Post-Soviet states

• 1. Introduction

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  The Post-Soviet states came into existence on the 26th of December 1991, the day the Soviet Union formally ceased to exist. Fifteen countries emerged from that dissolution, stretching from Estonia on the Baltic Sea to Uzbekistan on the edge of Central Asia. Together they inherited the institutions, borders, debts, and environmental wreckage of one of history's largest empires. What followed was not one story but fifteen, each taking a radically different path. Some raced toward NATO and the European Union. Others fell into the orbit of a restructured Russia. Several have never resolved the territorial disputes that broke open when the Soviet system collapsed. And across all of them, ordinary people navigated an economic shock more severe than the Great Depression. The questions worth asking are not just what these states are, but why they diverged so sharply, who has benefited from the transition, and what it means that, decades later, a majority of Russians still regret the Soviet Union's end.

• 2. Three Paths West

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  Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania did not simply declare independence in 1991. They declared the restoration of independence, insisting that the Soviet annexation of 1940 had never been legally valid and that their sovereignty had continued on paper throughout the entire occupation. That legal argument carried real consequences. It meant the three Baltic states owed nothing to the post-Soviet institutional order. They refused membership in the Commonwealth of Independent States, declined the Russian-led Collective Security Treaty Organization, and pursued a policy of near-total disengagement from Moscow's sphere. Both NATO and EU membership came through in 2004. Freedom House's 2021 report classified Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania as the only "free" countries among the fifteen post-Soviet states. Estonia went further still in June 2023, becoming the first former Soviet state to legalize same-sex marriage and joint adoption. One complication has persisted despite all this integration: the electricity and rail systems of the Baltic states remained physically connected to former Soviet networks long after political ties were severed.

• 3. The Economic Shock

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  Between 1990 and 1995, gross domestic product across the post-Soviet states fell by more than 40% in total. For comparison, the United States suffered a 27% GDP decline during the Great Depression between 1930 and 1934. The collapse of the Gosplan, the Soviet state planning agency, unraveled the economic connections between republics almost overnight. Most former Soviet states pivoted to market economies through what economists called shock therapy, following neoliberal prescriptions that slashed public spending on health, education, and social programs. A study by economist Steven Rosefielde found that 3.4 million Russians died prematurely between 1990 and 1998, attributing many of those deaths to the shock therapy policies promoted by what became known as the Washington Consensus. Across the broader former Soviet bloc, the economic shocks are estimated to have caused roughly 1 million excess deaths among working-age people. By 2007, ten of the fifteen post-Soviet states had recovered to their 1991 GDP levels. Economist Branko Milanovic concluded in 2015 that many had still not caught up, including Georgia, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Ukraine. His assessment that "only 1 out of 10 people living in 'transition' countries have seen a successful transition to capitalism and more democracy" drew disagreement; Mitchell A. Orenstein called it "overly pessimistic" and pointed to Poland's strong performance, while Kristen Ghodsee said in 2021 that Milanovic's view was "essentially correct" and may even understate the damage.

• 4. Disputed Territories and Frozen Conflicts

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  Transnistria declared independence in 1990, citing its majority Russian-speaking population's fear of unification with Romania. A ceasefire between Transnistrian and Moldovan forces has held since 1992, enforced by the presence of Russian troops. South Ossetia and Abkhazia, both in northern Georgia, followed a similar trajectory: each declared independence, each fought a war, and each gained Russian recognition after the 2008 conflict between Georgian and Russian forces. The United Nations has consistently regarded these Russian-backed entities as illegitimate and treats them as occupied territories. The most dramatic rupture came in Ukraine. In late February 2014, Russian special forces occupied Crimea and seized the local parliament; in March of that year, a referendum was held and the Republic of Crimea declared independence before Russia absorbed the peninsula within days. Also in 2014, the Donetsk People's Republic and the Luhansk People's Republic declared independence in Ukraine's Donbas region. Russia formally annexed both on the 4th of October 2022, following referendums that Ukraine and most of the international community rejected as fraudulent. Artsakh, the Armenian-majority territory within Azerbaijan, fought a war that began in 1988 and ended with a ceasefire in 1994. Azerbaijan launched a new military offensive in September 2023, prompting the government of Artsakh to agree to disarm. The president of Artsakh signed a decree calling for the republic to dissolve itself by the 1st of January 2024.

