Quietism (philosophy)
Philosophical quietists want to release humanity from deep perplexity that philosophical contemplation often causes. Quietism in philosophy sees the role of philosophy as broadly therapeutic or remedial. Quietist philosophers believe that philosophy has no positive thesis to contribute. Rather it defuses confusions in the linguistic and conceptual frameworks of other subjects including non-quietist philosophy. For quietists advancing knowledge or settling debates is not the job of philosophy. Philosophy should liberate the mind by diagnosing confusing concepts instead. Crispin Wright said that "Quietism is the view that significant metaphysical debate is impossible." It has been described as the view or stance that entails avoidance of substantive philosophical theorizing. More particularly it is opposed to putting forth positive theses and developing constructive arguments. Quietism by its nature is not a philosophical school as understood in the sense of a systematic body of truths. The objective of quietism is to show that philosophical positions or theories cannot solve problems settle debates or advance knowledge.
Pyrrhonism represents perhaps the earliest example of an identifiably quietist position in the West. The Pyrrhonist philosopher Sextus Empiricus described Pyrrhonism as a form of philosophical therapy. Some have identified Epicureans as another early proponent of quietism. The goals of Epicurean philosophy are the decidedly quietist objectives of aponia freedom from pain and ataraxia even dismissing Stoic logic as useless. The neo-Confucian philosopher Cheng Hao is also associated with advocating quietism. He argued that the goal of existence should be calming one's natural biases and embracing impartial tranquility. This aversion to bias is nevertheless quite distinct from Wittgenstein's position. These ancient traditions sought mental peace rather than constructing new systems of thought. They viewed confusion itself as the primary problem needing resolution through silence or therapeutic intervention.
Contemporary discussion of quietism can be traced back to Ludwig Wittgenstein whose work greatly influenced the ordinary language philosophers. While Wittgenstein himself did not advocate quietism he expressed sympathy with the viewpoint. One of the early 'ordinary language' works Gilbert Ryle's The Concept of Mind attempted to demonstrate that dualism arises from a failure to appreciate that mental vocabulary and physical vocabulary are simply different ways of describing one and the same thing namely human behaviour. J. L. Austin's Sense and Sensibilia took a similar approach to the problems of skepticism and the reliability of sense perception arguing that they arise only by misconstruing ordinary language not because there is anything genuinely wrong with empirical evidence. Norman Malcolm a friend of Wittgenstein's took a quietist approach to skeptical problems in the philosophy of mind. These thinkers shifted focus away from building grand theories toward examining how we actually use words in daily life. Their method treated philosophical puzzles as linguistic misunderstandings waiting to be dissolved rather than solved.
It is often raised in discussion as an opposite position to both philosophical realism and anti-realism. Specifically quietists deny that there is any substantial debate between the positions of realism and non-realism. There are a range of justifications for quietism about the realism debate offered by Gideon Rosen and John McDowell. Realists claim that a given concept exists has particular properties and is in some way mind independent while non-realists deny this claim. Quietists take a third position claiming that there is no real debate between realists and non-realists on a given subject. A version of this position espoused by John McDowell claims that the debate hinges on theses about the relationship between the mind and the world around us that are unsupported or unsupportable. Without those claims there will be no debate. Others such as Gideon Rosen argue more specifically against individual cases of the realism debate. They suggest that the entire conflict rests on false premises regarding existence and independence.
Quietism about truth is a version of the identity theory of truth. Specifically Jennifer Hornsby and John McDowell argue that when we think truly there is no ontological gap between what we think and what is actually true. Quietists about truth resist the distinction between truth bearers and truthmakers as leading to a correspondence theory of truth. Rather they claim that such a distinction should be eliminated true statements are simply one thinking truly about the world. The target of these thoughts is not a truthbearer but rather the facts of the world themselves. This approach rejects the idea that truth requires a separate entity called a truthmaker. Instead it posits that thinking truly directly engages with reality without intermediate constructs. The goal remains to dissolve philosophical confusion rather than establish new metaphysical categories.
More recently the philosophers John McDowell Irad Kimhi Sabina Lovibond Eric Marcus Gideon Rosen and to a certain degree Richard Rorty have taken explicitly quietist positions. Pete Mandik has argued for a position of qualia quietism on the hard problem of consciousness. These figures represent diverse approaches within the quietist framework while maintaining core therapeutic goals. Their work spans ethics aesthetics science mathematics and philosophy of mind. Some focus on specific subjects like realism or truth while others apply quietism to the entire project of philosophy. These positions can be held independent of one's view on quietism about the entire project of philosophy. The movement continues to challenge traditional assumptions about what philosophy should achieve. It remains an active area of debate among modern thinkers who question whether substantive theorizing is even possible.
Common questions
What is the purpose of philosophy according to Quietism?
Quietist philosophers believe that philosophy has no positive thesis to contribute and instead defuses confusions in linguistic and conceptual frameworks. The role of philosophy is broadly therapeutic or remedial, aiming to liberate the mind by diagnosing confusing concepts rather than advancing knowledge.
Who are the early proponents of philosophical quietism mentioned in the text?
Pyrrhonism represents perhaps the earliest example of an identifiably quietist position with Sextus Empiricus describing it as a form of philosophical therapy. Some have identified Epicureans as another early proponent while the neo-Confucian philosopher Cheng Hao is also associated with advocating quietism.
How does Ludwig Wittgenstein relate to the concept of quietism?
Contemporary discussion of quietism can be traced back to Ludwig Wittgenstein whose work greatly influenced ordinary language philosophers. While Wittgenstein himself did not advocate quietism he expressed sympathy with the viewpoint and his followers shifted focus away from building grand theories toward examining how words are used in daily life.
What is the relationship between quietism and the debate on realism versus anti-realism?
Quietists take a third position claiming that there is no real debate between realists and non-realists on a given subject. They deny that there is any substantial debate between these positions because the conflict rests on false premises regarding existence and independence.
What do John McDowell and Jennifer Hornsby argue about truth in quietism?
John McDowell and Jennifer Hornsby argue that when we think truly there is no ontological gap between what we think and what is actually true. Quietists resist the distinction between truth bearers and truthmakers and claim that such a distinction should be eliminated so true statements simply engage directly with reality.
All sources
16 references cited across the entry
- 1bookThe Oxford companion to philosophyDavid Bakhurst — Oxford University Press — 2005
- 2journalQuietismStelios Virvidakis et al. — 2013
- 3citationRealismAlexander Miller — Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University — 2019
- 4bookTruth and ObjectivityCrispin Wright — Harvard University Press — 1994
- 6webQuietism
- 7bookThe Oxford dictionary of philosophySimon Blackburn — 2016
- 8bookThe Stanford Encyclopedia of PhilosophyMetaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University — 2019
- 10bookEncyclopedia of philosophyThomson Gale/Macmillan Reference USA — 2006
- 11bookEncyclopedia of philosophyBrad Inwood et al. — Thomson Gale/Macmillan Reference USA — 2006
- 12citationEpicurusDavid Konstan — Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University — 2018
- 13bookEncyclopedia of philosophyWing-tsit Chan — Thomson Gale/Macmillan Reference USA — 2006
- 14citationGilbert RyleJulia Tanney — Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University — 2015
- 15journalThe New Loud: Richard Rorty, Quietist?Hanne Andrea Kraugerud et al. — 2010
- 16journalMeta-Illusionism and Qualia QuietismPete Mandik — 2016
- 17journalThe Identity Theory of TruthStewart Candlish et al. — 1996-03-28