National Security Act of 1947
The National Security Act of 1947 exists because of a warning Harry Truman put in writing three years before he had to act on it. He wrote it in an article called 'Our Armed Forces Must Be United.' It was published on the 26th of August 1944, while he was still a senator. In it he argued that under a unified command, 'another Pearl Harbor will not have to be feared.' By the time he reached the White House, turning that idea into a functioning law took years of hearings and competing plans from rival departments, plus a fight over the Marine Corps' survival as an independent service. What made a plan this widely supported take so long to pass. And once it finally took effect, did the military actually become the unified force its backers promised.
From 1921 to 1945, Congress considered roughly 50 bills aimed at reorganizing the armed forces. All but one failed to even reach the floor of the House, mostly blocked by the Department of the Navy and the War Department. The one bill that reached a vote lost in 1932, 153-135.
Industrial production and new recruits were among the resources the Army and Navy competed for during the war, even though cooperation between the branches remained strictly voluntary. In the Pacific, Army and Navy commanders clashed constantly over command and logistics problems. In Europe, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, modeled on the British Chiefs of Staff Committee, smoothed over similar disputes and became President Roosevelt's principal military advisors. That contrast fueled the JCS's own push for permanent unification once the fighting stopped.
On the 2nd of November 1942, Army Chief of Staff George Marshall circulated a memo backing postwar unification. He proposed folding the Navy and War Departments into one department led by a civilian secretary. Beneath it, he wanted an independent air force and an independent supply service. He also called for a 'United States General Staff' made up of the four service chiefs plus a chief of staff to the president. Marshall's plan also assigned each of the four services its own civilian secretary alongside a military chief of staff, a structure that would take years of further fighting to settle.
By 1945, investigators had already examined the surprise attack on Pearl Harbor multiple times, including through the Roberts Commission, and the inquiries would continue almost to the end of the century. One finding pointed to an intelligence failure rooted in bickering between the Army and Navy commanders at Pearl Harbor, General Walter Short and Admiral Husband Kimmel. Though it stopped short of a court martial, the Roberts Commission accused both men of dereliction of duty. It found they had failed to confer and coordinate despite the warnings they received.
Aviation's importance grew across both world wars, but especially in the second, when the aircraft carrier overtook the battleship as the Navy's premier surface ship. Army airmen had pushed for an independent air service since 1919. By the war's end, the Army Air Corps had already expanded into something close to a separate branch. Curtis LeMay and others believed nuclear weapons delivered by bombers would make air power more decisive than either ground or sea warfare.
The military's total budget ceiling fell from about $42 billion in fiscal year 1946 to about $14 billion in fiscal year 1947. Right after the war, balancing the federal budget and ending wartime austerity mattered more to leaders than confronting the Soviets, a priority that held until the Soviets built nuclear weapons in 1949 and the Korean War began in 1950. On V-J Day, the Army fielded 91 divisions, the Marine Corps 9, the Navy 1,166 combat ships, and the Army Air Forces 213 combat groups. By the end of demobilization on the 30th of June 1947, the Army was down to 10 divisions and the Marine Corps to 2. The Navy had shrunk to 343 ships and the Army Air Forces to 63 groups, of which only 11 were fully operational.
Before the war, congressional committees oversaw the separate Cabinet-level War and Navy Departments, and each service was able to obtain its own aircraft. After Pearl Harbor, Congress passed the First War Powers Act, letting the president redistribute functions among executive agencies. That power applied only to matters tied to the war, and it would expire six months after the war ended. During the war, Army Chief of Staff George Marshall brought the idea of unification to President Franklin D. Roosevelt. According to one account, he 'was routinely rebuffed on the grounds that a substantive discussion of this option while the country was at war might undermine the war effort.' That resistance meant real progress on unification would have to wait for a different president.
On the 15th and the 16th of March 1946, Army Air Corps commanding general Carl Spaatz and Army Chief of Staff Dwight Eisenhower wrote two papers on unification, JCS 1478/10 and 1478/11. Marked 'TOP SECRET,' the papers bluntly aimed to marginalize the Marine Corps. They proposed limiting Marine units to regiment size or smaller and capping the Corps' total strength at 50,000-60,000 troops. The plan also would have barred the Marine Corps from wartime expansion, eliminating any need for a Marine Corps Reserve. It further limited Marine missions to guarding naval ships and shore establishments, plus only minor shore combat 'in which the Navy alone is interested.' It also barred Marines from combined-arms operations, arguing those would duplicate what the Army and Air Force already did.
