Battle of Khanwa

• 1. Introduction

  ›

  On the 16th of March 1527, two of the most formidable military forces in northern India collided at a place called Khanwa, in what is today Rajasthan. On one side stood Babur, founder of the Mughal Empire, the man who had just shattered the Lodi dynasty at the First Battle of Panipat. On the other stood Rana Sanga, ruler of the Kingdom of Mewar, who had assembled a coalition of more than 120 chieftains from across northern India. Historians would later mark Khanwa among the most decisive battles of the Mughal conquest. Yet in the days before the fighting, Babur's own army was close to mutiny, his soldiers terrified of the Rajputs and desperate to retreat to Kabul with whatever loot they had taken. How did a commander on the edge of collapse turn that fear into a military victory? And what happened to the man who came so close to driving the Mughals out of India forever?

• 2. Rivals for the North

  ›

  Babur's path to Khanwa began well before his famous victory at Panipat. Until 1524 his ambitions were focused on Punjab, the territory once held by his ancestor Timur. He had raided Punjab in 1504 and again in 1518. In 1520-21 he captured Bhira and Sialkot, towns known at the time as the twin gateways to Hindustan. The invitation to move deeper into India came in 1523, when Alam Khan Lodi, Daulat Khan Lodi the Governor of Punjab, and Ala-ud-Din, all rivals of the Lodi sultan Ibrahim, urged Babur to invade the Delhi Sultanate. Alam Khan went personally to Babur's court to lay out the political situation. Babur agreed, sending nobles ahead to scout Punjab. But cooperation between the Mughals and the Lodi rebels broke down quickly. Alam Khan demanded Delhi for himself as the price of his invitation; Babur refused, and Alam marched on Delhi alone, where he was defeated. Daulat Khan also turned on Babur, capturing Sialkot with a force of 40,000 men before being defeated at Lahore. That defeat made Babur the undisputed master of Punjab and cleared the road south. Rana Sanga, meanwhile, had built Mewar into one of the strongest powers in the north, and Babur himself listed the Rana among the five great rulers in India, alongside Krishnadevaraya of the Vijayanagar empire.

• 3. The Coalition Against Babur

  ›

  Whether Rana Sanga originally promised to join Babur against Ibrahim Lodi is a question that divides the sources sharply. The Baburnama, Babur's own autobiography, states that Sanga offered help and then withheld it, and Babur accuses him directly of breaching their agreement. Rajput sources tell the opposite story: that it was Babur who approached Sanga first, and that Sanga had no need of Mughal help because Mewar was already prevailing against the Lodi empire. The historian Satish Chandra offers a third reading. Sanga may have expected a long, grinding struggle between Babur and Lodi, after which he could claim the regions he wanted. Or he may have assumed Babur would behave like Timur, seize the treasures of Delhi and Agra, and then withdraw. When it became clear Babur intended to stay, Sanga moved to build the widest possible coalition against him. Mahmud Lodi, the younger son of Sikandar Lodi and the man the remaining Afghans had proclaimed their new sultan, joined the alliance and brought Afghan horsemen with him. Khanzada Hasan Khan Mewati, ruler of Mewat, also added his forces. According to the historian Har Bilas Sarda, Sanga commanded more than 110,000 soldiers in total, including 10,000 men from Mahmud Lodi's contingent. In early 1527 Babur began receiving reports that this vast force was moving toward Agra.

• 4. Fear in the Mughal Camp

  ›

  Before a single major engagement at Khanwa, the Rajputs had already bloodied Babur's advance forces. Babur had sent military detachments to take Dholpur, Gwalior, and Bayana. Sanga responded quickly and defeated the Mughal force at the Battle of Bayana. Gwalior and other positions were also recovered. The 19th-century historian William Erskine recorded that the Mughals found themselves facing a foe more formidable than the Afghans or any of the other peoples they had yet encountered. The Rajputs were willing to die for their honour, Erskine wrote, and would meet the enemy face to face at all times. Babur's own account is even more candid. He writes that the fierceness and valour of the Rajput army made his troops anxious and afraid. Afghan soldiers began deserting. Turkish fighters complained about having to defend a land they hated and pressed Babur to return to Kabul with the rich spoils already taken. Babur records that no manly word or brave counsel was heard from anyone. An astrologer's grim predictions added to the general unease. Facing a crisis of morale, Babur made a calculated public gesture. He renounced wine entirely, broke his own drinking cups, poured out all the camp's liquor stores, and committed his army to total abstinence. He framed the coming battle as a holy war against Hindus. In his autobiography he reflected that it was a really good plan and that it had a favourable propagandistic effect on friend and foe.

