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Tet Offensive: the story on HearLore | HearLore
— Ch. 1 · Strategic Origins And Political Context —
Tet Offensive.
~11 min read · Ch. 1 of 7
In early 1967, a bitter debate raged within the North Vietnamese Politburo over the future of the war. Party theorist Trường Chinh and Minister of Defense Võ Nguyên Giáp led a moderate faction that argued for economic stability in the north and peaceful reunification through political means. They followed the Soviet line of peaceful coexistence and believed the United States could not be defeated conventionally. On the other side stood Communist Party First Secretary Lê Duẩn and his ally Lê Đức Thọ. This militant faction adhered to the foreign policy line of the People's Republic of China and demanded military reunification without negotiations. From the early to mid-1960s, these militants dictated the direction of the conflict in South Vietnam.
By late 1966, the situation had deteriorated significantly. Massive casualties on the battlefield and the destruction of the northern economy by U.S. aerial bombing created a dawning realization that Hanoi would eventually lack the resources necessary to affect the military situation in the south. Strident calls for negotiations grew louder among the moderates who felt a return to guerrilla tactics was more appropriate. General Nguyễn Chí Thanh, head of the Central Office for South Vietnam, ordered Thanh to incorporate aspects of protracted guerrilla warfare into his strategy during 1967. A counter-attack launched by a new third grouping called centrists included President Hồ Chí Minh and Foreign Minister Nguyễn Duy Trinh. These centrists called for negotiations despite Hồ Chí Minh being sidelined politically since 1963.
The debate became so public that it played out in print and via radio between Thanh and Giáp from October 1966 through April 1967. Giáp advocated a defensive primarily guerrilla strategy while Thanh argued that his rivals were too conservative and captive to past experiences. The arguments carried a foreign policy element as North Vietnam depended heavily on outside aid from either the Soviet Union or China. Beijing advocated a protracted war on the Maoist model fearing that a conventional conflict might draw China in. Moscow advocated negotiations but simultaneously armed Hanoi's forces to conduct a conventional war on the Soviet model. To break the will of domestic opponents, hundreds of pro-Soviet party moderates and intelligentsia were arrested on the 27th of July 1967 during what came to be called the Revisionist Anti-Party Affair. All arrests were based on individual stances regarding the Politburo's choice of tactics. This move cemented the position of the militants as Hanoi's strategy.
Intelligence Failure And Allied Unpreparedness
During late summer and fall of 1967, South Vietnamese and U.S. intelligence agencies collected clues indicating a significant shift in communist strategic planning. By mid-December, mounting evidence convinced many in Washington and Saigon that something big was underway. In October, the number of trucks observed heading south through Laos on the Ho Chi Minh trail jumped from a previous monthly average of 480 to 1,116. By November this total reached 3,823 and in December it hit 6,315. Despite these clear signs, allies remained surprised by the scale and scope of the offensive.
The answer lay partly with allied intelligence methodology which tended to estimate the enemy probable course of action based upon capabilities rather than intentions. Since communists hardly had the capability to launch such an ambitious enterprise according to allied estimation there was little possibility they could initiate a general offensive regardless of their intentions. The situation from the U.S. perspective was summed up by a MACV intelligence analyst who stated if they had gotten the whole battle plan it would not have been believed or credible to them. The Tet offensive later became a textbook example at West Point of an allied intelligence failure to rank with Pearl Harbor in 1941 or the Ardennes offensive in 1944.
On the 24th of April a U.S. Marine Corps patrol prematurely triggered a PAVN offensive aimed at taking Khe Sanh Combat Base. For 49 days during early September and lasting into October the PAVN began shelling the U.S. Marine outpost of Con Thien just south of the Demilitarized Zone. The intense shelling prompted General William C. Westmoreland to launch Operation Neutralize an aerial bombardment campaign of 4,000 sorties. On the 27th of October an ARVN battalion at Sông Bé came under attack by an entire PAVN regiment while another PAVN regiment attacked a U.S. Special Forces border outpost at Lộc Ninh two days later. These clashes drew in elements of the U.S. 1st Infantry Division and left 800 PAVN troops dead. The most severe Border Battles erupted during October and November around Dak To where between 1,200 and 1,600 PAVN and 262 U.S. troops had been killed.