The papers reached Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Chester Nimitz, and came to the attention of Merritt Edson, the Marine liaison to his office. Edson alerted the commandant and the Marine Corps Board. Board member Merrill Twining believed the classification existed only to hide the Army's goals from Congress. Nimitz replied on the 30th of March with responses from the commandant and the head of Naval Aviation, both strongly opposed to the proposal.
On the 6th of May 1946, Commandant Alexander Vandegrift testified before the Senate Naval Affairs Committee against the War Department's plan. He pointed to past attempts to marginalize or disband the Marine Corps, noting that congressional oversight had ended every one of them. Vandegrift cited Marine successes such as Pete Ellis's prediction of how the Pacific War would unfold, and a record of frugality unlike other services. He denounced the War Department's plan as a disguised attempt to marginalize and disband the Marine Corps by stripping away its congressional protection.
In January 1947, the same month the Patterson-Forrestal agreement reached the White House, Vandegrift appointed a second Marine Corps Board. Many Marines, Vandegrift included, believed Vice Admiral Forrest Sherman had struck a deal with Norstad to protect Navy aviation by abandoning the push for statutory protection of the Marine Corps. Merritt Edson and Gerald C. Thomas led the new board, whose other named members included Merrill Twining, Victor Krulak, and Robert Heinl, among ten officers formally appointed.
On the 6th of May 1947, the second Marine Corps Board was dissolved. The next day, at a committee member's invitation, Merritt Edson testified in opposition to the bill, the only active-duty officer to do so. He had first asked to retire on the 24th of April so he could speak freely against the bill, but the commandant refused. A second retirement request, submitted on the 7th of June, was accepted, and Edson testified before the committee again on the 17th of June. By then, Congress had opened three rounds of hearings on the bill that would decide whether the Marine Corps' independence survived in the final law.
On the 19th of December 1945, Truman told Congress his own views on unification, and they matched the War Department's plan in every respect. At a press conference on the 11th of April 1946, he said he had never authorized Navy officers to argue against unification, only to share honest opinions. He ordered both departments to 'get in line' behind official White House policy. He denied encouraging Army lobbying, though he said he opposed congressional lobbying by both sides.
By May 1946, Truman's aide Clark Clifford warned that the Thomas bill could not pass in its current form and was losing support daily. On the 13th of May, Truman met with the secretaries of War and the Navy and demanded they resolve the impasse by month's end. He also told his own chief of staff, Admiral William Leahy, to quiet naval officers' criticism of unification. On the 31st of May, Patterson and Forrestal reported that they agreed on eight of the bill's twelve points and disagreed on the other four. The unresolved points included whether to create one defense department, a separate Air Force, and the status of military aviation and the Marine Corps. On the 2nd of August 1946, Truman signed the Legislative Reorganization Act, merging the Military and Naval Affairs Committees into Armed Services Committees.
On the 7th of November 1946, Forrestal gathered Army and Navy negotiators at his own home to find a way forward. The main result was replacing Admiral Arthur Radford as the Navy's negotiator with Forrestal's friend, Vice Admiral Forrest Sherman. On the 16th of January 1947, Norstad, Sherman, and Symington sent the White House a joint Army-Navy agreement outline.
Truman formally proposed the legislation to Congress on the 26th of February 1947, describing a new 'National Defense Establishment.' Representative Clare Hoffman introduced it in the House as H.R. 2319 on the 28th of February. Senator Chan Gurney introduced the same bill in the Senate as S. 758 on the 3rd of March.
Gurney, chairman of the Senate Committee on Armed Services, ran hearings in three parts between the 18th of March and the 9th of May 1947. Most witnesses backed the bill, including Army Chief of Staff Dwight Eisenhower, Navy Secretary James Forrestal, War Secretary Robert Patterson, and Chief of Naval Operations Chester Nimitz. Assistant Navy Secretary W. John Kenney supported it while raising concerns about appropriations, and Army Surgeon General Norman Kirk worried about the role of medical services. Former senator Thomas C. Hart opposed the bill outright and pushed for changes affecting the Navy and Marine Corps. Melvin Maas, president of the Marine Reserve Officers Association, said 95 percent of his members opposed it and wanted the Marine Corps' role adjusted. On the 6th of June, Truman issued Executive Order 9877, spelling out the specific functions of each military service.
