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Chetniks: the story on HearLore | HearLore
Chetniks
The word Chetnik, derived from the Turkish çete meaning to plunder and burn down, or the Proto-Slavic četa meaning a company, describes a movement that would become one of the most controversial forces of World War II. In the early days of the Axis invasion of Yugoslavia on the 6th of April 1941, Colonel Draža Mihailović led a small group of only seven officers and 27 other ranks into the hills of Ravna Gora. They chose to form a resistance movement rather than surrender to the Germans, creating what became known as the Ravna Gora Movement. This group, formally the Chetnik Detachments of the Yugoslav Army, was not a homogeneous force but a complex network of Serbian nationalists, royalists, and local defense units. While they claimed to be the primary resistance against the occupiers, their history is defined by a paradoxical strategy of tactical collaboration with Axis powers to fight their ideological enemies, the Communist Partisans. The movement adopted a policy of using the enemy, engaging in cooperation with puppet governments and occupying forces to one degree or another, establishing a modus vivendi that allowed them to operate as legalized auxiliary forces under Axis control. This approach would eventually lead to their designation as a partner in a pattern of terror and counter-terror that developed across the Balkans, resulting in the deaths of tens of thousands of non-Serbs and the destruction of hundreds of villages.
The Greater Serbia Blueprint
The ideological core of the Chetnik movement was not merely resistance but the creation of an ethnically homogeneous Greater Serbia. In June 1941, Stevan Moljević wrote a memorandum titled Homogeneous Serbia, advocating for a state that would include 65 to 70 percent of the total Yugoslav territory and population. This plan envisioned the expulsion of 2,675,000 people from Greater Serbia, including 1,000,000 Croats and 500,000 Germans, while bringing 1,310,000 Serbs from outside the borders to populate the new state. The Chetnik Central National Committee approved this Greater Serbia project in August 1941, and Mihailović endorsed the proposals in a set of detailed instructions dated the 20th of December 1941. These documents outlined a strategy to cleanse areas intended to be part of Greater Serbia of non-Serbs, regardless of whether they were Croats, Muslims, or other minorities. The movement's ideology was anti-Croat, anti-Muslim, and anti-communist, with a firm commitment to the Karađorđević dynasty. The final ideological document produced by the Ba Congress in January 1944, The Goals of the Ravna Gora Movement, reinforced the idea that all Serbian provinces would be united in a single Serbian unit within a federal arrangement. This congress, which included only two or three Croats and one Slovene among its 300 attendees, effectively planned for a post-war Chetnik dictatorship that would hold all power within the country. The practical outcome was a vision of a country that would return to the same Serb-dominated state it had been in during the interwar period, but worse for the Croats and other minorities.
Who led the Chetnik movement in the hills of Ravna Gora on the 6th of April 1941?
Colonel Draža Mihailović led the Chetnik movement into the hills of Ravna Gora on the 6th of April 1941. He started with a small group of seven officers and 27 other ranks to form the Ravna Gora Movement. This group became formally known as the Chetnik Detachments of the Yugoslav Army.
What was the Greater Serbia plan proposed by Stevan Moljević in June 1941?
Stevan Moljević wrote a memorandum titled Homogeneous Serbia in June 1941 advocating for a state including 65 to 70 percent of the total Yugoslav territory and population. The plan envisioned the expulsion of 2,675,000 people from Greater Serbia including 1,000,000 Croats and 500,000 Germans. Mihailović endorsed these proposals in a set of detailed instructions dated the 20th of December 1941.
Why did the Chetniks collaborate with Axis forces during World War II?
The Chetniks collaborated with Axis forces following the massacres in Kraljevo and Kragujevac in October 1941 where over 4,500 civilians were killed. Mihailović concluded that killing German troops would result in further unnecessary deaths of tens of thousands of Serbs. This led to a policy of using the enemy and operating as legalized auxiliary forces under Axis control.
