Partial Nuclear Test Ban Treaty

• 1. Rising Public Anxiety And Fallout

  ›

  The Castle Bravo test at Bikini Atoll in 1954 released a yield of 15 megatons, more than double the expected power. Radioactive particles spread over thousands of square miles, affecting inhabited areas like Rongelap Atoll and Utirik Atoll. Japanese fishermen aboard the Lucky Dragon ship received what was called "ashes of death" from the fallout. This event became the worst radiological incident in US history, sickening crew members and drawing global attention to the dangers of atmospheric testing. In the same year, Soviet tests sent radioactive particles over Japan, compounding international fears. By 1961, the Soviet Union detonated the Tsar Bomba, the most powerful human-made explosion ever recorded, though its lead tamper limited immediate fallout. Between 1951 and 1958, the United States conducted 166 atmospheric tests while the Soviet Union carried out 82. Only 22 underground tests occurred during that period, all performed by the US. The public began noticing strontium-90 levels rising in baby teeth through the Baby Tooth Survey, which used modern media advocacy techniques to communicate complex scientific issues. Support for a test ban grew from 20% in 1954 to 63% by 1957. Albert Schweitzer, a Nobel Peace Prize laureate, organized appeals endorsed by Pope Pius XII. Linus Pauling led an anti-test petition signed by more than 9,000 scientists across 43 countries, including the infirm and elderly Albert Einstein.

  5712

• 2. Early Diplomatic Efforts And Baruch Plan

  ›

  In 1945, Britain and Canada called for international discussions on controlling atomic power before any cohesive US policy existed. Vannevar Bush, who oversaw the Manhattan Project, proposed creating an international agency dedicated to nuclear control. He unsuccessfully argued in 1952 that the US should pursue a test ban agreement with the Soviet Union before testing its first thermonuclear weapon. The Acheson-Lilienthal Report commissioned by President Harry S. Truman recommended establishing an International Atomic Development Authority. J. Robert Oppenheimer influenced the report's recommendation for an international body to control uranium and thorium production. Dwight D. Eisenhower supported Truman's nuclear control policy when he was Chief of Staff of the United States Army. The Baruch Plan presented to the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission in June 1946 proposed that this authority would control all research and equipment involved in atomic energy production. The Soviet Union dismissed the plan as a US attempt to secure nuclear dominance. They demanded the US halt weapons production and release technical information about their program. Between 1947 and 1954, both nations discussed demands within the UN Commission for Conventional Disarmament. By 1954, both countries had assembled large nuclear stockpiles, reducing hopes of complete disarmament. The US approach reflected tension between controlling weapons and believing dominance was critical to security. Interest in preventing proliferation grew as Soviet capabilities increased. In May 1955, the Soviet Union proposed a test ban before the UN Disarmament Commission's Committee of Five. This proposal closely reflected prior Anglo-French efforts but was rejected by the US without general control agreements.

  1164

• 3. The Geneva Conference Of Experts

  ›

  On the 1st of July 1958, representatives from eight nations convened in Geneva to study detection methods for nuclear tests. James Fisk led the US delegation while Evgenii Fedorov represented the Soviets. William Penney headed the British team, having previously led their Manhattan Project delegation. Four techniques were examined: acoustic waves, seismic signals, radio waves, and radioactive debris inspection. By August 1958, experts devised the Geneva System involving 160-170 land-based monitoring posts plus 10 sea-based monitors. Occasional flights over suspicious events would be controlled by the state under inspection. The system could detect 90% of underground detonations accurate to 5 kilotons and atmospheric tests with minimum yield of 1 kiloton. The US initially advocated for 650 posts versus a Soviet proposal of 100-110. A compromise forged by Britain resulted in the final recommendation. On the 21st of August 1958, the conference declared it technically feasible to establish an effective control system. However, the report failed to address who would monitor or when on-site inspections would occur. Detection of outer-space tests was deemed impractical. The size of the system may have rendered it too expensive. Data gathered from Operation Hardtack's Rainier shot complicated verification provisions as US scientists became convinced findings were too optimistic about detecting underground tests. In early 1959, Wadsworth told Tsarapkin that detection capability had dropped from 5 kilotons to 20 kilotons. The Soviets dismissed this argument as a ruse suggesting falsified data.

  183749

• 4. Eisenhower Administration Stalemates

  ›

  Eisenhower first explicitly expressed interest in a comprehensive test ban in 1954 arguing before the National Security Council. Secretary of State John Foster Dulles responded skeptically to Nehru's limited arms-control suggestion. Harold Stassen argued prioritizing a test ban over full disarmament but faced dismissal due to fears of secret Soviet testing. Strauss and Teller protested against any moratorium lacking on-the-ground inspections. At a White House meeting, they claimed testing was necessary for developing fallout-free bombs. Freeman Dyson supported their claim that the Soviet Union could conduct secret nuclear tests. On the 7th of November 1957, Eisenhower created the President's Science Advisory Committee after Sputnik pressured him to bring on a dedicated science advisor. PSAC promoted a test ban contrary to Strauss's claims about strategic implications. In late 1957, the Soviet Union offered another three-year moratorium without inspections which Eisenhower rejected due to internal discord. Hearings before Senator Hubert Humphrey's Senate Subcommittee revealed conflicting testimony between Teller and Linus Pauling. AEC members argued production cutoffs should precede test bans while Stassen believed separation was safe. By March 1959, negotiators agreed on seven articles concerning uncontroversial issues while disputes persisted over verification. The Soviets required Control Commission unanimity before acting while the West rejected giving Moscow veto power. Macmillan proposed each original party be subject to annual on-site inspections in February 1959. Khrushchev and Eisenhower explored this quota proposal though Eisenhower made further negotiations conditional on dropping the Control Commission veto demand. Analysis by Livermore National Laboratory found seismic effects of underground tests could be artificially dampened through decoupling. This meant a 300-kiloton detonation might appear as only one kiloton in readings. Even on-site inspections faced serious difficulty determining whether an underground test had occurred.

