Operation Deliberate Force

• 1. Introduction

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  Operation Deliberate Force changed the course of a war that had already claimed tens of thousands of lives. On the 28th of August 1995, a shell struck the Markale marketplace in Sarajevo, killing civilians in what became known as the second Markale massacre. Within two days, NATO launched its most intensive military campaign since the alliance was founded. What followed was a three-week air campaign that struck 338 targets, deployed 400 aircraft from 15 nations, and finally broke the military will of the Army of Republika Srpska. But the story of how Europe's bloodiest conflict since World War II reached this turning point is more tangled than any single moment of decision. Why did it take years of documented atrocities, a genocide, and two marketplace massacres before the alliance acted? And what did it actually take to end a siege that had lasted more than three years?

• 2. Years of Restraint

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  The United Nations Security Council passed Resolution 743 on the 21st of February 1992, creating UNPROFOR. The mandate was defined narrowly: keep people alive, deliver humanitarian aid, and hold until the war ended. That constraint would prove costly. When Serb forces on the ground continued attacking UN-declared safe areas, the peacekeepers held no authority to fight back. On the 9th of October 1992, the UNSC passed Resolution 781 prohibiting unauthorized military flights in Bosnian airspace. But the resolution that followed it, Operation Sky Monitor, only watched violations. It did not stop them. By the time the UNSC passed Resolution 816 on the 31st of March 1993, 500 documented violations of the no-fly zone had already occurred.

  NATO initiated Operation Deny Flight on the 12th of April 1993, with authority to engage violators. The first real test came on the 28th of February 1994, when NATO fighters shot down four Bosnian Serb aircraft violating the no-fly zone in what became known as the Banja Luka incident. That engagement was the first combat operation in the history of NATO. On the 10th and the 11th of April 1994, after UNPROFOR called in air strikes to protect the Goražde safe area, two US F-16 jets bombed a Bosnian Serb military command outpost near Goražde. It was the first time NATO had ever attacked ground targets with aircraft. The Bosnian Serbs responded by seizing 150 UN personnel as hostages on the 14th of April.

  The pattern was clear by then. Each limited use of force drew a hostage-taking response that froze further action. On the 25th-the 26th of May 1995, after NATO struck Bosnian Serb ammunition depots at Pale following violations of exclusion zones, the Serbs seized 370 UN peacekeepers and used them as human shields at potential targets. The threat worked. Air strikes stopped. Three weeks later, on the 2nd of June 1995, Captain Scott O'Grady's F-16 was shot down by a Bosnian Serb surface-to-air missile while on patrol. He evaded capture for six days before US Marines from the 24th Marine Expeditionary Unit rescued him.

• 3. Srebrenica and the Breaking Point

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  On the 11th of July 1995, NATO aircraft struck targets in the Srebrenica area after Bosnian Serb forces advanced on the UN-declared safe area. Ratko Mladić, the Bosnian Serb military commander, threatened to kill 50 UN peacekeepers held hostage and to shell the Muslim population if air strikes continued. The UN peacekeepers called off the strikes and agreed to withdraw from Srebrenica. Mladić's forces promised they would care for the population. Over the next two weeks, VRS forces under Mladić killed over 8,000 Bosniaks, mainly men and boys. The Srebrenica massacre remains the worst act of genocide in Europe since World War II.

  The massacre stripped away any remaining argument for a purely passive UN role. On the 25th of July 1995, the North Atlantic Council authorized military planning aimed at deterring an attack on the Goražde safe area, with explicit threat of NATO air power. On the 1st of August, the Council extended the same deterrence posture to Sarajevo, Bihać, and Tuzla. The political will that had been withheld for three years was now assembling. On the 10th of August, the commanders of CINCSOUTH and UNPROFOR concluded a memorandum of understanding on how air strikes would actually be executed. The machinery was in place. All that remained was the trigger.

• 4. The Campaign Itself

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  On the 30th of August 1995, two days after the second Markale massacre, NATO Secretary General announced the start of air strikes. The commander of the operation was Admiral Leighton W. Smith Jr. His aircraft struck 97% of their targets and seriously damaged more than 80% of them. Over the course of the campaign, 3,515 sorties were flown and 1,026 bombs were dropped on 338 targets located within 48 complexes. Of those bombs, 708 were precision-guided munitions. On 19 separate occasions, depleted uranium munitions were used against targets near Sarajevo and Han Pijesak.

