Civil war
The destruction wrought on Granollers after a raid by German aircraft on the 31st of May 1938 during the Spanish Civil War illustrates the scale of modern internal conflict. A civil war is a war between organized groups within the same state or country. The aim of one side may be to take control of the country, achieve independence for a region, or change government policies. James Fearon, a scholar at Stanford University, defines this as a violent conflict fought by organized groups aiming to seize power at the center or in a region. Ann Hironaka further specifies that one side must be the state itself. Stathis Kalyvas describes it as armed combat taking place within recognized sovereign boundaries between parties subject to a common authority at the outset. Some political scientists define a civil war as having more than 1,000 casualties per year. Others specify that at least 100 casualties must come from each side. The Correlates of War dataset classifies these conflicts based on over 1,000 war-related casualties annually. This rate excludes several highly publicized conflicts like The Troubles of Northern Ireland. It also excludes the struggle of the African National Congress in Apartheid-era South Africa. Based on the 1,000-casualties-per-year criterion, there were 213 civil wars from 1816 to 1997. Of those, 104 occurred from 1944 to 1997. If using the less-stringent 1,000 total casualties criterion, there were over 90 civil wars between 1945 and 2007. As of 2007, there were 20 ongoing civil wars.
A comprehensive study by the World Bank team examined 78 five-year increments when civil war occurred from 1960 to 1999. They compared this against 1,167 five-year increments of no civil war for statistical analysis. A high proportion of primary commodities in national exports significantly increases the risk of conflict. A country at peak danger with commodities comprising 32% of gross domestic product has a 22% risk of falling into civil war in a given five-year period. A country with no primary commodity exports has only a 1% risk. When disaggregated, petroleum dependence results in slightly more risk than other primary commodities. A second source of finance is national diasporas funding rebellions from abroad. Statistically switching the size of a country's diaspora from smallest to largest resulted in a sixfold increase in the chance of civil war. Higher male secondary school enrollment reduced the chance of conflict by about 3%. A growth rate 1% higher than average resulted in a decline in the chance of civil war of about 1%. Low per capita income was proposed as a cause for grievance but economic inequality proved insignificant. Most proxies for grievance were statistically insignificant including ethnic polarization and religious fractionalization. Only ethnic dominance increased the risk nearly twofold. The combined effects of ethnic and religious fractionalization mitigated each other in many cases. David Keen argues conflicts are too complex to be analyzed through simplified methods like greed versus grievance theory.
James Fearon and David Laitin found that factors making it easier for rebels to recruit foot soldiers make civil wars more likely. Poverty marks financially and bureaucratically weak states and favors rebel recruitment. Political instability, rough terrain, and large populations also contribute to likelihood. Such research finds civil wars happen because the state is weak regardless of whether it is authoritarian or democratic. High levels of population dispersion increased the chance of conflict significantly. Mountainous terrain offered rebels sanctuary where they could seek safety. Rough terrain was highlighted as one of the more important factors in a 2006 systematic review. The risk of a civil war rises approximately proportionately with the size of a country's population. Elisabeth Wood studied the Salvadoran Civil War and found traditional explanations insufficient. She argued emotional engagements and moral commitments drove thousands of civilians from poor rural backgrounds to join the Farabuno Martí National Liberation Front. These individuals faced high risks and virtually no foreseeable gains individually. Wood attributes participation to the value insurgents assigned to changing social relations in El Salvador. This experience she defines as the pleasure of agency. Some scholars criticize data used by Fearon and Laitin regarding ethnic diversity measures. Lars-Erik Cederman argues ethno-linguistic fractionalization indices fail to determine how many groups hold power in the state.
Civil wars between 1900 and 1944 lasted on average one and a half years. The state itself formed the obvious center of authority in the majority of cases. Whoever had control of the capital and military could normally crush resistance quickly. For example, fighting associated with the 1871 Paris Commune occurred almost entirely in Paris. It ended quickly once the military sided with the government at Versailles and conquered Paris. The American Civil War from 1861 to 1865 was unusual for being fought around regional identities as well as political ideologies. It ended through war of attrition rather than decisive battle over control of the capital. The Spanish Civil War from 1936 to 1939 proved exceptional because both sides received support from intervening great powers. Germany, Italy, and Portugal supported opposition leader Francisco Franco while France and Soviet Union supported the government. In the 1990s about twenty civil wars were occurring concurrently during an average year. This rate was about ten times the historical average since the 19th century. However the drastic rise in ongoing wars after World War II resulted from tripling of average duration to over four years. Following World War II the number of ex-colonial states jumped from about 30 to almost 120. Hironaka statistically measures this impact as increasing post-World War II incidence by plus 165% over pre-1945 numbers.
According to Patrick M. Regan in his book Civil Wars and Foreign Powers about two thirds of 138 intrastate conflicts between end of World War II and 2000 saw international intervention. The United States intervened in 35 of these conflicts alone. On average a civil war with interstate intervention was 300% longer than those without. When disaggregated a civil war with intervention on only one side is 156% longer. When intervention occurs on both sides the average civil war is longer by additional 92%. If one intervening state was a superpower a civil war is further 72% longer. A conflict such as Angolan Civil War involving two-sided foreign intervention including superpowers would be 538% longer on average than civil war without any international intervention. The Cold War provided global network of material and ideological support that often helped perpetuate civil wars. In some cases superpowers superimposed Cold War ideology onto local conflicts while others used it to attract attention for support. Greek Civil War from 1946 to 1949 erupted shortly after end of World War II. Communist-dominated Democratic Army of Greece received support from Yugoslavia and Soviet Union opposing Kingdom of Greece backed by United Kingdom and United States under Truman Doctrine. Civil wars including pro- or anti-communist forces lasted 141% longer than average non-Cold War conflict. End of Cold War marked by fall of Berlin Wall in 1989 resulted in reduction of duration of Cold War civil wars of 92%.
Common questions
What is the definition of a civil war according to James Fearon?
James Fearon defines a civil war as a violent conflict fought by organized groups aiming to seize power at the center or in a region. This definition requires that one side must be the state itself.
How many civil wars occurred between 1816 and 1997 based on the 1,000-casualties-per-year criterion?
There were 213 civil wars from 1816 to 1997 when using the 1,000-casualties-per-year criterion. Of those conflicts, 104 occurred from 1944 to 1997.
What economic factor significantly increases the risk of civil war according to World Bank studies?
A high proportion of primary commodities in national exports significantly increases the risk of conflict. A country with commodities comprising 32% of gross domestic product has a 22% risk of falling into civil war in a given five-year period.
How does international intervention affect the duration of civil wars?
On average a civil war with interstate intervention was 300% longer than those without. When intervention occurs on both sides the average civil war is longer by additional 92%.
When did the Spanish Civil War take place and which countries supported Francisco Franco?
The Spanish Civil War took place from 1936 to 1939. Germany, Italy, and Portugal supported opposition leader Francisco Franco while France and Soviet Union supported the government.
All sources
35 references cited across the entry
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- 6webCivil WarsStathis N. Kalyvas — 2009
- 7bookThe Logic of Violence in Civil WarStathis N. Kalyvas — Cambridge University Press — 2006
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- 16newsAmericans hate each other. But we aren't headed for civil war.Richard Hanania — 29 Oct 2020
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- 29bookInsurgent collective action and civil war in El SalvadorElisabeth Jean Wood — Cambridge Univ. Press — 2003
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- 32journalBases, Bullets and Ballots; The Effect of US-Military Aid on Political Conflict in ColombiaDube, Vargas — 2015
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