Third Battle of Panipat

On the 14th of January 1761, the earth around Panipat drank so deeply of blood that it became the single deadliest day in the history of classic formation battles. Over 125,000 troops clashed in a landscape that would soon be littered with the severed heads of the dead, arranged in victory mounds by the victors. This was not merely a skirmish but a cataclysm that would define the fate of India for the next century. The Maratha Empire, having pushed its northern frontier to the banks of the Indus River, found itself trapped in a death spiral against the Durrani Empire of Ahmad Shah Durrani. The battle involved over 60,000 combatants and nearly 200,000 non-combatants, including pilgrims, women, and children, all of whom became casualties in a war that had spiraled beyond military necessity into a struggle for survival. The sheer scale of the slaughter, with estimates of 60,000 to 70,000 dead and up to 40,000 prisoners massacred the day after the fighting ceased, remains a subject of historical debate but stands as a testament to the ferocity of 18th-century warfare. The Marathas, led by Sadashivrao Bhau, had marched north from the Deccan Plateau to secure their dominance, only to find themselves encircled by a coalition of Afghan, Rohilla, and Mughal forces. The outcome was a decisive victory for Ahmad Shah Durrani, but the cost was so high that it left a void in the political landscape of India, allowing the British East India Company to eventually rise as the dominant power.

The Northern Gambit

The road to Panipat began not with a clash of armies but with a complex web of betrayals and shifting alliances that turned the Punjab into a powder keg. In 1757, Ahmad Shah Durrani had appointed his son, Timur Shah, as governor of Punjab, but the administration was effectively run by the harsh commander-in-chief Jahan Khan. His rule was so brutal that it drove Adina Beg Khan, the governor of Jalandhar Doab, into the hills, where he allied with the Sikh leader Jassa Singh Ahluwalia. This alliance allowed the Sikhs to plunder the region and defeat the Afghans at the Battle of Mahilpur in 1757. However, by March 1758, Adina Beg Khan grew uneasy with the growing power of the Sikhs and sought help from the Marathas, who had recently captured Delhi from the Mughals. Adina Beg offered the Marathas a large daily payment to assist in capturing Lahore, and together they drove the Afghans out of the city. The Marathas and Sikhs pursued the retreating Afghans to Attock, bringing the Punjab under Maratha rule, with Adina appointed as subahdar in 1758 in return for a yearly tribute of seventy-five lakh rupees. This expansion brought the Marathas into direct confrontation with the Durrani Empire, which was determined to reclaim its lost territories. Ahmad Shah Durrani raised an army composed of Qizilbash, Pashtun tribes, Kurds, and Uzbeks, and joined forces with the Rohillas of the Gangetic Doab and Shuja-ud-Daula, the Nawab of Oudh. This coalition was formed to counter the Maratha advance, which had reached its high-water mark with boundaries extending from the Sindhu River to northern Kerala. The Marathas, under the command of Sadashivrao Bhau, responded by gathering an army of between 45,000 and 60,000 soldiers, accompanied by roughly 200,000 non-combatants. The Marathas started their northward journey from Patdur on the 14th of March 1760, setting the stage for a confrontation that would test the limits of their empire.

When did the Third Battle of Panipat take place?

The Third Battle of Panipat took place on the 14th of January 1761. This date marks the single deadliest day in the history of classic formation battles where over 125,000 troops clashed.

Who led the Maratha forces at the Third Battle of Panipat?

Sadashivrao Bhau led the Maratha forces at the Third Battle of Panipat. He commanded an army of between 45,000 and 60,000 soldiers accompanied by roughly 200,000 non-combatants.

What was the outcome of the Third Battle of Panipat?

The outcome was a decisive victory for Ahmad Shah Durrani and his coalition of Afghan, Rohilla, and Mughal forces. The Maratha Empire suffered a catastrophic defeat with estimates of 60,000 to 70,000 dead and up to 40,000 prisoners massacred the day after the fighting ceased.

How many people died during the Third Battle of Panipat?

