— Ch. 1 · Foundations And Origins —
Theory of Games and Economic Behavior.
~2 min read · Ch. 1 of 5
John von Neumann published a German paper titled Zur Theorie der Gesellschaftsspiele in 1928. This early work laid the groundwork for what would become a massive collaboration with economist Oskar Morgenstern. The Princeton University Press released their joint book Theory of Games and Economic Behavior in 1944. Von Neumann had been working on game theory concepts since the late 1920s, but the full economic application required Morgenstern's expertise. Their partnership transformed abstract mathematical ideas into a practical framework for understanding human decision-making. The authors approached the problem from different angles yet found common ground in strategic interaction.
Mathematical Frameworks
The text introduces zero-sum games as a core concept where one player's gain equals another's loss. Von Neumann and Morgenstern used objective probabilities assuming all agents shared the same probability distribution. They noted that subjective probability theories could exist but left this task to future researchers. Jimmie Savage completed the development of subjective probability theory in 1954. Johann Pfanzagl later provided an axiomatization for subjective expected utility in 1967. Morgenstern acknowledged in 1976 that they had anticipated these questions but did not carry out the necessary rigorous demonstration themselves. The appendix to the Second Edition published in 1947 derived expected utility from its axioms.Structural Architecture
A chapter titled Theory of Zero-Sum Two-Person Games appears early in the book's progression. Following this comes a section on Examples before moving to Three-Person Games Zero Sum games. The authors then offer a General Theory covering Zero-Sum N-Person Games. A dedicated chapter addresses Four-Person Zero-Sum games specifically. Later sections discuss Some Remarks Concerning N greater than or equal to 5 Participants Games. The final chapters cover Composition and Decomposition of Games, Simple Games, and General Non-Zero-Sum Games. An appendix at the end provides an Axiomatic Treatment of Utility. This structure moves systematically from simple two-player scenarios to complex multi-agent interactions.