Battle of Spotsylvania Court House

• 1. Grant's Attrition Strategy

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  In March 1864, Lt. Gen. Ulysses S. Grant received a promotion to lieutenant general and command of all Union armies. He chose to make his headquarters with the Army of the Potomac while Maj. Gen. George G. Meade remained the actual commander of that army. President Abraham Lincoln had long advocated for destroying Lee's army rather than capturing Richmond. Grant ordered Meade to follow wherever Lee went. This strategy accepted high casualties because the Union had far greater resources to replace lost soldiers and equipment. The goal was not a quick victory but a war of attrition. Both sides could suffer heavy losses, yet the North possessed the manpower to sustain them. Previous Union commanders would have withdrawn behind the Rappahannock River under similar circumstances. Grant instead ordered Meade to move around Lee's right flank.

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• 2. The Race For Spotsylvania

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  On May 7, Grant's orders directed Meade to march the night of the 7th of May 8 over two routes toward Spotsylvania Court House. Warren's V Corps took the Brock Road followed by Hancock's II Corps. Sedgwick's VI Corps headed toward Chancellorsville on the Orange Plank Road before turning south. Sheridan's Cavalry Corps attempted to clear the Brock Road but soon bogged down at Corbin's Bridge. Wade Hampton and Rooney Lee stopped Gregg's brigade west of Todd's Tavern. Wesley Merritt's division encountered Fitzhugh Lee's cavalry behind barricades about a mile south of Todd's Tavern. Sharp fighting resulted in the late afternoon. By nightfall, Sheridan decided against continuing in the dark and ordered his men to bivouac at Todd's Tavern. The first Union infantry began moving at 8 p.m. Their advance was plagued by traffic jams. When Meade reached Todd's Tavern after midnight he was infuriated to see Sheridan's sleeping cavalrymen. He ordered them to resume their road clearing operation. Lee did not indicate any need for haste, yet Anderson and his men desired to leave the stench of burning forest and dead bodies in the Wilderness. They began marching about 10 p.m.

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• 3. Laurel Hill And The Mule Shoe

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  At dawn on May 8, Wesley Merritt's cavalrymen attacked Fitzhugh Lee's barricades on the Brock Road again but were repulsed. Meade ordered Warren's V Corps to break through with infantry. John C. Robinson led the way in overwhelming the cavalry obstacle. Fitzhugh Lee's horse artillery made a gallant stand around the Alsop farm. Anderson immediately dispatched two infantry brigades and an artillery battalion which arrived at Laurel Hill just as Warren's men pulled up within 100 yards to the north. Multiple attacks by the divisions of the V Corps were repulsed with heavy casualties. By noon the Union troops began building earthworks on the northern end of the Spindle clearing. Meanwhile, Wilson sent a brigade under Col. John B. McIntosh up the Brock Road. J.E.B. Stuart had only a single cavalry regiment available to send out against McIntosh. With orders from Sheridan to withdraw and with Confederate infantry in hot pursuit, Wilson withdrew up the Fredericksburg Road. In the afternoon, Sedgwick's VI Corps arrived near Laurel Hill and extended Warren's line to the east. Both corps began a coordinated assault at 7 p.m. but were repulsed by heavy fire.

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• 4. The Bloody Angle Assault

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  Hancock's assault was scheduled to commence at 4 a.m. on May 12 but it was still pitch black. He delayed until 4:35 when the rain stopped and was replaced by a thick mist. The attack crashed through the Confederate works virtually destroying Jones's Brigade now commanded by Col. William Witcher. Barlow's division swung around to the eastern tip of the Mule Shoe and overran Steuart's brigade capturing both Steuart and his division commander Allegheny Johnson. On Barlow's right Birney's division met stronger resistance from Monaghan's and Walker's brigades. The recent rain had ruined much of the Confederates' gunpowder yet they fought fiercely hand to hand. The Union troops continued to spread south along the western edge of the Mule Shoe. No one had considered how to capitalize on the breakthrough. The 15,000 infantrymen of Hancock's II Corps crowded into a narrow front about a half mile wide and soon lost all unit cohesion. Following the initial shock John B. Gordon sent Brig. Gen. Robert D. Johnston's brigade racing toward the gap where Steuart's men had collapsed. Johnston was wounded but his brigade halted the breakthrough in that sector.

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• 5. Command Failures And Casualties

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  Throughout the afternoon Confederate engineers scrambled to create a new defensive line 500 yards further south at the base of the Mule Shoe. Fighting at the Bloody Angle continued day and night with neither side achieving an advantage until around 12:00 a.m. on May 13. The combat endured for almost 24 hours characterized by an intensity of firepower never previously seen in Civil War battles. An example can be found in the Smithsonian Museum of American History: a 22-inch stump of an oak tree at the Bloody Angle completely severed by rifle fire. Bodies piled up four and five high and soldiers were forced to pause from time to time and throw corpses over the parapet since they formed an obstacle in the way of the fighting. Dead and wounded men were shot so many times that many simply fell apart into unrecognizable heaps of flesh. Five general officers were killed or mortally wounded during the battle including Union Maj. Gen. John Sedgwick who famously said They couldn't hit an elephant at this distance shortly before his death. Lee lost another 10, 13,000 men about 23% of his army while Grant lost close to 3,000 killed out of over 18,000 total casualties.

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• 6. Final Attacks And Withdrawal

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  The weather finally cleared on May 17. Grant made an assumption that led him to his next attack plan since Lee had observed Grant's buildup along the Fredericksburg Road it was likely he had countered the Union moves by shifting forces away from the former Mule Shoe positions. He ordered the II Corps and VI Corps to attack there at sunrise May 18. They retraced their steps to the vicinity of the Landrum house the night of May 17. Unfortunately for the Union plan the former Confederate works were still occupied by Ewell's Second Corps. They had used the intervening time to improve the earthworks and obstacles laid out in front of them. As Hancock's men advanced they were caught up in an abatis and subjected to artillery fire so devastating that infantry rifle fire was not necessary to repulse the attack. Wright and Burnside had no better luck. Grant reacted to this final repulse by deciding to abandon this general area as a battlefield. He ordered Hancock's II Corps to march to the railroad line between Fredericksburg and Richmond then turn south. Lee did not fall into Grant's trap but traveled on a parallel path to the North Anna River. On May 21 Grant disengaged from the Confederate Army and started southeast on another maneuver.

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