Emissions trading
A coal power plant in Germany stands as a visual reminder of the stakes involved. Emissions trading transforms this industrial reality into an economic calculation. The system allocates or sells a limited number of permits, known as a cap, to allow discharge of specific pollutants over set time periods. Polluters must hold permits equal to their actual emissions. Those wishing to increase output buy permits from others willing to sell them. This mechanism incorporates economic costs directly into production expenses. Corporations now consider investment returns and capital expenditure decisions through models that include carbon prices. Organizations that do not pollute may also trade these financial derivatives. Participants can bank allowances for future use or donate permits to nonprofits for tax deductions. Environmental groups sometimes purchase and retire permits to drive up remaining permit prices according to demand laws.
Micro-economic computer simulation studies between 1967 and 1970 first demonstrated the efficiency of what later became known as cap-and-trade. Ellison Burton and William Sanjour conducted these studies for the National Air Pollution Control Administration. They used mathematical models of several cities and emission sources to compare control strategies. Each abatement strategy was compared with the least-cost solution produced by a computer optimization program. Results showed the least-cost solution was dramatically less expensive than conventional abatement strategies. The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency introduced computer modeling with least-cost abatement strategies in its 1972 annual report to Congress. This led to the concept of cap and trade as a means of achieving the least-cost solution for a given level of abatement. The development over time divides into four distinct phases: gestation, proof of principle, prototype, and regime formation. The prototype phase launched the first cap-and-trade system under Title IV of the 1990 Clean Air Act. C. Boyden Gray conceived this acid rain related system while working with the Environmental Defense Fund. The new emissions cap on nitrogen oxides and sulfur dioxide gases took effect in 1995. Acid rain emissions dropped three million tons that year according to Smithsonian magazine.
The Coase model argues social costs could be accounted for by negotiating property rights according to a particular objective. Ronald Coase published his argument in 1960 assuming perfectly operating markets and equal bargaining power among those arguing for property rights. Efficiency promotes achieving a given reduction in emissions at lowest cost through the market system. Flexibility allows emission reductions to occur first where marginal costs are lowest. Marginal costs vary significantly between countries and regions. Emissions trading enables reductions where the marginal costs of abatement are lowest. Over time, efficiency promotes allowing banking of permits to reduce emissions when most efficient. One advantage suggests fairness can be addressed in distribution of property rights regardless of assignment. Markets produce the most efficient outcome even if trade-offs occur between equity and efficiency. Grandfathering allocates permits based on past emissions but results in firms having incentives to maintain emissions. A firm reducing emissions receives fewer permits in future periods under grandfathering rules. Polluting industries may stay in business longer than otherwise occurs due to these subsidies. Ross Garnaut states permits allocated to existing emitters by grandfathering are not free despite being scarce. The benefit of value is acquired fully by the emitter while costs impose elsewhere on consumers.
Sulfur dioxide emissions from Acid Rain Program sources fell from seventeen point three million tons in 1980 to about seven point six million tons in 2008. This represents a decrease in emissions of fifty-six percent. Some experts argue the cap-and-trade system reduced acid rain control costs by as much as eighty percent versus source-by-source reduction. The program faced challenges in 2004 leading to the 2011 Cross-State Air Pollution Rule. Under this rule, the national sulfur dioxide trading program replaced four separate trading groups for sulfur dioxide and nitrogen oxides. A 2014 Environmental Protection Agency analysis estimated implementation avoided between twenty thousand and fifty thousand incidences of premature mortality annually. Ozone season emissions decreased forty-three percent between 2003 and 2008 even while energy demand remained flat. Nitrogen oxide Budget Trading Program created to reduce emissions from power plants began administration in 2003. NOx reductions led to improvements saving an estimated five hundred eighty to one thousand eight hundred lives in 2008. A 2017 study found the program decreased emissions and ambient ozone concentrations reducing expenditures on medicine by about one point five percent.