The Battle Of Hue And Civilian Casualties
At 03:40 on the foggy morning of the 31st of January allied defensive positions north of the Hương River were mortared and rocketed before being attacked by VC formations accompanied by two battalions of the PAVN 6th Regiment. Their target was the ARVN 1st Division headquarters located in the Citadel a three-square mile complex surrounded by a moat and massive earth fortress. The undermanned ARVN defenders led by General Ngô Quang Trưởng managed to hold their position but the majority of the Citadel fell to the PAVN. Lasting 25 days the battle became one of the longest and bloodiest single battles of the Vietnam War.
During the first days of North Vietnamese occupation U.S. intelligence vastly underestimated troop numbers and little appreciated the effort necessary to evict them. Westmoreland informed the Joint Chiefs that the enemy had approximately three companies while marines sent a battalion into the area. A later assessment noted three Marine and 11 Vietnamese battalions engaged at least 8 PAVN/VC battalions not including large forces outside the city. Relief forces had to move up from Phu Bai Combat Base eight kilometers to the southeast. In misty drizzle U.S. Marines of the 1st Marine Division and soldiers of the 1st ARVN Division cleared the city street by street and house by house.
More than 5,800 civilians lost their lives during the battle and 116,000 were left homeless out of an original population of 140,000. Forty to fifty percent of Huế was destroyed by the end of the fighting. In the aftermath of recapture discovery of several mass graves sparked controversy that has not diminished with time. The last of these graves were uncovered in 1970. Victims had been clubbed or shot to death or simply buried alive. During initial occupation PAVN quickly began systematically rounding up as many as 2,800 South Vietnamese citizens they believed potentially hostile to communist control. Those taken included military personnel government officials civil servants teachers policemen and religious figures.
Saigon Attacks And The Embassy Breach
At 02:45 on the 31st of January a 19-man sapper team attacked the US Embassy in Saigon blowing a hole in the surrounding wall and charging through. With officers killed in the initial attack and attempts to gain access failing the sappers occupied the chancery grounds until all were killed or captured by U.S. reinforcements landed on the roof six hours later. By 09:20 the embassy and grounds were secured with loss of five U.S. personnel. At 03:00 twelve VC sappers approached the Vietnamese Navy Headquarters in two civilian cars killing two guards at a barricade before advancing toward the base gate.
One of the most important targets from a symbolic point of view was Radio Saigon. Its troops brought along a tape recording of Hồ Chi Minh announcing liberation of Saigon and calling for a General Uprising against the Thiệu government. They seized the building held it for six hours but when running out of ammunition the last eight attackers destroyed it and killed themselves using explosive charges unable to broadcast due to cut audio lines. Outside city proper two VC battalions attacked U.S. logistical complex at Long Binh Post while Biên Hòa Air Base struck by another battalion.
On the 1st of February General Nguyễn Ngọc Loan chief of National Police publicly executed VC officer Nguyễn Văn Lém in front of photographer Eddie Adams and film cameraman. That photograph titled Saigon Execution won the 1969 Pulitzer Prize for Spot News Photography and is widely seen as defining moment influencing U.S. public opinion even being called picture that lost war. A total of 35 PAVN/VC battalions many undercover cadres who lived within capital had been committed to objectives. By dawn most attacks eliminated but severe fighting erupted in Chinese neighborhood Cholon around Phú Thọ racetrack used as staging area.
Khe Sanh Siege And Tactical Diversion
The attack on Khe Sanh began on the 21st of January before other offensives probably serving two purposes as real attempt to seize position or diversion drawing American attention away from population centers. In Westmoreland view purpose was provoke North Vietnamese into prolonged confrontation allowing application of massive artillery and air strikes inflicting heavy casualties in unpopulated region. By end of 1967 MACV moved nearly half maneuver battalions to I Corps anticipating such battle. Khe Sanh and its 6,000 defenders surrounded by two to three PAVN divisions totaling approximately 20,000 men.
Throughout siege lasting until the 8th of April allies subjected to heavy mortar rocket and artillery bombardment combined with sporadic small-scale infantry attacks. There never major ground assault except overrunning of U.S. Special Forces camp at Lang Vei. Battle became largely duel between American and North Vietnamese artillerists combined with massive air strikes conducted by U.S. aircraft. U.S. Air Force Marine Corps and Navy aircraft dropped 39,179 tons ordnance in defense base. Overland supply route cut off but airborne resupply never halted thanks to innovative Super Gaggles using fighter-bombers and C-130 Hercules cargo aircraft employing LAPES delivery method.
On the 1st of February as offensive reached height Westmoreland wrote memo for staff stating enemy attempting confuse issue suspect trying draw everyone attention from area greatest threat northern part I Corps. In end major allied relief expedition Operation Pegasus launched by all three brigades of 1st Cavalry Division reached Khe Sanh on the 8th of April but PAVN forces already withdrawing. Both sides claimed battle served intended purpose. MACV estimated 5,500 PAVN troops killed while entire battle from November 1967 to April 1968 saw 730 U.S. personnel killed.
