the war. By April 1865, Lee's army needed supplies and his men were starving.

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