China started considering a national pollution permit trading system in 2006 to reverse adverse consequences of air pollution. Four provinces, three municipalities and one state-owned enterprise participated in the initial pilot project launched in 2002. These included Shandong, Shanxi, Jiangsu, Henan, Shanghai, Tianjin, Liuzhou and China Huaneng Group. By 2014 more than twenty local pollution permit trading platforms existed across the country. The Yangtze River Delta region ran test trading though scale remained limited. China established its national Emissions Trading System in 2017 following these regional efforts. A 2021 study found the system effectively reduced firm emissions despite low carbon prices and infrequent trading. Total emissions reduced by sixteen point seven percent and emission intensity dropped nine point seven percent. Distinct cap-and-trade systems link together through mutual or unilateral recognition of allowances for compliance. Linking creates larger markets that reduce overall compliance costs and increase market liquidity. California and Québec successfully linked their systems in 2014. Ontario and Manitoba agreed to join the linked system between Quebec and California in 2015. Formal agreements establishing linkage signed on the 22nd of September 2017 by premiers and governor.
Cap and trade functions as a tax where rate varies based relative cost of abatement per unit. Tax base varies based amount of abatement needed compared to command-and-control approaches. Command and control prescribes emission limits and compliance methods for each facility or source. Performance standards set fixed goals making burden reduction impossible to shift to firms achieving it cheaper. Results show performance standards likely more costly overall with additional costs passed to end consumers. Baseline and credit programs allow polluters to create permits called credits by reducing emissions below baseline level. Pollution taxes act as surcharges on pollution created while producing goods and services. Carbon tax targets carbon content of fossil fuels aiming to discourage use and thereby reduce carbon dioxide emissions. Main difference lies in what is defined versus derived from the instrument. A tax serves as price control while cap-and-trade operates as quantity control instrument. Cap-and-trade adjusts automatically to inflation changes whereas emissions fees require regulator intervention. Recessions cause drop in demand lowering emissions cost automatically under cap-and-trade schemes. Lower pollution prices also result in reduced efforts to cut pollution if government stimulates economy regardless scheme. Price floors provide certainty and stability for investment in emissions reductions unlike EU emissions trading scheme currently providing.
A 2008 book compiling research on emissions trading in European Union cautiously endorses effectiveness in practice. Emissions trading seems very much suited to reaching necessary reductions in cost-effective way according to findings. Recent empirical research supports assessment that average emissions reductions approximately five to twenty-one percent after implementation occur. Correcting for publication bias shows around four to fifteen percent reduction achieved. Firm-level causal evidence indicates EU Emissions Trading System reduced regulated manufacturers' CO₂ emissions by fourteen to sixteen percent without detectable losses in output or employment. Achievements primarily through investments lowering emissions intensity with no observed carbon leakage. US Congressional Budget Office examined potential effects of American Clean Energy and Security Act on households. Bill found to protect low-income consumers but recommended making more efficient by reducing welfare provisions for corporations. A cap-and-trade initiative in U.S. Northeast caused concerns it would be regressive causing poorer households to absorb most new tax. Distributional effects remain critical consideration alongside overall environmental effectiveness metrics.
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Common questions
What is emissions trading and how does it work?
Emissions trading allocates or sells a limited number of permits to allow discharge of specific pollutants over set time periods. Polluters must hold permits equal to their actual emissions, while those wishing to increase output buy permits from others willing to sell them.
When did the first cap-and-trade system launch under Title IV of the 1990 Clean Air Act?
The prototype phase launched the first cap-and-trade system under Title IV of the 1990 Clean Air Act in 1995. C. Boyden Gray conceived this acid rain related system while working with the Environmental Defense Fund.
How much did sulfur dioxide emissions fall between 1980 and 2008 in the Acid Rain Program?
Sulfur dioxide emissions from Acid Rain Program sources fell from seventeen point three million tons in 1980 to about seven point six million tons in 2008. This represents a decrease in emissions of fifty-six percent.
Which regions successfully linked their cap-and-trade systems together in 2014 and 2015?
California and Québec successfully linked their systems in 2014. Ontario and Manitoba agreed to join the linked system between Quebec and California in 2015.
What percentage reduction did the EU Emissions Trading System achieve for regulated manufacturers?
Firm-level causal evidence indicates EU Emissions Trading System reduced regulated manufacturers' CO₂ emissions by fourteen to sixteen percent without detectable losses in output or employment.
All sources
72 references cited across the entry
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