The Senate debated the bill on the 7th and the 9th of July 1947, passing it by voice vote with an amendment to its title. Senator Joseph McCarthy offered an amendment to protect Marine and Naval Aviation's existing status; it was the most-debated amendment and lost by a 52-19 roll call. The only amendment to pass, from Senator Robert Taft, narrowed the National Security Council's focus to national security matters alone. The House debated on the 15th and the 19th of July, then passed the bill alongside H.R. 4214. Representative Judd, working with Representative Brown, passed an amendment requiring the director of central intelligence to be a Senate-confirmed civilian. Judd also passed a second amendment letting the FBI and Atomic Energy Commission conduct secret operations without inspection from the director of central intelligence. The Senate agreed to the conference report on the 24th of July, the House on the 25th, and the recorded votes 'drew strong bipartisan support.' One final step remained before any of it took effect: the president's signature.
Truman signed the National Security Act of 1947 into law on the 26th of July 1947. The signing happened aboard his VC-54C presidential aircraft, named Sacred Cow, the first plane used in the role that would become Air Force One. Truman was flying to be at his dying mother's bedside and delayed his departure only long enough to sign the bill first.
Most of the act's provisions took effect on the 18th of September 1947, one day after the Senate confirmed James Forrestal as the first secretary of defense. Forrestal's authority was initially limited, and he struggled to make his office effective. That weakness would follow him for the rest of his tenure, and it would take an amendment two years later to change it.
Title I of the act established the National Security Council, an advisory body to the president on 'domestic, foreign, and military policies.' Under that council, the act placed the new Central Intelligence Agency, led by the director of central intelligence, who advised the council and coordinated intelligence work. Title I also created the National Security Resources Board, an advisory body to the president on coordinating military, industrial, and civilian mobilization.
Title II established the National Military Establishment, combining the Department of the Army, the Department of the Navy, and the new Department of the Air Force. A single secretary of defense led the whole structure. The War Department was renamed the Department of the Army, and the Department of the Navy kept the Marine Corps, Navy, and Coast Guard under its own roof. The Department of the Air Force gained its own United States Air Force, its chief of staff equal in authority to the Army and Navy's top officers. The act also created a War Council to advise the secretary of defense. It set up the Joint Chiefs of Staff as the president's principal military advisers, supported by a new Joint Staff. Two more boards followed: a Munitions Board replacing the old Joint Army and Navy Munitions Board, and a Research and Development Board replacing its joint predecessor.
Title III, mostly administrative, still managed to amend the Presidential Succession Act, replacing 'Secretary of War' with 'Secretary of Defense.'
Even before the act passed, the military's total budget ceiling had already been cut by two thirds. Truman cut it again, by several billion dollars, in the act's first year. By the next year, though, the defense budget had returned to its earlier level, pushed back up by the Soviet Union's new nuclear weapons and the Korean War.
On the 1st of June 1948, the Air Force's Air Transport Command merged with the Navy's Naval Air Transport Service to form the Military Air Transport Service. That merger stood as one of the act's clearer successes at cutting duplication.
Close air support became one of the new flashpoints, with the Army and the Air Force fighting over who controlled it, while the Air Force and Navy fought separately over carriers versus strategic bombers. Both the Army and the Navy also kept working to marginalize the Marine Corps. Failed joint operations during the 1980 Iranian hostage rescue and the 1983 invasion of Grenada eventually pushed Congress toward a second overhaul, passed in 1986 as the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act.
As the National Military Establishment's first secretary of defense, Forrestal had to live with the same watered-down powers he had once fought for while serving as Navy secretary. He found himself unable to truly control the military services beneath him, and spent the rest of his time in office pushing to amend the act.
By the end of 1952, the Army and Air Force secretaries had signed the Pace-Finletter memorandum of understanding, lifting all weight limits on Army helicopters and allowing fixed-wing aircraft up to 5,000 pounds. Denied the close air support and troop transport it wanted from the new Air Force, the Army had turned to helicopters as its own alternative. Army helicopter use grew rapidly during the Vietnam War. By 1983, the Army had created its own Aviation Branch, effectively recreating the air arm it lost in 1947.
After 1949 amendments gave the secretary of defense real power, the second secretary, Louis Johnson, an Army veteran, cancelled the aircraft carrier USS United States without consulting Congress. The Navy had kept its own aircraft and the Marine Corps had kept its independence, but the service regretted unification almost immediately. In what became known as the Revolt of the Admirals, the Navy secretary resigned in protest. Naval officers then lobbied hard against the rival B-36 bomber program.