Estimates of the dead range from 60,000 to 70,000 combatants with up to 40,000 prisoners massacred the day after the battle. The total casualties included over 125,000 troops and nearly 200,000 non-combatants who became casualties in the war.

Why did the Marathas lose the Third Battle of Panipat?

The Marathas lost the Third Battle of Panipat because they were encircled by a coalition of Afghan, Rohilla, and Mughal forces while suffering from an acute shortage of supplies. Senior Maratha chiefs constantly bickered with one another and had ambitions of carving out independent states instead of fighting a common enemy.

What happened to the Maratha prisoners after the Third Battle of Panipat?

About 40,000 Maratha prisoners were slaughtered in cold blood the day after the battle according to the bakhar by Shuja-ud-Daula's Diwan Kashi Raja. Some 22,000 women and children were driven off as slaves and transported on bullock carts, camels, and elephants in bamboo cages.

The Formations of Death

On the 13th of January, the Marathas left their camp before dawn and marched south towards the Afghan camp in a desperate attempt to break the siege. The two armies came face-to-face around 8:00 a.m., with the Maratha lines beginning a little to the north of Kala Amb. The Maratha line was formed up some 12 kilometers across, with the artillery in front, protected by infantry, pikemen, musketeers, and bowmen. The cavalry was instructed to wait behind the artillery and bayonet-wielding musketeers, ready to be thrown in when control of the battlefield had been fully established. Behind this line was another ring of 30,000 young Maratha soldiers who were not battle-tested, and then the civilians. Many were ordinary men, women, and children on a pilgrimage to Hindu holy places and shrines. Behind the civilians was yet another protective infantry line of young, inexperienced soldiers. On the other side, the Afghans formed a somewhat similar line, a few meters to the south of today's Sanauli Road. Their left was being formed by Najib, and their right by two brigades of troops. Their left center was led by two Viziers, Shuja-ud-daulah with 3,000 soldiers and 50 to 60 cannons, and Ahmad Shah's Vizier Shah Wali with a choice body of 19,000 mailed Afghan horsemen. The right center consisted of 15,000 Rohillas under Hafiz Rahmat and other chiefs of the Rohilla Pathans. Pasand Khan covered the left wing with 5,000 cavalry, and Barkurdar Khan and Amir Beg covered the right with 3,000 Rohilla cavalry. Long-range musketeers were also present during the battle. In this order, the army of Ahmed Shah moved forward, leaving him at his preferred post in the center, which was now in the rear of the line, from where he could watch and direct the battle. The Marathas had blocked the northward path of Abdali's troops and were themselves blocked from heading south, in the direction of Delhi, where they could get badly needed supplies. The stage was set for a battle that would decide the fate of India.

The Carnage of January

Before dawn on the 14th of January 1761, the Maratha troops broke their fast with sugared water in the camp and prepared for combat. They emerged from the trenches, pushing the artillery into position on their prearranged lines, some 2 kilometers from the Afghans. Seeing that the battle was on, Ahmad Shah positioned his 60 smooth-bore cannon and opened fire. The initial attack was led by the Maratha left flank under Ibrahim Khan, who advanced his infantry in formation against the Rohillas and Shah Pasand Khan. The first salvos from the Maratha artillery went over the Afghans' heads and did very little damage. Nevertheless, the first Afghan attack by Najib Khan's Rohillas was broken by Maratha bowmen and pikemen, along with a unit of the famed Gardi musketeers stationed close to the artillery positions. The second and subsequent salvos were fired at point-blank range into the Afghan ranks. The resulting carnage sent the Rohillas reeling back to their lines, leaving the battlefield in the hands of Ibrahim for the next three hours, during which the 8,000 Gardi musketeers killed about 12,000 Rohillas. In the second phase, Bhau himself led the charge against the left-of-center Afghan forces, under the Afghan Vizier Shah Wali Khan. The sheer force of the attack nearly broke the Afghan lines, and the Afghan soldiers started to desert their positions in the confusion. Desperately trying to rally his forces, Shah Wali appealed to Shuja ud Daulah for assistance. However, the Nawab did not break from his position, effectively splitting the Afghan force's center. Despite Bhau's success and the ferocity of the charge, the attack did not attain complete success as many of the half-starved Maratha mounts were exhausted. Also, there were no heavy armored cavalry units for the Marathas to maintain these openings. In order to turn about the deserting Afghan troopers, Abdali deployed his Nascibchi musketeers to gun down the deserters who finally stopped and returned to the field. The battle was turning into a slaughter, with the Marathas unable to sustain their momentum.