• 5. Power Without Limits

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  Nursultan Nazarbayev ruled Kazakhstan from independence until his surprise resignation in 2019. Islam Karimov governed Uzbekistan until his death in September 2016. Saparmurat Niyazov ruled Turkmenistan from independence until his death in 2006, building a personality cult around himself; his successor, Gurbanguly Berdimuhamedov, replaced that cult with one of his own. Each of these leaders initially held more limited terms but used decrees or referendums to extend their stay. Alexander Lukashenko of Belarus and Emomali Rahmon of Tajikistan followed the same pattern. Heydar Aliyev of Azerbaijan constructed an extensive personal cult and then handed the presidency directly to his son, Ilham Aliyev. In Kyrgyzstan, the participation of Askar Akayev's son and daughter in the 2005 parliamentary elections stoked fears of dynastic succession; those fears contributed to the climate that produced the Kyrgyz revolution of 2005, which forced Akayev to resign. The Reporters Without Borders Press Freedom Index for 2025 rated eight of the fifteen states, including Russia, Belarus, Azerbaijan, and the five Central Asian republics, as having a "Very serious situation." By contrast, Estonia rated "Good situation," the only post-Soviet state to reach that level.

• 6. Competing Blocs

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  Belarus, Russia, and Ukraine founded the Commonwealth of Independent States in December 1991. By December 1993, the CIS had expanded to twelve of the fifteen former Soviet republics, with the three Baltic states absent. Georgia withdrew in August 2008 following its war with Russia. Ukraine, though a CIS founding state, never ratified the 1993 CIS Charter and therefore was never a full legal member; it stopped participating in May 2018. The Eurasian Economic Union took shape gradually, with a founding treaty signed on the 29th of May 2014 by Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Russia, entering into force on the 1st of January 2015. Armenia's accession treaty came into force on the 2nd of January 2015; Kyrgyzstan's followed in August 2015. A rival grouping emerged in the form of GUAM, comprising Georgia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan, and Moldova. Formed in Strasbourg on the 10th of October 1997, GUAM was widely understood as a vehicle for those four states to maintain independence from Moscow. The Community of Democratic Choice, formed in December 2005 at the instigation of Ukraine and Georgia, became the only post-Soviet forum in which the Baltic states also participated, joining six post-Soviet states and three countries from Eastern and Central Europe. Ukraine's pursuit of an EU Eastern Partnership agreement in 2013 fractured the country internally; the government's reversal on that agreement triggered the Revolution of Dignity, which reshaped Ukrainian politics and set the stage for the Russian interventions that followed.

• 7. Nostalgia and Its Limits

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  A 2009 Pew Research Center poll found that 62% of Ukrainians felt their lives were worse after 1989, when free markets became dominant. A follow-up Pew poll in 2011 showed that 45% of Lithuanians, 42% of Russians, and 34% of Ukrainians approved of the shift to a market economy. Polls conducted by Russia's Levada Center in November 2016, 2017, and 2018 found that majorities of Russian citizens viewed the USSR's collapse negatively, with the share rising from 56% in 2016 to 66% in 2018, the highest figure recorded since 2004. In 2019-59% of Russians told Levada that the Soviet government "took care of ordinary people," and favorability toward Joseph Stalin reached record highs that same year. The source of this sentiment tends to cluster among people around the age of 55 to 80, roughly those who were active adults during what the source identifies as the USSR's peak years under Brezhnev. Yet nostalgia coexists with divergence: a July 2012 poll by RATING in Ukraine found that 42% of respondents supported forming a unified state of Ukraine, Russia, and Belarus, down from 48% earlier that year. Whether that appetite for reunion will persist as the Russian invasion of Ukraine continues is a question the polling data from that period cannot answer.