Gulf of Tonkin Resolution
In March 1956, North Vietnamese leadership approved tentative measures to revive the southern insurgency. A communist-led uprising began against Ngo Dinh Diem's government in April 1957. The North Vietnamese Communist Party approved a people's war on the South at a session in January 1959. On July 28, North Vietnamese forces invaded Laos to maintain and upgrade the Ho Chi Minh trail. By September 1960, COSVN gave an order for a full-scale coordinated uprising by the Viet Cong. One-third of the population soon lived in areas under communist control. About 40,000 communist soldiers infiltrated from North Vietnam into the south from 1961 to 1963.
Throughout 1963, U.S. President John F. Kennedy was concerned that the South Vietnamese regime was losing the war. Such concerns intensified after Diem was overthrown and killed in a CIA-supported coup on the 2nd of November 1963. On December 19, Defense Secretary Robert McNamara visited Saigon and reported to Lyndon B. Johnson that the situation was very disturbing. He stated current trends would lead to neutralization or a Communist-controlled state within two or three months. McNamara further reported that the Viet Cong were winning the war as they controlled larger percentages of the population and greater amounts of territory.
In response to McNamara's report, the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommended U.S. intervention. Air Force commander General Curtis LeMay called for a strategic bombing campaign against North Vietnam. He said the United States was swatting flies when it should be going after the manure pile. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Maxwell D. Taylor, called South Vietnam pivotal to the worldwide confrontation with Communism. Taylor argued that allowing South Vietnam to fall would damage American durability, resolution, and trustworthiness. He claimed all of Asia might then be lost to Communism.
The journalist Stanley Karnow wrote that Taylor had offered an inflated version of the domino theory. Johnson feared losing South Vietnam would cause him to be branded soft on Communism. This fear could end the career of any American politician at the time. Johnson was more motivated by domestic policy concerns than foreign policy reasons. He worried a new McCarthy-type Republican politician would emerge and derail his domestic reforms. The instability of South Vietnamese politics made it impossible for the Army of Republic of Vietnam to focus on the war. Another coup took place in Saigon on the 30th of January 1964, when General Nguyen Khanh overthrew General Duong Van Minh.
Starting in 1961, the Central Intelligence Agency trained squads of South Vietnamese volunteers. They infiltrated them into North Vietnam with the aim of starting an anti-Communist guerrilla war. Of the 80 teams infiltrated into North Vietnam in 1963, all were captured. One CIA agent later said they were butchering their own allies. In January 1964, Johnson approved Operation 34A to step up the pace of covert war against North Vietnam. Starting the 1st of February 1964, South Vietnamese commandos began maritime raids on coastal North Vietnam under American naval operational command.
In February 1964, Walt Whitman Rostow pointed out a major constitutional problem with plans to commit American forces to Vietnam. Under the American constitution only Congress had the power to declare war. Johnson had made it clear he was opposed to Khánh's plans to have South Vietnam invade North Vietnam. He feared causing a war with China would be disastrous. By 1964, China possessed nuclear weapons unlike in 1950. To resolve this problem, Rostow suggested Congress pass a resolution authorizing Johnson to use force in Vietnam.
William Bundy advised Johnson in a memo on the 1st of March 1964 that the U.S. Navy should blockade Haiphong and start bombing railroads. Bundy stated the plans for stepped-up U.S. involvement would normally require a declaration of war from Congress. He argued the best answer was an event from Johnson's career as Senator when he voted for the Formosa Resolution in January 1955. That resolution gave President Eisenhower power to use military force as he deemed necessary to protect Taiwan. Unlike the 1955 resolution, Senate Majority Leader Mike Mansfield was skeptical about using American forces to support South Vietnam.
Bundy predicted problems from Senator Wayne Morse who strongly believed only Congress had power to declare war. Morse deeply disliked resolutions like the Formosa resolution as weakening congressional power. On the 27th of May 1964, Johnson invited his mentor Richard Russell Jr. to the Oval Office for a discussion about Vietnam. Russell predicted American involvement would lead to a war with China. He called it the damned worst mess he ever saw and said South Vietnam was not important at all.
Johnson noted according to most polls 63% of Americans did not know or care about Vietnam. Those who did were making an issue of the 35 American advisers killed fighting in Vietnam so far in 1964. Russell dismissed Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge Jr. as too arrogant. He thought Lodge dealt with barbarian tribes out there and acted like emperor. Johnson called the coup that saw the Ngo brothers killed a tragic mistake which he blamed on Lodge.
By late May 1964, a rough draft of the resolution became completed by Bundy. It gave Johnson legal power to use force to defend any nation in Southeast Asia threatened by Communist aggression or subversion. By June 1964, the final draft was completed and ready for submission to Congress. Acting Attorney General Nicholas Katzenbach called the resolution the functional equivalent of a declaration of war. The U.S. Air Force had already selected 94 sites in North Vietnam to be bombed while the Navy moved a carrier task force into the Gulf of Tonkin.
