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START I: the story on HearLore | HearLore
— Ch. 1 · Origins And Proposal —
START I.
~6 min read · Ch. 1 of 7
US President Ronald Reagan stood at Eureka College on the 9th of May 1982 to announce a radical new vision for global security. He proposed reducing strategic forces in two distinct phases, which he labeled SALT III. The first phase aimed to cap warhead counts on any missile type at 5,000. It also set an additional limit of 2,500 specifically for intercontinental ballistic missiles. A total of 850 ICBMs would be permitted under these rules. Heavy throw missiles like the Soviet SS-18 faced strict caps. The second phase introduced similar limits on heavy bombers and their warheads. The United States held a commanding lead in strategic bomber numbers during this period. The aging B-52 force was equipped with AGM-86 cruise missiles beginning in 1982. New systems like the B-1B Lancer were entering service while the Advanced Technology Bomber project continued secretly. Time magazine noted that American arms-control advocates might accuse the administration of making an unfair offer. They argued the proposal was part of a hardliners' secret agenda to sabotage disarmament. The Soviets possessed monstrous ICBMs that gave them nearly a three-to-one advantage in throw weight.
Negotiation Timeline
Formal negotiations for START I began in May 1982 but stalled repeatedly due to rigid US terms. The Soviet Union discontinued communication with the US in November 1983 after Washington deployed intermediate-range missiles in Europe. US Secretary of State George Shultz and Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko discussed a formula for a three-part strategy in January 1985. This plan included intermediate-range forces, strategic defense, and missile defense components. The Reykjavík Summit between Reagan and Mikhail Gorbachev in October 1986 accelerated talks significantly. Negotiations turned toward reducing strategic weapons following the signing of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty in December 1987. A dramatic nuclear arms race proceeded throughout the 1980s before ending in 1991. Both sides maintained parity with approximately 10,000 strategic warheads at the conclusion of the decade. The treaty officially signed by President George H. W. Bush and General Secretary Gorbachev on the 31st of July 1991 marked the end of this long process. Implementation did not occur until late 2001 when about 80% of all existing strategic nuclear weapons were removed.
Verification Mechanisms
The START Treaty verification provisions became the most complicated regime of any agreement at that time. It provided twelve different types of inspection to hold parties accountable for violations. Data exchanges required exact quantities, technical characteristics, locations, movements, and status of all offensive threats. National technical means protected satellites and information-gathering systems controlled by the verifying side. International technical means protected multilateral systems specified in other treaties. Cooperative measures included displaying items in plain sight without hiding them from detection. New on-site inspections and Perimeter and Portal Continuous Monitoring provisions maintained integrity through a regulatory system. Representatives from the verifying side remained present at all times during monitoring operations. Access to telemetry from ballistic missile flight tests was mandatory for both parties. Exchanges of tapes occurred alongside bans on encryption and encapsulation from either side. These tools ensured adherence to international treaties despite the immense complexity involved.
Implementation Costs
Three institutes studied estimated costs for implementing START I within the US government. The Congressional Budget Office assumed full-implementation cost would consist of one-time expenses between $410 million and $1,830 million. Continuing annual costs ranged from $100 million to $390 million according to their estimates. The Senate Foreign Relations Committee projected total inspection costs over 15 years between $1,250 million and $2,050 million. The Institute for Defense Analyses claimed verification costs alone were around $760 million. The Cooperative Threat Reduction Program added another $591 million to implementation costs in former Soviet republics. This addition almost doubled the program's cost for the United States. After implementation, the former Soviet Union stock fell from 12,000 nuclear weapons down to 3,500. The CBO estimated savings totaling $46 billion in the first five years alone. Total savings reached approximately $130 billion until 2010. These figures paid for the cost of implementation about twenty times over. The Joint Chiefs of Staff determined risks of significant treaty violations remained acceptable factors.
Post-Soviet Transition
Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, treaty obligations passed to twelve successor states. Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan each eliminated their single nuclear-related sites quickly. On-site inspections continued only in Belarus, Kazakhstan, Russia, and Ukraine. Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine became non-nuclear weapons states under the Treaty on Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons on the 1st of July 1968. They committed to this status under the 1992 Lisbon Protocol signed by five START parties. The protocol bound Russia, Belarus, Ukraine, and Kazakhstan to START terms since all four possessed former Soviet strategic nuclear weapons. It was signed in May 1992 and effective December 1994. All three nations disposed of their nuclear weapons or transferred them to Russia eventually. This transition ensured no proliferation occurred despite the sudden political fragmentation of the USSR.
Compliance Issues
A report released by the US State Department on the 28th of July 2010 stated Russia was not in full compliance when the treaty expired on the 5th of December 2009. One incident concerning violation occurred in 1994 announced by Arms Control and Disarmament Agency Director John Holum. He testified that Russia converted its SS-19 ICBM into a space-launch vehicle without notifying appropriate parties. Russia justified claiming it did not have to follow reporting policies regarding recreated missiles. The dispute involved inaccurate numbers and locations of Russian ICBMs with those violations. Another issue involved using SS-25 missiles to assemble space-launch vehicles. The dispute resolved itself in 1995 after months of diplomatic pressure. The US Senate Defence Committee expressed concerns about covert production capabilities earlier. They worried Russia could produce false numbers regarding warhead counts during inspections. These issues highlighted ongoing tensions even as the treaty functioned technically.
Expiration And Successor
START I expired on the 5th of December 2009 but both sides agreed to keep observing terms until new agreements formed. President Barack Obama supported proposals to renew and expand the treaty significantly. Sergei Rogov, director of the Institute of the U.S. and Canada, predicted signing might occur in summer or fall 2009. He noted Washington needed to abandon plans for missile shield elements in Central Europe first. On the 4th of May 2009, the US and Russia began renegotiating START counting nuclear warheads again. Both sides agreed to make further cuts to around 1,000 to 1,500 warheads each. A Joint understanding signed by Obama and Medvedev in Moscow on the 6th of July 2009 reduced deployed warheads to 1,500, 1,675. Ukraine offered Kyiv as a venue for signing before March 2010. Obama and Medvedev signed the successor treaty Measures to Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms in Prague on the 8th of April 2010. The New START Treaty entered full force on the 5th of February 2011 after ratification. It extended deep reductions through February 2026 despite later Russian suspension in 2023.
The START I treaty was officially signed by President George H. W. Bush and General Secretary Gorbachev on the 31st of July 1991.
How many strategic warheads did both sides maintain at the conclusion of the decade before START I expired?
Both sides maintained parity with approximately 10,000 strategic warheads at the conclusion of the decade before the treaty expired in 2009.
What were the specific limits for intercontinental ballistic missiles under the first phase of Ronald Reagan's proposal?
The first phase aimed to cap warhead counts on any missile type at 5,000 and set an additional limit of 2,500 specifically for intercontinental ballistic missiles.
Which successor states continued on-site inspections after the collapse of the Soviet Union?
On-site inspections continued only in Belarus, Kazakhstan, Russia, and Ukraine following the dissolution of the Soviet Union.
When did the New START Treaty enter full force after ratification?
The New START Treaty entered full force on the 5th of February 2011 after ratification.