• 5. Terrain, Carts, and Cannon

  ›

  Sanga's strategy after capturing Bayana was to move north-east and take Bhusawar, cutting Babur's supply lines from both Delhi and Kabul. With supplies threatened, Babur discussed peace overtures and proposed making Bayana the boundary between their forces. Sanga rejected the offer on the advice of his chiefs. On battle day, Sanga placed his most trusted commanders at the centre and arrayed others on the flanks, planning to throw the bulk of his cavalry at the Mughal line in a frontal assault where the Rajput horsemen were unmatched. Babur planned around exactly that charge. He had inspected the site carefully and, as at Panipat, he constructed a fortified encampment. Carts were fastened together with iron chains rather than the leather straps used at Panipat, and reinforced with mantlets. Gaps between the carts allowed horsemen to charge out at the right moment. To extend the defensive line further, ropes of rawhide were laid over wheeled wooden tripods. Ditches were dug to protect the flanks. Foot-musketeers, falconets, and mortars were positioned behind the carts where they could fire and advance as needed. Behind them stood heavy Turkish cavalry, with two elite mounted units held in reserve for the taulqama, the flanking pincer movement that Babur had used to devastating effect at Panipat.

• 6. The Battle Itself

  ›

  Rana Sanga opened with a traditional frontal charge into the Mughal ranks. The Mughal muskets cut down his cavalry in large numbers, and the noise of the guns panicked the Rajput horses and elephants, causing them to trample their own men. Unable to break the Mughal centre, Sanga ordered attacks on both flanks. The fighting on those flanks lasted three hours. The Mughals fired muskets and arrows into the Rajput ranks while the Rajputs, unable to close the distance against gunfire, could only retaliate in hand-to-hand fighting when they managed to reach the Mughal line. Babur twice attempted his taulqama pincer movement, pushing the Rajputs back on each occasion, but the relentless pressure of Rajput horsemen forced the Mughal flanking units to retreat each time. At a critical point, Silhadi of Raisen defected from Sanga's army to Babur's side. Some historians dispute whether this betrayal actually occurred or was a later invention, but the source text records that Sanga was forced to change his plans and issue new orders because of it. Then the Rana himself was struck by a bullet and lost consciousness. The historian Jadunath Sarkar later described the Rajput position in the centre as hopeless: every bullet found its target in the dense Rajput masses, and they could not advance to close range. With their king unconscious and hidden within a circle of trusted men, a Jhala chieftain named Ajja assumed the Rana's place and led the Rajputs forward. Babur, seeing the Rajput centre weakening, ordered his own offensive. The Mughal push forward killed many Rajput senior commanders. Bodies were found as far away as Bayana, Alwar, and Mewat. Babur, whose own forces had taken very heavy casualties in the long fight, gave up any thought of pursuing the enemy into Mewar.

• 7. Aftermath and Legacy

  ›

  Prithviraj Kachwaha and Maldev Rathore of Marwar carried Rana Sanga from the battlefield while he was still unconscious. When he came round, Sanga swore not to return to Chittor until he had defeated Babur and driven him out of India. As a mark of that vow he stopped wearing a turban, choosing instead to wrap a cloth over his head. He began preparing for another campaign. Before he could fight again, his own nobles poisoned him. He died at Kalpi in January 1528. Babur, following a practice formulated by Timur, ordered a tower of enemy skulls to be built after the battle. Satish Chandra notes that the objective was not only to mark a great victory but to terrorize future opponents; Babur had used the same tactic earlier against the Afghans of Bajaur. The scholar Pradeep Barua later argued that Babur's cannon ended a long era of outdated trends in Indian warfare. Yet the defeat at Khanwa did not erase Rajput power from the north. The vacuum left by Sanga's death was filled by Rao Maldeo Rathore, who took on the role of the leading Rajput king and dominated the decades that followed.