Soviet-North Vietnamese relations had become badly strained in the early 1960s as North Vietnam moved closer to China. When Mao Zedong denounced Nikita Khrushchev for his cowardice regarding the Cuban Missile Crisis, North Vietnamese newspapers approvingly cited his remarks. In a bid to recapture influence lost to China, the Soviet Union sold North Vietnam advanced radar systems and surface-to-air missile batteries. All through spring and summer 1964, Soviet workers built and installed radar stations across North Vietnam.
As U.S. plans developed to bomb North Vietnam, admirals and generals insisted they needed more information about the radar network. They required knowledge of frequencies used to develop jamming mechanisms. As a result, the U.S. Navy began increasing DESOTO patrols off the coast of North Vietnam. Admiral U.S. Grant Sharp Jr. ordered Captain John J. Herrick of the USS Maddox not to go closer than eight miles from the coast. He also set limits four miles from any archipelagos off the coast.
On the 30th of July 1964, South Vietnamese commandos tried to attack the North Vietnamese radar station on Hon Me island. They were detected coming in leading North Vietnamese to open fire making landing impossible. The radar turned on and the Maddox picked up the frequency being used. North Vietnam made a formal protest about the raid to the International Control Commission consisting of diplomats from India, Canada, and Poland.
The Maddox conducted a DESOTO patrol in Gulf of Tonkin waters on the 2nd of August 1964 when it reported being attacked by three North Vietnamese Navy torpedo boats. These boats attempted to close range for effective torpedo fire since one thousand yards was maximum effective range. The Maddox fired over 280 five-inch shells while the boats expended six torpedoes all misses plus some fourteen point five millimeter machine gun fire. Breaking contact, combatants went separate ways before four USN F-8 Crusader jet fighter bombers damaged all three torpedo boats with twenty-millimeter cannons.
Johnson called Khrushchev in Kremlin using first hotline installed after Cuban Missile Crisis saying United States did not want war but hoped Soviets would use influence to persuade North Vietnam not to attack American warships. Johnson declined to use this incident as reason to present resolution to Congress immediately. He wanted an incident where it was unambiguous that North Vietnamese were aggressors attacking American warships in international waters.
Early morning the 4th of August 1964, Johnson told several congressmen at meeting that North Vietnam had just attacked American patrol in Gulf of Tonkin. He promised retaliation and stated he wanted Congress to vote for resolution of support. After meeting, Johnson told aide Kenny O'Donnell he felt being tested by North Vietnam. Both agreed how president handled crisis would affect election. O'Donnell recalled Johnson's main fear was incident might allow Republican opponent Barry Goldwater chance to gain in polls.
Equivocal nature of Captain Herrick's reports worried administration. Johnson informed McNamara member of cabinet he trusted most to ensure naval report remove ambiguous elements. In turn McNamara phoned Admiral Sharp saying president keen to launch retaliatory raid but could not move unless dammed sure what happened. Admiral Sharp applied strong pressure on Herrick to confirm absolutely patrol had been attacked by torpedo boats. At two oh eight pm Sharp called Air Force general David A. Burchinal stating no doubt second attack occurred expressing annoyance at Herrick for doubts.
Forty minutes later Herrick sent radio message certain original ambush bona fide. Meanwhile Johnson summoned McNamara to White House pointing out best places to bomb North Vietnam. British ambassador Lord Harlech and West German ambassador Karl Heinrich Knappstein summoned to State Department told United States launching major bombing raid soon. Defense Department press release accused North Vietnam of second deliberate attack on American warships in international waters.
At National Security Council meeting Rusk pressed for bombing raid saying second alleged attack more serious than first indicating North Vietnam wanted war with United States. CIA director John A. McCone stated agency believed North Vietnam did not want war acting out of pride and anger over violation sovereignty. Carl Rowan lone black man at meeting said agency would have to justify any bombing raid rebutting charges United States fabricated incidents leading McNamara say no doubt both incidents occurred.
Johnson invited eighteen senators and congressmen led by Mansfield to White House informing them ordered bombing raid asking support for resolution. He warned leaders coming here dangerous as reporters see them going back report all over Hill. Some boys floating in water meant facts presented must held closest confidence until announced. Congressman Charles Halleck denied leaking meeting saying I did not tell damn person. Atmosphere made it difficult for those present oppose president fearing appearing unpatriotic.
On the 5th of August 1964 Johnson submitted resolution to Congress giving him legal power take all necessary measures prevent further aggression allowing decide when peace security attained Southeast Asia. He commented resolution like grandma's nightshirt covered everything. Despite public claims aggression Johnson privately believed second incident had not taken place saying hell those dumb stupid sailors just shooting at flying fish.