Military Defeat And Human Cost
Except at Huế and mopping-up operations first surge offensive over by second week of February. U.S. estimated during first phase approximately 45,000 PAVN/VC soldiers killed though figure held excessively optimistic representing more than half forces involved. Stanley Karnow claims confirmed this figure in Hanoi in 1981. Westmoreland himself claimed smaller number estimating 32,000 PAVN troops killed and another 5,800 captured. According to Max Hastings Tet Offensive including Mini-Tet offensives resulted in deaths of 50,000 VC total casualties draining 60-70% their strength.
U.S. forces lost 4,000 killed while ARVN suffered 6,000 dead. South Vietnamese suffered 2,788 killed 8,299 wounded and 587 missing in action. U.S. and other allied forces suffered 1,536 killed 7,764 wounded and 11 missing. Combined Viet Cong and PAVN forces numbered 262,000 at end 1967 increasing to 287,000 by expansion for offensive. Popular uprising anticipated by Hanoi never materialized nor did ARVN unit defections occur in South Vietnam.
The offensive was military defeat for North Vietnam yet had far-reaching consequences for effect on views of war by American public and international community. Initial attacks stunned allies losing several cities temporarily but they quickly regrouped repelled attacks inflicting heavy casualties on PAVN/VC forces. During Battle of Huế intense fighting lasted month resulting destruction city. Around American combat base Khe Sanh fighting continued two more months.
Psychological Impact On American Public Opinion
The Tet Offensive shocked the American public which had been led to believe by political and military leaders that North Vietnamese were being defeated and incapable launching such ambitious operation. American public support for war declined as result of Tet casualties and escalation draft calls. Subsequently Johnson administration sought negotiations to end war. Shortly before 1968 United States presidential election Republican candidate Richard Nixon encouraged South Vietnamese president Nguyễn Văn Thiệu become publicly uncooperative casting doubt Johnson ability bring peace.
During year Pentagon Papers claimed Johnson discounted any negative analysis of U.S. strategy by CIA and Pentagon offices International Security Affairs System Analysis seizing upon optimistic reports from General Westmoreland. According to public opinion polls percentage Americans believing U.S. made mistake sending troops rose from 25 percent in 1965 to 45 percent by December 1967. This trend fueled not belief struggle worthless but mounting casualty figures rising taxes feeling no end war sight.
A poll taken November indicated 55 percent wanted tougher war policy exemplified by public belief error gotten involved Vietnam first place but now there let win or get out. Administration launched so-called success offensive concerted effort alter widespread perception war reached stalemate convince people policies succeeding. Under leadership National Security Advisor Walt W. Rostow news media inundated wave effusive optimism. Every statistical indicator progress from kill ratios body counts village pacification fed press Congress. We beginning win struggle asserted Vice President Hubert H. Humphrey on NBC Today show mid-November.
The Tet Offensive began on the 31st of January 1968 as a massive military campaign launched by North Vietnamese forces against South Vietnam. It involved coordinated attacks across numerous cities including Huế and Saigon to break allied defensive lines.
Who led the militant faction that planned the Tet Offensive in North Vietnam?
Communist Party First Secretary Lê Duẩn and his ally Lê Đức Thọ led the militant faction that demanded military reunification without negotiations. This group opposed the moderate faction led by Trường Chinh and Võ Nguyên Giáp who favored economic stability and peaceful coexistence with the Soviet Union.
How many civilians died during the Battle of Huế in the Tet Offensive?
More than 5,800 civilians lost their lives during the battle while 116,000 were left homeless out of an original population of 140,000. The fighting lasted 25 days from the 31st of January until mid-February 1968 and resulted in the destruction of forty to fifty percent of the city.
Why did the United States intelligence fail to predict the Tet Offensive before it started?
Allied intelligence estimated enemy probable course of action based upon capabilities rather than intentions which made them believe communists could not launch such an ambitious enterprise. A MACV intelligence analyst stated that if they had gotten the whole battle plan it would not have been believed or credible to them.
What happened at the US Embassy in Saigon on the 31st of January 1968?
A 19-man sapper team attacked the US Embassy at 02:45 on the 31st of January by blowing a hole in the surrounding wall and charging through. The attackers occupied the chancery grounds until all were killed or captured by U.S. reinforcements landed on the roof six hours later with loss of five U.S. personnel.