— Ch. 1 · Origins And Context —
Truman Doctrine.
~7 min read · Ch. 1 of 6
In October 1944, British and Greek forces landed in Greece following the gradual withdrawal of Axis occupational forces from the country. Despite the Caserta Agreement stipulating that all Greek resistance factions would join a new Greek Army under British command, General Ronald Scobie ordered the EAM's armed wing, ELAS, to unilaterally disarm on the 1st of December 1944. EAM responded to the "Scobie Order" by organizing a rally in Athens on December 3 in protest, which was fired upon by Greek security forces, killing 28 protestors. This sparked the Dekemvriana, a series of clashes between EAM and Greek government forces along with their British allies. It ended in EAM's defeat and disarmament under the terms of the Treaty of Varkiza, which marked the end of ELAS and broke EAM's power. This was followed by the White Terror, a period of persecution against Greek leftists, which contributed to the outbreak of the Greek Civil War in 1946. After the civil war broke out, Communist Party of Greece guerrillas revolted against the internationally recognized Greek government which was formed after elections in 1946 which were boycotted by the KKE. The British realized that the KKE were being directly funded by Josip Broz Tito in neighboring Yugoslavia. In line with the Anglo-Soviet percentages agreement, the KKE received no help from the Soviet Union, and Yugoslavia provided them support and sanctuary against Joseph Stalin's wishes. By late 1946, Britain informed the U.S. that due to its own declining economy, it could no longer continue to provide military and economic support to the Greek government.
Truman Speech Delivery
To pass any legislation, Truman needed the support of the Republicans, who controlled both houses of Congress. The chief Republican spokesman Senator Arthur Vandenberg strongly supported Truman and overcame the doubts of isolationists such as Senator Robert A. Taft. Truman laid the groundwork for his request by having key congressional leaders meet with himself, Secretary of State George C. Marshall, and Undersecretary of State Dean Acheson. Acheson laid out the "domino theory" in the starkest terms, comparing a communist state to a rotten apple that could spread its infection to an entire barrel. Vandenberg was impressed, and advised Truman to appear before Congress and "scare the hell out of the American people." On March 7, Acheson warned Truman that the communists in Greece could win within weeks without outside aid. When a draft for Truman's address was circulated to policymakers, Marshall, Kennan, and others criticized it for containing excess "rhetoric." Truman responded that, as Vandenberg had suggested, his request would only be approved if he played up the threat. On the 12th of March 1947, Truman appeared before a joint session of Congress. In his eighteen-minute speech, he stated: "it must be the policy of the United States to support free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressures." The domestic reaction to Truman's speech was broadly positive, though there were dissenters. Anti-communists in both parties supported both Truman's proposed aid package and the doctrine behind it, and Collier's described it as a "popularity jackpot" for the President. Influential columnist Walter Lippmann was more skeptical, noting the open-ended nature of Truman's pledge; he felt so strongly that he almost came to blows while arguing with Acheson over the doctrine. Others argued that the Greek monarchy Truman proposed to defend was itself a repressive government, rather than a democracy.