The Final Collapse

By noon, it looked as though Bhau would clinch victory for the Marathas once again. The Afghan left flank still held its own, but the center was cut in two, and the right was almost destroyed. Ahmad Shah had watched the fortunes of the battle from his tent, guarded by the still unbroken forces on his left. He sent his bodyguards to call up his 15,000 reserve troops from his camp and arranged them as a column in front of his cavalry of musketeers (Qizilbash) and 2,000 swivel-mounted shutarnaals or Ushtranaal, cannons, on the backs of camels. The shutarnaals, because of their positioning on camels, could fire an extensive salvo over the heads of their own infantry, at the Maratha cavalry. The Maratha cavalry was unable to withstand the muskets and camel-mounted swivel cannons of the Afghans. They could be fired without the rider having to dismount and were especially effective against fast-moving cavalry. Abdali therefore, sent 500 of his own bodyguards with orders to raise all able-bodied men out of camp and send them to the front. He sent 1,500 more to punish the front-line troops who attempted to flee the battle and kill without mercy any soldier who would not return to the fight. These extra troops, along with 4,000 of his reserve troops, went to support the broken ranks of the Rohillas on the right. The remainder of the reserve, 10,000 strong, were sent to the aid of Shah Wali, still laboring unequally against the Bhau in the center of the field. These mailed warriors were to charge with the Vizier in close order and at full gallop. Whenever they charged the enemy in front, the chief of the staff and Najib were directed to fall upon either flank. With their own men in the firing line, the Maratha artillery could not respond to the shathurnals and the cavalry charge. Some 7,000 Maratha cavalry and infantry were killed before the hand-to-hand fighting began at around 14:00 hours. By 16:00 hours, the tired Maratha infantry began to succumb to the onslaught of attacks from fresh Afghan reserves, protected by armored leather jackets. The Marathas were fighting alone at a place which was almost 1,000 kilometers away from their capital Pune, and the senior Maratha chiefs constantly bickered with one another. Each had ambitions of carving out an independent state and had no interest in fighting against a common enemy. Some of them did not want a pitched battle, and wanted to fight using guerrilla tactics instead of charging the enemy head-on. The Marathas were fighting alone at a place which was almost 1,000 kilometers away from their capital Pune, and the senior Maratha chiefs constantly bickered with one another. Each had ambitions of carving out an independent state and had no interest in fighting against a common enemy. Some of them did not want a pitched battle, and wanted to fight using guerrilla tactics instead of charging the enemy head-on.