  191446

• 5. Kennedy Leadership And Vienna Summit

  ›

  John F. Kennedy assumed presidency in January 1961 committed to advancing comprehensive test ban negotiations. He ordered immediate review of US negotiating position believing Eisenhower's approach insufficient for meaningful progress. Kennedy linked continued testing directly to nuclear proliferation calling it the "Nth-country problem." He warned that if China or France successfully tested atomic bombs, security for both Russians and Americans would dangerously weaken. On the 21st of March 1961, test-ban negotiations resumed in Geneva with Arthur Dean leading the US delegation. Early proposals largely grew from later Eisenhower efforts banning all tests except low-yield underground ones below magnitude 4.75. The US and UK proposed 20 on-site inspections annually while the Soviet Union suggested just three. In May 1961, Robert F. Kennedy attempted secret contact between Attorney General and Soviet intelligence officer to settle on 15 inspections per year but Khrushchev rejected this. Ahead of June 1961 Vienna summit, President Kennedy announced strong hopes for progress after Soviet ambassador suggested direct leader meetings could yield results. At Vienna, Khrushchev insisted three inspections yearly must be limit since anything more frequent constituted espionage. He privately believed allowing three inspections significant concession as other Soviet officials preferred less intrusive systems. Khrushchev told his son holding out a finger would result in having whole hand chopped off. The Soviet Union had once supported control commission under UN aegis but could no longer do so given perceived bias in recent Congo actions. Both leaders left Vienna without clear progress though Soviet Union dropped general-disarmament demand in November 1961.

  303329

• 6. Cuban Missile Crisis Rapprochement

  ›

  In October 1962, the Cuban Missile Crisis brought superpowers to brink of nuclear war prompting accelerated rapprochement efforts. American and British negotiators subsequently forged strong working relationships finding common ground with Soviets later that year. After years pursuing comprehensive ban, Khrushchev convinced to accept partial ban partly due to Soviet nuclear scientists including Kurchatov Sakharov and Yulii Khariton arguing atmospheric testing severe consequences for human health. By 1962 US conducted 89 underground tests while Soviet Union performed just two focusing instead on cheaper larger-yield atmospheric tests. Many weapons industry members argued partial ban would give US advantage in capabilities. Khrushchev saw test-ban negotiations prime venue for ameliorating tensions after Cuba crisis. Shocked by proximity to thermonuclear war he proposed easing tensions via letter dated the 30th of October 1962 outlining bold initiatives preventing possibility of nuclear war. Proposals included non-aggression treaty between NATO and Warsaw Pact disbanding military blocs ceasing all nuclear weapons testing eliminating all nuclear weapons completely. He also suggested resolving Germany issue having East and West formally recognize existence of both countries plus calling for US recognition of mainland China government. Norman Cousins editor of major US periodical invited serve liaison meeting four hours with Khrushchev in December 1962. Pope John XXIII served intermediary helping ease misunderstandings between world leaders through shuttle diplomacy.

  263155

• 7. Final Negotiations And Treaty Signing

  ›

  On the 13th of November 1962 Tsarapkin indicated Soviet Union would accept proposal involving automated test detection stations called black boxes limited number on-site inspections. Disagreement persisted over station numbers as US sought 12-20 while Soviets rejected any more than three. On the 28th of December 1962 Kennedy lowered US demand to 8-10 stations reducing further to seven by the 19th of February 1963. Khrushchev continued insisting no more than three though Kennedy willing reduce to six not clearly communicated. On the 20th of April 1963 Khrushchev withdrew support for three inspections entirely. Progress complicated early 1963 when Congress group called discarding Soviet proposal favoring Geneva System. On the 27th of May 1963 thirty-four Senators led by Humphrey and Thomas J. Dodd introduced resolution urging Kennedy propose another partial ban involving national monitoring without on-site inspections. Absent Soviet agreement resolution called pursuing widest possible international support suspending all atmospheric underwater tests. That spring Kennedy sent antinuclear activist Norman Cousins Moscow explaining political situation made agreeing comprehensive ban difficult. Cousins assured Khrushchev despite rejecting offer of three yearly inspections still set achieving test ban. In March 1963 Kennedy held press conference recommitting negotiations preventing rapid nuclear proliferation characterizing greatest possible danger hazard. Walt Whitman Rostow advised making test ban conditional withdrawing troops from Cuba abiding 1962 Laos agreement but Kennedy opted instead test-ban negotiations preconditions. On the 10th of June 1963 President Kennedy dedicated American University commencement address world peace making case treaty outlawing nuclear tests first step complete disarmament. Speech well received Khrushchev later calling greatest speech any American President since Roosevelt though met skepticism within US. W Averell Harriman chosen chief negotiator joining Adrian S Fisher Carl Kaysen John McNaughton William R Tyler. Macmillan chose Quintin Hogg leading British delegation after concerns Ormsby-Gore appeared US stooge. The Partial Test Ban Treaty signed by governments of Soviet Union United Kingdom and United States in Moscow on the 5th of August 1963 before opened signature other countries. Treaty formally went into effect the 10th of October 1963. Since then 123 states become party ten signed not ratified.

  333840