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— CH. 1 · INTRODUCTION —

Moral blindness

6 min listen · Ch. 1 of 6
6 sections
  • Moral blindness describes a strange malfunction. A person with perfectly intact moral values can, for a stretch of time, simply fail to see that what they are doing is wrong. For that to count as moral blindness, the deviation from a person's own beliefs has to be temporary. It also has to be unconscious, meaning the person does not realize in the moment that they are acting unethically. In 1961, Adolf Eichmann stood trial. He was a German-Austrian Nazi soldier who had organized the deportation of Jews to extermination camps, playing a major role in the Holocaust. Courtroom observers were struck by how ordinary he looked and sounded, nothing like the monster his crimes implied. That contradiction pushed psychologists to ask a harder question. What lets someone act against their own moral values without feeling, at the time, that they are doing anything wrong? Researchers have spent decades chasing that question, and their answers reach back long before the Holocaust.

  • Hannah Arendt covered Eichmann's trial for The New Yorker, and her account became a book, Eichmann in Jerusalem: A Report on the Banality of Evil. Out of that title came a phrase that stuck: the banality of evil. Eichmann showed no remorse and accepted no responsibility during the trial. He said, in his defense, that he had simply done what he was told. That defense is what convinced Stanley Milgram to test whether ordinary obedience could really produce atrocity. In his 1961-62 obedience studies, Milgram told subjects they were administering electric shocks to another participant, who was actually a confederate working with the experimenters. The studies asked, in effect, whether Eichmann and his many accomplices could really have just been following orders. Sixty-five percent of subjects in the original study pulled a switch delivering what they believed was the maximum shock, 450 volts. A decade later, in 1971, Philip Zimbardo ran the Stanford Prison Experiment. Male undergraduates at Stanford were assigned to play guards or prisoners inside a simulated prison. Zimbardo said the study showed how "good people behave in pathological ways that are alien to their nature." The experiment was built to see how far subjects would go to internalize their assigned roles and obey orders from above. It later became the subject of its own ethical concerns, given how the researchers had let it run.

  • Socrates spoke of moral intellectualism, tying moral action to knowledge itself. Plato took a different angle, warning that emotions could cloud moral judgment. Aristotle was the first to use the word "ethics" for the whole field of moral philosophy. Outside Greece, the Buddha and Confucius also taught about moral behavior. Their teachings leaned more prescriptive, telling people what to do rather than analyzing why judgment fails. Centuries later, Descartes, Locke, Hume, and Kant carried the conversation forward through the 17th and 18th centuries. In his book Principia Ethica, the philosopher G.E. Moore wrote about what he called the indefinability of good. Normative ethics, the branch concerned with what makes an action right or wrong, split into two rival camps. Deontology judges an action by whether it follows the right rules. Consequentialism judges an action by its results instead. Both positions surface whenever people are asked to respond to Greene's trolley problem.

  • Empirical studies of morality go back to the 1890s. Researchers first pursued a cognitive and developmental approach, asking how people's capacity for moral reasoning changes as they grow. Piaget put forward his theory of cognitive development in 1936. Kohlberg built on that work in 1958 with a model describing three stages of moral development. In 1982, James Rest published his Four Component Model of Morality. It broke moral behavior into four separate stages: moral sensitivity, moral judgment, moral motivation, and moral implementation. Rest's point was that competence in one stage said nothing about competence in another. A person's immoral behavior, in his model, could trace back to failure at any single stage. That cognitive picture, though, kept clashing with what researchers actually observed in people's behavior. Out of that mismatch grew the field of behavioral ethics, built specifically to study how people react when they are faced with real moral dilemmas.

  • Bandura argued that moral disengagement can come from three different directions: individual, situational, or institutional forces. He pointed to specific mechanisms that let people distance themselves from wrongdoing. Diffusion of responsibility spreads blame across a group until it seems to belong to no one. Disconnected division of tasks breaks a job into small pieces, hiding its overall moral weight from any single person. More recent research built on that foundation with the concept of bounded ethicality. The idea is that people can act unethically without meaning to, often recognizing it only on later reflection. Studies on individual unethicality have also looked at the role of social norms, and at how people judge others' unethical behavior. That same blind spot is what later research would go looking for in offices, courtrooms, and boardrooms.