How many deaths did the Chetniks cause in Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina?
Estimates of the number of deaths caused by the Chetniks in Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina range from 50,000 to 68,000. More than 5,000 victims are registered in the region of Sandžak alone. About 300 villages and small towns were destroyed along with a large number of mosques and Catholic churches.
When did the Chetniks sign an agreement with the Italian 2nd Army in 1942?
An agreement was concluded on the 11th of January 1942 between the representative of the Italian 2nd Army Captain Angelo De Matteis and the Chetnik representative for southeastern Bosnia Mutimir Petković. This agreement stipulated that the Italians would support Chetnik formations with arms and provisions. In 1942 and 1943 an overwhelming proportion of Chetnik forces in Italian-controlled areas were organized as Italian auxiliary forces.
What happened to the Chetnik movement in early May 1945 during the Bleiburg repatriations?
In early May 1945 Chetnik forces withdrew through Ustaše-held Zagreb and many were later killed by the Partisans as part of the Bleiburg repatriations. Pavle Đurišić had negotiated an agreement with the Ustaše in March 1945 to provide safe conduct for his Chetniks across the Independent State of Croatia. The movement faced a catastrophic collapse with their forces retreating through Ustaše-held territory to Austria and Italy.
The decision to collaborate with Axis forces was driven by a specific calculation of human cost following the massacres in Kraljevo and Kragujevac in October 1941. After German soldiers and Serbian collaborators killed over 4,500 civilians in these two towns, Mihailović concluded that killing German troops would result in further unnecessary deaths of tens of thousands of Serbs. This conviction led him to scale back Chetnik guerrilla attacks and wait for an Allied landing in the Balkans. The movement adopted a policy of using the enemy, engaging in cooperation to one degree or another by establishing a modus vivendi and operating as legalized auxiliary forces under Axis control. This collaboration reached extensive and systematic proportions, with the Chetniks first aligning with the puppet Government of National Salvation in the German-occupied territory of Serbia, then with the Italians in occupied Dalmatia and Montenegro, and later with the Germans directly after the Italian capitulation in September 1943. The Chetniks viewed the Partisans, the Ustasha, the Muslims, the Croats, and lastly the Germans and Italians as their enemies in that order. This strategic shift was not merely a tactical decision but a fundamental reorientation of their war aims, as they prioritized the destruction of their internal enemies over the liberation of their country from foreign occupation.
The Terror of Cleansing
The Chetniks were partners in a pattern of terror and counter-terror that developed in Yugoslavia during World War II, using terror tactics against Croats in areas where Serbs and Croats were intermixed, against the Muslim population in Bosnia, Herzegovina and Sandžak, and against the Communist-led Yugoslav Partisans and their supporters in all areas. These tactics included the killing of civilians, burning of villages, assassinations and destruction of property, and exacerbating existing ethnic tensions between Croats and Serbs. Estimates of the number of deaths caused by the Chetniks in Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina range from 50,000 to 68,000, while more than 5,000 victims are registered in the region of Sandžak alone. About 300 villages and small towns were destroyed, along with a large number of mosques and Catholic churches. The terror against the non-Serb population in the Independent State of Croatia was, at least to an extent, a reaction to the massacres of Serbs carried out by the Ustasha, however the largest Chetnik massacres took place in eastern Bosnia where they preceded any significant Ustasha operations. Several historians regard Chetnik actions during this period as constituting genocide, as they sought to cleanse areas intended to be part of Greater Serbia of non-Serbs regardless, in accordance with Mihailović's directive of the 20th of December 1941.