The Aftermath of Ruin

After the defeat, the Marathas fled in all directions, and the Afghans, Mughals, Rohillas, and Awadh troops fell upon them and were busy in plundering and slaying soldiers and civilians. Afghan officers who had lost their kin in battle were permitted to carry out massacres of Marathas the next day also, in Panipat and the surrounding area. They arranged victory mounds of severed heads outside their camps. According to the single best eyewitness chronicle, the bakhar by Shuja-ud-Daula's Diwan Kashi Raja, about 40,000 Maratha prisoners were slaughtered in cold blood the day after the battle. According to Hamilton, a reporter of the Bombay Gazette, about half a million Marathi people were present there in Panipat town, and he gives a figure of 40,000 prisoners as executed by Afghans. Qutb Shah's son slaughtered 4,000 fugitives near Sonepat, and Abdus Samad Khan's son killed 5,000 near Bahadurgad, to avenge their fathers' deaths. Some 22,000 women and children were driven off as slaves. All of the prisoners were transported on bullock carts, camels, and elephants in bamboo cages. 2,000 of whom were saved by Sikhs led by Jassa Singh Ahluwalia. Thereafter, he was known as Bandi chhor, or the Liberator of captives. The bodies of Vishwasrao and Bhau were recovered by the Marathas and were cremated according to their custom. Bhau's wife Parvatibai was saved by Holkar, per the directions of Bhau, and eventually returned to Pune. Peshwa Balaji Baji Rao, uninformed about the state of his army, was crossing the Narmada with a relief force and supplies when he heard of the defeat. He returned to Pune and never recovered from the shock of the debacle at Panipat. According to Kashi Raja Pundit, It was Balaji Bajirao's love of pleasure which was responsible for Panipat. He delayed at Paithan celebrating his second marriage until the 27th of December, when it was too late. Jankoji Scindia was taken prisoner and executed at the instigation of Najib. Ibrahim Khan Gardi was tortured and executed by enraged Afghan soldiers. The Marathas never fully recovered from the loss at Panipat, but they remained the largest empire in the Indian subcontinent and managed to retake Delhi ten years later. However, their claim over all of India ended with the three Anglo-Maratha Wars, in the early 19th century. These circumstances made Abdali leave India at the earliest. Before departing, he ordered the Indian chiefs, through a Royal Firman (order) (including Clive of India), to recognize Shah Alam II as Emperor. Ahmad Shah also appointed Najib-ud-Daula as ostensible regent to the Mughal Emperor. In addition, Najib and Munir-ud-daulah agreed to pay to Abdali, on behalf of the Mughal emperor, an annual tribute of four million rupees, which was never actually paid. On the 17th of March 1761, Ahmad Shah left for Afghanistan. As he traveled through Punjab, his forces were often troubled by the Sikhs. After crossing the Sutlej River, the Sikhs attacked some of the soldiers who were lagging behind. Ahmad Shah did not react immediately because his army was weighed down by the loot. To protect his camp, he built small fortifications around it every night and continued his journey toward the Attock River, with the Sikhs following him. The Durrani victory at Panipat put an end to the Maratha plans of taking control of Punjab. This left the Durranis and the Sikhs as the two main powers fighting for control over the region. Ahmad Shah then focused on confronting the Sikhs. The Jats under Suraj Mal benefited significantly from not participating in the Battle of Panipat. They provided considerable assistance to the Maratha soldiers and civilians who escaped the fighting. Shah Shuja's forces (including Persian advisers) played a decisive role in collecting intelligence against the Maratha forces and was notorious in ambushing the leading in hundreds of casualties. The services of the Rohillas were rewarded by grants of Shikohabad to Nawab Faiz-ullah Khan and of Jalesar and Firozabad to Nawab Sadullah Khan. Najib Khan proved to be an effective ruler, who restored Delhi to a large extent. However, after his death on the 30th of October 1770, the Rohillas were defeated by the forces of the British East India Company in 1774. The Mughals once again changed sides and welcomed the Afghans to Delhi. The Mughals remained in nominal control over small areas of India but were never a force again. The empire officially ended in 1857 when its last emperor, Bahadur Shah II, was accused of being involved in the Indian Rebellion and exiled. The result of the battle was the temporary halting of further Maratha advances in the north and destabilization of their territories for roughly ten years. This period is marked by the rule of Peshwa Madhavrao, who is credited with the revival of Maratha domination following the defeat at Panipat. In 1771, ten years after Panipat, Mahadji Shinde led a large Maratha army into northern India in a counter-offensive in which he along with others re-established the fallen Maratha supremacy in the area and punished refractory powers that had either sided with the Afghans, such as the Rohillas, or had shaken off Maratha domination after Panipat, slaughtering tens of thousands of Rohillas. They desecrated the grave of Rohilla chieftain Najib ad-Dawla and captured Najibabad. But their success was short-lived. Crippled by Madhavrao's untimely death at the age of 28, infighting ensued among Maratha chiefs soon after, and they were ultimately defeated and annexed by the British East India Company administration in 1819.