  • Business organizations and legal systems are two of the areas flagged as a real concern for moral blindness. In management and organizational behavior, researchers have traced it through corporate transgressions, everyday business ethics, and moral disengagement inside the workplace. Law and justice make up another concern, especially moral blindness among lawyers over the course of their work. Some scholars have gone further and framed psychopathy itself as a specific kind of moral blindness, though the evidence for that claim remains inconclusive. The field has since branched into related ideas with their own names. Moral blind spots describe people overestimating their own ability to act ethically. Ethical erosion describes a gradual decline in ethical standards over time. Ethical fading names the moment when a person's awareness of right and wrong quietly drops out of a decision already in progress. There is no single dramatic turning point to mark when it happened.

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Common questions

What is moral blindness?

Moral blindness, also known as ethical blindness, is a person's temporary inability to see the ethical aspect of a decision they are making. It is often caused by external factors that keep someone from recognizing the immoral aspect of their own behavior in that situation.

When did the concept of moral blindness become widely studied?

Moral blindness became a widely studied idea after World War II, particularly after the Holocaust, when psychologists began researching obedience and authority bias. Stanley Milgram and Philip Zimbardo were among the researchers who produced notable findings on human behavior in this area.

How is Adolf Eichmann connected to the study of moral blindness?

Adolf Eichmann was a German-Austrian Nazi soldier responsible for the deportation of Jews to extermination camps during the Holocaust, and his 1961 trial renewed interest in moral blindness. Hannah Arendt covered the trial for The New Yorker and coined the phrase "banality of evil" after Eichmann showed no remorse and claimed to have simply followed orders.

What did Stanley Milgram's obedience experiments reveal about moral blindness?

In his 1961-62 obedience studies, Milgram had subjects believe they were administering electric shocks to another participant who was actually a confederate. Sixty-five percent of subjects in the original study pulled a switch delivering what they believed was the maximum shock of 450 volts.

Where has research on moral blindness been applied outside of war crimes?

Research on moral blindness has been applied to management and organizational behavior, including corporate transgressions, business ethics, and moral disengagement at work. It has also been applied to law and justice, particularly concerns about moral blindness among lawyers, and to related ideas such as moral blind spots, ethical erosion, and ethical fading.

Why do psychologists believe moral blindness happens to people with normal moral values?

Psychologists believe moral blindness happens because situational or other external factors can cause a temporary, unconscious deviation from a person's intrinsic moral beliefs. Bandura argued this moral disengagement can stem from individual, situational, or institutional forces, including mechanisms like diffusion of responsibility.

All sources

31 references cited across the entry

  1. 1JournalEthical BlindnessGuido Palazzo et al. — 2012-09-01
  2. 3JournalEichmann in Jerusalem: A Report on the Banality of Evil.Frederic S. Burin et al. — March 1964
  3. 4BookBecoming Eichmann: rethinking the life, crimes, and trial of a "desk murderer"2006-10-01
  4. 5JournalStanford Encyclopedia of PhilosophyDavid D. Oberhelman — Emerald Group Publishing Limited — 2001-06-01
  5. 6The Oxford Handbook of Japanese PhilosophyJohn A. Tucker — Oxford University Press — 2015-02-03
  6. 7Hume's Moral PhilosophyRachel Cohon — Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University — 2018
  7. 8Moral BlindnessGarcía Moriyon — 2011
  8. 9Religion and MoralityJohn Hare — Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University — 2019
  9. 10JournalThe Alleged Indefinability of GoodBarton C. Cooper — 1959-01-01
  10. 12BookThe evolution of moral understandingHallpike, C. R. (Christopher Robert) — Prometheus Research Group — 2004
  11. 16BookConscience : the duty to obey and the duty to disobeySchulweis, Harold M. — Jewish Lights Pub — 2009
  12. 19JournalMoral Disengagement in the Perpetration of InhumanitiesAlbert Bandura — 1999-08-01
  13. 22Conflicts of InterestDolly Chugh et al. — Cambridge University Press — 2005-04-18
  14. 25JournalCorporate Transgressions through Moral DisengagementAlbert Bandura et al. — 2000
  15. 30BookBlind SpotsMax H. Bazerman et al. — Princeton University Press — 2011-12-31
  16. 31JournalEthical Fading: The Role of Self-Deception in Unethical BehaviorAnn E. Tenbrunsel et al. — June 2004