Trent Affair

• 1. Background Tensions

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  In the early 1840s, a boundary dispute between the United States and Great Britain over Oregon nearly sparked war. British leaders in London grew increasingly annoyed by what they perceived as Washington's pandering to public mobs during that conflict. These tensions simmered through the 1850s despite minor incidents like the Pig War of 1859 in the Pacific Northwest. By 1861, Secretary of State William H. Seward intended to maintain long-standing American foreign policy principles regarding non-intervention. He sought to prevent any European power from interfering in the affairs of the Western Hemisphere. Lord Palmerston, the British Prime Minister, urged a policy of neutrality while focusing his own attention on rising threats from Napoleon III in France and Bismarck in Prussia. The Russian Minister Eduard de Stoeckl observed that the Cabinet of London watched American internal dissensions with impatience. Cassius Clay, the U.S. minister to Russia, stated that England hoped for American ruin and cared neither for the North nor the South. Charles Francis Adams served as the U.S. minister to the Court of St. James and made clear that Washington considered the Civil War an internal insurrection. Any movement by Britain toward officially recognizing the Confederacy would be viewed as an unfriendly act.

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• 2. Confederate Diplomatic Mission

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  In February 1861, the Confederate States created a three-person European delegation consisting of William Lowndes Yancey, Pierre Rost, and Ambrose Dudley Mann. Their instructions from Confederate Secretary of State Robert Toombs were to open diplomatic relations and negotiate treaties of friendship. By August 1861, President Jefferson Davis decided he needed diplomats better suited to serve if international recognition was achieved. He selected John Slidell of Louisiana and James Murray Mason of Virginia. Both men had extensive backgrounds in foreign affairs and were widely respected throughout the South. Slidell had been appointed as a negotiator at the end of the Mexican War under President Polk. Mason had chaired the Senate Foreign Relations Committee from 1847 to 1860. Their mission was to emphasize the stronger position of the Confederacy which now included eleven states. They carried documents arguing against the legality of the Union blockade and likening their cause to Italy's struggle for independence. The intended departure of the envoys was no secret, yet Union intelligence received daily updates on their movements. An original plan to run the blockade in the steamer Nashville failed due to deep draft issues and guarded channels.

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• 3. The Naval Interception

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  On the 7th of November 1861, the British mail packet Trent left Havana with Mason, Slidell, and their families aboard. Captain Charles Wilkes commanded the U.S. Navy frigate San Jacinto which had cruised off the African coast for nearly a month prior. Wilkes learned that the Confederate raider CSS Sumter had captured three U.S. merchant ships near Cienfuegos in July. He headed there but found no trace of the raider. A newspaper in Cienfuegos revealed that Mason and Slidell were scheduled to leave Havana on November 7 bound for England via St. Thomas. Wilkes decided to intercept them in the narrow Bahama Channel where the Trent would have to pass. Around noon on November 8, lookouts aboard the San Jacinto spotted the Trent unfurling its Union Jack. Wilkes fired a shot across the bow which Captain James Moir ignored. A second shot from the forward pivot gun landed right in front of the steamer causing it to stop. Lieutenant D. M. Fairfax boarded the vessel with orders to arrest Mr. Mason and Mr. Slidell as contraband of war. The crew and passengers threatened Fairfax while his armed escort climbed aboard to protect him. Fairfax failed to force a search of the vessel which would have required seizing the ship as a prize.

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• 4. American Public Reaction

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  Most Northerners learned of the Trent capture on November 16 when the news hit afternoon newspapers. By Monday, November 18, the press seemed universally engulfed in a massive wave of chauvinistic elation. Many newspapers argued for the legality of Wilkes' actions while numerous lawyers stepped forward to add their approval. Harvard law professor Theophilus Parsons defended the action alongside Caleb Cushing, a former Attorney General. On December 2, Congress passed unanimously a resolution thanking Wilkes for his brave conduct and proposing he receive a gold medal. But as the matter received closer study, experts began to have doubts about the legal precedent. Secretary of the Navy Gideon Welles wrote to Wilkes expressing emphatic approval while cautioning that failure to take the Trent to a prize court must not constitute a future precedent. The New York Times claimed on November 24 to find no actual on-point precedent for such an act. Thurlow Weed's Albany Evening Journal suggested that if Wilkes had exercised unwarranted discretion, the government should disavow the proceedings. Leaders realized the issue might be resolved less on legalities and more on the necessity of avoiding serious conflict with Britain. Elder statesmen James Buchanan, Thomas Ewing, Lewis Cass, and Robert J. Walker all publicly came out for releasing them.

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• 5. British Outrage And Ultimatum

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  News of the actual capture did not arrive in London until November 27 when Commander Marchand learned from The Times that his targets had arrived in Cuba. Much of the public and many newspapers immediately perceived it as an outrageous insult to British honor. The London Standard saw the capture as one of a series of premeditated blows aimed at involving Britain in war. A letter from an American visitor declared that 999 men out of 1,000 would declare for immediate war if polled. Karl Marx organized British workers to publicly voice dissent against any coalition with the Confederacy despite widespread misery. An anti-Union meeting held in Liverpool was chaired by the future Confederate spokesman James Spence. Initial reaction among political leaders was firmly opposed to the American actions. Lord Clarendon accused Seward of trying to provoke a quarrel at sea after failing to do so at Washington. Palmerston called an emergency cabinet meeting on Friday, November 29 where he reportedly threw his hat on the table. The Queen's husband Prince Albert reviewed the dispatches and composed a softened version before they were sent to Seward. The British still demanded an apology and the release of the Confederate emissaries while closing the British Legation in Washington if no satisfactory response came within seven days.

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• 6. Diplomatic Resolution

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  Military preparations accelerated rapidly after news of the Trent reached Great Britain. Secretary of War Sir George Lewis proposed sending thirty thousand rifles and an artillery battery to Canada within a week. By December 3, he wrote to Lord Palmerston proposing to engage a Cunard Steamer to send one regiment and one battery of artillery. Land forces in Canada consisted of five thousand regular troops and about an equal number of ill-trained militia. During December the British managed to send eleven thousand troops using eighteen transport ships. By the end of the month reinforcements had raised the count to nine hundred twenty-four officers and seventeen thousand six hundred fifty-eight men. The crisis ended when President Lincoln released the envoys and disavowed Captain Wilkes' actions without a formal apology. Mason and Slidell resumed their voyage to Europe on the 10th of January 1862. The United States avoided war with Britain despite the initial public euphoria and subsequent legal scrutiny. Treasury Secretary Salmon P. Chase felt that releasing the prisoners was necessary to support the economy and prevent financial collapse. The diplomatic resolution prevented a conflict between the world's strongest navy and the Union blockade while preserving American sovereignty.

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