  The United States contributed the largest share of sorties at 2,318, followed by Great Britain at 326, France at 284, the Netherlands at 198, Turkey at 78, Germany at 59, Italy at 35, and Spain at 13. Aircraft operated from Italian bases including Aviano Air Base, from US aircraft carriers, and from French aircraft carriers Foch and Clemenceau positioned in the Adriatic Sea. The VRS integrated air defense network, combining aircraft and surface-to-air missiles, posed a real threat. On the 30th of August, a French Mirage 2000N was shot down by a shoulder-fired 9K38 Igla missile near Pale. Its two crew members, Lt. Jose Souvignet and Capt. Frederic Chiffot, were taken prisoner.

  On the night of the 10th of September, a naval vessel launched Tomahawk cruise missiles from the central Adriatic against a key air defense radio relay tower at Lisina, near Banja Luka. USAF F-15E jets and US Navy F/A-18 aircraft hit the same targets with precision-guided bombs, while F-16s attacked with Maverick missiles. The Bosnian Serb air defense network was methodically taken apart.

• 5. The Rapid Reaction Force

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  French President Jacques Chirac drove the creation of a ground deterrent force when diplomatic efforts were stalling. France, the United Kingdom, and the United States agreed to send a multinational brigade to the Mount Igman area, with an airmobile brigade and an armored battalion held in reserve. The brigade comprised 2,000 French troops, 1,500 British troops, and 500 Dutch troops, for a total of 4,000 personnel. UNSC Resolution 998, passed on the 16th of June 1995, authorized the force.

  French General Andre Soubirou commanded the brigade, which became operational on Mount Igman in August 1995. Its main component was a mixed artillery regiment: a French group with eight 155 mm AUF1 howitzers, a British group with twelve 105 mm light guns, and a French-Dutch 120 mm heavy mortar company. During the main action on the 28th and the 29th of August, the artillery fired 1,070 shells on Serbian positions, broken down as 305 rounds of 155 mm, 408 rounds of 120 mm, and 357 rounds of 105 mm. The artillery's role was to pound Serb gun positions in support of NATO aircraft overhead.

  The German Luftwaffe saw combat for the first time since 1945 during this operation. Six interdictor-strike Tornados, escorted by eight ECR Tornados, pinpointed Serb targets around Sarajevo for the Rapid Reaction Force artillery. The Netherlands and Turkey each contributed 18 F-16s to the campaign, with the Netherlands flying F-16As and Turkey flying F-16Cs.

• 6. Ultimatums and Aftermath

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  On the 1st of September 1995, NATO and the UN issued three demands to Bosnian Serb leaders: lift the siege of Sarajevo, remove all heavy weapons from the exclusion zone around the city, and guarantee the security of other UN safe areas. A deadline was set for the 4th of September. The Serbs did not comply, and on the 5th of September, NATO resumed air strikes against positions around Sarajevo and near the Bosnian Serb headquarters at Pale. On the 14th of September, air strikes were suspended to allow implementation of an agreement for heavy weapons withdrawal. The initial 72-hour suspension was extended to 114 hours. On the 20th of September, General Bernard Janvier and Admiral Leighton W. Smith Jr. agreed the resumption of air strikes was not necessary. The Bosnian Serbs had complied. The operation was terminated.

  The campaign lifted the three-year siege of Sarajevo and opened the path to a negotiated settlement. It ran roughly concurrent with Operation Mistral 2, a linked offensive by Croatian and Bosnian government forces in western Bosnia. In December 1995, NATO deployed a 60,000-strong peacekeeping force, the IFOR, to enforce the Dayton Peace Agreement. The two French airmen who had been held captive since the 30th of August were released on the 12th of December 1995, upon the formal end of the Bosnian War. Lt. Souvignet and Capt. Chiffot told reporters they had been treated well in captivity. The NATO-led SFOR replaced IFOR in December 1996, and that mission continued until December 2004, when Operation Althea took over.