In September 1962, Robert Heinl wrote an account of the unification battle for the journal Proceedings, and the Pentagon blocked its publication. Five days later, a Senate subcommittee opened hearings on Pentagon censorship, and Senator Strom Thurmond cited Heinl's blocked article as evidence. When the Pentagon allowed publication in October, the press seized on the article's unflattering statements about the Marine Corps from Truman, Eisenhower, and others. Veterans of the Marine Corps Board, many of whom had fought the plan back in the 1940s, remembered that fight as one of the Corps' finest hours. In 1984, Victor Krulak published his own account, First to Fight, a book that has stayed on the Commandant's Professional Reading List ever since.
Congress amended the act on the 10th of August 1949. The National Military Establishment became a full Cabinet-level department, renamed the Department of Defense, with all three military departments placed under the secretary of defense's authority. The three service secretaries lost their direct access to the president and their seats on the National Security Council. In exchange, they gained direct access to Congress. The old chief of staff to the commander in chief gave way to a full-time chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, senior to every other officer. The War Council was renamed the Armed Forces Policy Council. That 1949 rewrite finally gave Forrestal's successors the direct control over the military he had spent his own tenure fighting to get.
Common questions
When was the National Security Act of 1947 signed into law?
President Harry Truman signed the National Security Act of 1947 on the 26th of July 1947. He signed it aboard his VC-54C presidential aircraft, Sacred Cow, while flying to see his dying mother.
What agencies did the National Security Act of 1947 create?
The act created the National Military Establishment, the National Security Council, and the Central Intelligence Agency. It also established the United States Air Force as an independent service and the position of secretary of defense.
Who sponsored the National Security Act of 1947 in Congress?
Senator Chan Gurney sponsored the bill in the Senate, where it was introduced as S. 758 on the 3rd of March 1947. Representative Clare Hoffman introduced the companion bill, H.R. 2319, in the House on the 28th of February 1947.
Why did the United States pass the National Security Act of 1947?
The act followed years of debate over unifying the military after World War II exposed problems such as intelligence failures linked to Pearl Harbor and constant Army-Navy friction in the Pacific. President Truman proposed the legislation to Congress on the 26th of February 1947.
Who was the first secretary of defense under the National Security Act of 1947?
James Forrestal became the first secretary of defense after the Senate confirmed him, with most of the act's provisions taking effect the next day, on the 18th of September 1947. His powers were initially limited, and he struggled to make the office effective.
How did the 1949 amendments change the National Security Act of 1947?
The 10th of August 1949 amendments converted the National Military Establishment into the Cabinet-level Department of Defense and placed the three military departments under the secretary of defense's authority. They also created a full-time chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and renamed the War Council the Armed Forces Policy Council.
All sources
28 references cited across the entry
- 1Letter from James Forrestal to Chan GurneyU.S. National Archives and Records Administration — March 4, 1947
- 2Unification of the armed forcesCongressional Quarterly — 1947
- 3BookHistory of the Office of Secretary of Defense, Vol. 1: The Formative Years 1947-1950Steven Rearden — Historical Office, the Office of the Secretary of Defense — 1984
- 4BookMilitary Roles and Missions: Past Revisions and Future ProspectsJames H. Kurtz et al. — Institute for Defense Analyses — March 2009
- 6BookOrganizing for National SecurityDouglas Stuart — Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College — 2000
- 7JournalThe Organization for National SecurityGus C. Lee — 1949
- 8NewsARMY-NAVY DISPUTE BACK AT WHITE HOUSE1 June 1946
- 9Report, to the Honorable James Forrestal, “Unification of the War and Navy Departments and Postwar Organization for National Security,” (henceforth, Eberstadt Report), “Introduction” and “Conclusions and Recommendations,” page 1-14, 22 October 1945Ferdinand Eberstadt — U.S. Senate, 79th Congress, 1st session, Committee on Naval Affairs
- 10BookHistory of the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, 1915-2015Thomas Hone et al. — Naval History and Heritage Command — 2020
- 11BookThe US Marine Corps and Defense Unification 1944-1947Gordon Keiser — National Defense University Press — 1982
- 12BookPlanning and Organizing the Postwar Air Force 1943-1947Herman Wolk — Office of Air Force History — 1984
- 13JournalUnification of the Armed Forces1947
- 24JournalOrigins of Oversight: Covert Action Amendments to the National Security Act of 1947Melinda Haas — 2022
- 27JournalSemper Fidelis: Defending the Marine CorpsAlan Rems — June 2017
- 28BookFirst to Fight: An Inside View of the U.S. Marine CorpsVictor Krulak — Naval Institute Press — 1984