President's two chosen instruments passing resolution were Defense Secretary Robert McNamara and Senator J. William Fulbright chairman Senate Foreign Relations Committee. McNamara had image whiz kid man almost superhuman intelligence ability whose computer generated graphs showed best way scientifically solve problem. Statements always seemed backed up Pentagon computers having ability dazzle Congress whatever requested approved. Fulbright widely respected Senate resident foreign policy expert defender Congress prerogatives.
If Fulbright backed resolution Johnson knew probably carry doubters waverers several existed. Johnson knew conservative Republicans together with conservative Southern Democrats would vote resolution but did not want dependent upon their support foreign policy as domestic policies anathema them. From Johnson viewpoint having liberal Democrats and liberal Republicans vote resolution free hands carry out domestic reforms wanted pass after election.
Fulbright arrived White House meet Johnson where president asked old friend use influence get resolution passed. Johnson insisted quite vehemently alleged attack destroyers took place only later Fulbright became skeptical whether attack really occurred. Furthermore Johnson insisted resolution functional equivalent declaration war not intended used going war Vietnam. In 1964 election Republicans nominated Goldwater candidate running platform accusing Johnson soft on Communism promising total victory over Communism.
Johnson argued to Fulbright resolution election year stunt prove voters really tough on Communism denting appeal Goldwater denying main avenue attack. Besides primat der innenpolitik reason Johnson gave resolution also gave primat der aussen politik reason arguing such resolution intimidate North Vietnam ceasing try overthrow government South Vietnam making American involvement less likely rather more likely.
By 1967 rationale for costly U.S. involvement in Vietnam War receiving close scrutiny. With opposition mounting movement repeal resolution began gather steam. War critics decried giving Johnson administration blank check. Investigation Senate Foreign Relations Committee revealed Maddox electronic intelligence collection mission off North Vietnamese coast. It also learned U.S. Naval Communication Center Philippine Islands reviewing ships messages questioned whether any second attack actually occurred.
Administration President Richard Nixon taking office January 1969 initially opposed repeal warning consequences Southeast Asia go beyond war Vietnam. In 1970 administration began shift stance asserting conduct operations Southeast Asia based not resolution constitutional exercise president authority commander-in-chief take necessary steps protect American troops gradually withdrawn.
In February 1966 Morse introduced motion repeal resolution arguing unconstitutional used ways Johnson promised would not. Through Morse motion chance passing Senate Majority Leader Mansfield fatalistically saying we too deep now able extend debate two weeks. Morse described skilled parliamentarian able use various procedural methods keep debate going despite Mansfield efforts several senators spoke favor motion.
Russell complained very great grant power resolution granted Johnson. Ultimately most senators followed Johnson argument America at war patriotic duty Congress support president no matter what only five senators voted Morse motion. By 1968 public opinion polls showed majority Americans wanted withdrawal from Vietnam. The resolution remained law until the 2nd of January 1970 when Congress passed the Joint Resolution to Repeal the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution.
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Common questions
What was the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution and when did Congress pass it?
The Gulf of Tonkin Resolution gave President Lyndon B. Johnson legal power to use force in Southeast Asia without a formal declaration of war. Congress passed this joint resolution on the 5th of August 1964 following reported attacks by North Vietnamese torpedo boats.
Who were the key political figures involved in passing the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution?
President Lyndon B. Johnson worked closely with Defense Secretary Robert McNamara and Senate Foreign Relations Committee Chairman J. William Fulbright to secure passage of the resolution. Senator Wayne Morse led opposition efforts while Majority Leader Mike Mansfield facilitated the vote despite personal skepticism about the events.
When did the alleged attacks on American ships occur that triggered the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution?
The USS Maddox conducted patrols off the coast of North Vietnam on the 2nd of August 1964 and reported being attacked by three North Vietnamese Navy torpedo boats. A second alleged attack occurred early morning on the 4th of August 1964 which prompted Johnson to submit the resolution to Congress.
Why did Lyndon B. Johnson push for the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution instead of seeking a formal declaration of war?
Johnson sought the resolution because it provided functional equivalent powers to declare war while avoiding the constitutional requirement for a formal congressional declaration. He also viewed the measure as an election year strategy to counter Republican opponent Barry Goldwater's campaign platform regarding Communism.
When was the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution officially repealed by Congress?
Congress passed the Joint Resolution to Repeal the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution on the 2nd of January 1970 after years of scrutiny and growing public opposition to the Vietnam War. Senator Wayne Morse had introduced motions to repeal the resolution starting in February 1966 arguing it was unconstitutional.
All sources
5 references cited across the entry
- 1bookWhere the Domino Fell: America and Vietnam 1945–1995James S. Olson et al. — Blackwell Publishing — 2008
- 2bookVietnam an epic tragedy, 1945–1975Max Hastings — Harper Collins — 2018
- 3bookRain of Fire: Air War, 1969–1973John Morrocco — Boston Publishing Company — 1985
- 4bookThe Vietnam War from the Other SideCheng Guan Ang — RoutledgeCurzon — 2002