The Italian and German Alliances
Chetnik collaboration with the occupation forces of fascist Italy took place in three main areas: in Italian-occupied and Italian-annexed Dalmatia; in the Italian puppet state of Montenegro; and in the Italian-annexed and later German-occupied Ljubljana Province in Slovenia. An agreement was concluded on the 11th of January 1942 between the representative of the Italian 2nd Army, Captain Angelo De Matteis, and the Chetnik representative for southeastern Bosnia, Mutimir Petković. This agreement stipulated that the Italians would support Chetnik formations with arms and provisions, and would facilitate the release of recommended individuals from Axis concentration camps. In 1942 and 1943, an overwhelming proportion of Chetnik forces in the Italian-controlled areas of occupied Yugoslavia were organized as Italian auxiliary forces in the form of the Anti-Communist Volunteer Militia. General Giacomo Zanussi, then a Colonel and Roatta's chief of staff, noted that there were 19,000 to 20,000 Chetniks in the Anti-Communist Volunteer Militia in Italian-occupied parts of the Independent State of Croatia alone. The Chetniks were extensively supplied with thousands of rifles, grenades, mortars and artillery pieces. After the Italian capitulation on the 8th of September 1943, the German 114th Jäger Division even incorporated a Chetnik detachment in its advance to retake the Adriatic coast from the Partisans who had temporarily liberated it. The report on German-Chetnik collaboration of the XV Army Corps on the 19th of November 1943 to the 2nd Panzer Army states that the Chetniks were leaning on the German forces for close to a year.
The Partisan Rivalry
The conflict between the Chetniks and the Communist-led Partisans was the defining struggle of the Yugoslav resistance, with the Chetniks eventually focusing their efforts on destroying the Partisans rather than the Axis occupiers. In June 1941, following the start of Operation Barbarossa, the Partisans under Josip Broz Tito organized an uprising, and in the period between June and November 1941, the Chetniks and Partisans largely cooperated in their anti-Axis activities. On the 19th of September 1941, Tito and Mihailović met for the first time in Struganik where Tito offered Mihailović the chief-of-staff post in return for the merger of their units. Mihailović refused to attack the Germans, fearing reprisals, but promised to not attack the Partisans. However, the Partisan-Chetnik truces were repeatedly violated by the Chetniks, first with the killing of a local Partisan commander in October and then later, under orders of Mihailović's staff, massacring 30 Partisan supporters, mostly girls and wounded individuals, in November. On the 2nd of November, Mihailović's Chetniks attacked Partisan headquarters in Užice, losing 1,000 men in these two battles and a large amount of weaponry. The conflict resulted in a near-total Partisan victory, after which the Chetniks were almost entirely incapacitated in the area west of the Drina river. The Partisans continued on, and later again escaped the Germans in the Battle of Sutjeska, while the Allies stopped planning an invasion of the Balkans and finally rescinded their support for the Chetniks and instead supplied the Partisans.
The Final Retreat and Legacy
As the war drew to a close, the Chetnik movement faced a catastrophic collapse, with their forces retreating through Ustaše-held territory to Austria and Italy. In March 1945, Pavle Đurišić negotiated an agreement with the Ustaše and Ustaše-supported Montenegrin separatist, Sekula Drljević, to provide safe conduct for his Chetniks across the Independent State of Croatia. The Ustaše agreed to this, but when the Chetniks failed to follow the agreed-upon withdrawal route, the Ustaše attacked the Chetniks at Lijevče Field, afterward killing the captured commanders. The remaining Chetniks continued to withdraw to Austria with the NDH army and under their military command. In early May 1945, Chetnik forces withdrew through Ustaše-held Zagreb, and many of these were later killed, along with captured Ustaše, by the Partisans as part of the Bleiburg repatriations. The movement's legacy remains one of the most contentious in modern history, with the political scientist Sabrina Ramet observing that both the Chetniks' political program and the extent of their collaboration have been amply, even voluminously, documented. Despite this, people can still be found who believe that the Chetniks were doing anything besides attempting to realize a vision of an ethnically homogeneous Greater Serbian state, which they intended to advance, in the short run, by a policy of collaboration with the Axis forces. The movement's history is a testament to the complexities of war, where ideological purity often clashed with survival, and where the line between resistance and collaboration became increasingly blurred.