NSC 68

• 1. The Blueprint For Militarization

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  A 66-page top secret policy paper titled United States Objectives and Programs for National Security arrived on President Harry S. Truman's desk on the 7th of April 1950. Paul H. Nitze, Director of Policy Planning for the Department of State, drafted the document under tight deadlines to address a rapidly shifting global landscape. The report described the international situation as momentous and involving the destruction of civilization itself if left unchecked. It became one of the most important American policy statements of the Cold War era. Scholar Ernest R. May later noted that NSC-68 provided the blueprint for the militarization of the Cold War from 1950 until the collapse of the Soviet Union in the early 1990s. The text advocated for a large expansion in the military budget and the development of a hydrogen bomb. It also called for increased military aid to allies of the United States while rejecting policies of détente.

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• 2. Geopolitical Catalysts Of 1949

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  By 1950 U.S. national security policies required reexamination due to a series of specific events. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization was operational and military assistance for European allies had begun. The Soviet Union had detonated an atomic bomb and communists had solidified their control of China. A British sterling-dollar crisis in the summer of 1949 brought home to U.S. officials that the Marshall Plan would not suffice by its scheduled end year of 1952. Western Europe faced the prospect of pursuing autarky similar to the 1930s with all attendant difficulties for the world economy. Similar economic problems were plaguing Japan at the same time. On the 31st of January 1950 President Truman directed the Department of State and Department of Defense to undertake a reexamination of objectives in peace and war. A State-Defense Policy Review Group was set up under the chairmanship of Paul Nitze to address these expanding threats.

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• 3. The Economics Of Military Keynesianism

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  NSC-68 did not contain any specific cost estimates when the United States was committing six to seven percent of its GNP to defense. The report called for tripling defense spending to $40 or $50 billion per year from the original $13 billion set for 1950. It specified a reduction of taxes and a reduction of Federal expenditures for purposes other than defense if necessary. Several officials involved in the preparation including Leon Keyserling suggested massive military spending could be afforded by deliberate acceptance of government deficits. This approach promised to energize and stimulate parts of the American economy as it had done after 1930. The document noted that achieving a high gross national product might itself be aided by a build-up of economic and military strength. Deputy Secretary of Defense Robert Lovett also suggested the American economy might benefit from the kind of build-up being suggested. Economists assumed the United States normally operated below production capacity so increasing government expenditure would place the nation at full capacity.

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• 4. Internal Skepticism And Dissent

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  NSC-68 drew criticism from senior government officials who believed the Cold War was being escalated unnecessarily. Willard Thorp questioned the contention that the USSR was steadily reducing the discrepancy between its overall economic strength and that of the United States. He argued the actual gap was widening in favor of the U.S. with steel production outpacing the Soviet Union by 2 million tons. William Schaub of the Bureau of the Budget believed the US was far superior to the Soviet Union in every arena. George Kennan although the father of containment policy disagreed particularly with the call for massive rearmament. Nitze ensured only the most severe claims about the Soviet Union were cited while top Kremlin experts like Llewellyn Thompson and Charles Bohlen were categorically omitted. Dean Acheson wrote that the purpose of NSC-68 was to bludgeon the mind of top government into making a decision that could be carried out.

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• 5. The Korean War Implementation

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  President Harry S. Truman initially did not support NSC-68 when it was brought to him in 1950. He sent it back for further review until he finally approved it in 1951. By June Paul Nitze had practically given up on the report as little progress was made. On the 25th of June 1950 North Korean forces crossed the 38th parallel north. With the Korean War begun NSC-68 took on new importance immediately. As Acheson later remarked Korea created the stimulus which made action possible. The Truman Administration almost tripled defense spending as a percentage of the gross domestic product between 1950 and 1953 from 5 to 14.2 percent. This implementation showed the extent to which the document marked a shift in US policy toward all communist governments.

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• 6. Public Opinion And Political Mobilization

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  The Truman Administration began a nationwide public relations campaign to convince Congress and opinion-setters of the need for strategic rearmament. It had to overcome isolationists including Senator Robert A. Taft who wanted less world involvement. Intense anti-Communists such as James Burnham proposed an alternative strategy of rollback that would eliminate Communism or perhaps launch a preemptive war. The State Department and the White House used the North Korean attack of June 1950 and see-saw battles during the first few months of the Korean War. They steered congressional and public opinion toward a course of rearmament between the two poles of preventive war and isolationism. This mobilization effort was essential to securing the massive budget increases required by the report's recommendations.

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